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Physical products, from toasters and lawnmowers, to infant car seats and 
toys, to meat and drugs, are routinely inspected and regulated for safety.  Credit 
products, like mortgage loans and credit cards, on the other hand, are left 
largely unregulated, even though they can also be unsafe.  Because financial 
products are analyzed through a contract paradigm rather than a products 
paradigm, consumers have been left with unsafe credit products.  These dan-
gerous products can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure, 
and, as evidenced by the recent subprime crisis, they can have devastating ef-
fects on communities and on the economy.  In this Article, we use the physical 
products analogy to build a case, supported by both theory and data, for com-
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prehensive safety regulation of consumer credit.  We then examine the present 
state of consumer credit regulation, explaining why the current regulatory re-
gime has systematically failed to provide meaningful safety regulations.  We 
propose a fundamental restructuring of this regime, urging the creation of a 
new federal regulator that will have both the authority and the incentives to po-
lice the safety of consumer credit products. 
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INTRODUCTION
Safety regulation is everywhere.  Toasters, lawnmowers, infant car 
seats, toys, meat, drugs, and many other physical products are rou-
tinely inspected and regulated for safety.  Indeed, regulation of such 
products has become so firmly woven into the marketplace that it is 
headline news when regulators fail to prevent a dangerous product 
from making it into the hands of consumers.  No one asks if such 
items should be regulated; policy discussions center instead on 
whether such regulation is adequate. 
Consumer credit products also pose safety risks for customers.  
Credit cards, subprime mortgages, and payday loans can lead to fi-
nancial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure.  Economic losses can be 
imposed on innocent third parties, including neighbors of foreclosed 
property, and widespread economic instability may affect economic 
growth and job prospects for millions of families that never took on a 
risky financial instrument.  Financial harm is not the same as physical 
harm, but it can be as real and as painful.  Why are consumers pro-
tected from dangerous products and sharp business practices when 
they purchase tangible consumer products, but left at the mercy of 
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their creditors when they sign up for routine financial products like 
mortgages and credit cards?1
The difference between the two markets is regulation.  Although 
the “R-word” is considered an epithet in many circles, regulation sup-
ports a booming market in tangible consumer goods.  Nearly every 
product sold in America has passed basic safety regulations well in ad-
vance of being stocked on store shelves.2  Credit products, by com-
parison, are weakly regulated by a tattered patchwork of federal and 
state laws that have failed to adapt to changing markets.  Thanks to ef-
fective regulation, innovation in the market for physical products has 
1 Our identification of financial consumer products as a subcategory of consumer 
products mirrors the well-known argument about the collapse of the contract-product 
distinction. See generally Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 
(2006) (analyzing boilerplate and fine print language as components and attributes of 
products); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144–51, 155 
(1970) (arguing in favor of recognizing the contract not merely as the result of a proc-
ess, but as part of the product); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment, Unconscionability in 
Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1976) (recommending a legislatively imposed 
measure of unconscionability that looks to a contract’s resultant terms, not merely de-
fects in the contracting process).  The contract-product distinction also has been chal-
lenged in the consumer credit context.  See John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reck-
less Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2007) (proposing a products 
liability approach to financial products).  In this Article we focus on consumer credit 
products, but most of our arguments and conclusions can be extended to other finan-
cial consumer products, including insurance and investment products. 
2 See Robert S. Adler, Redesigning People Versus Redesigning Products:  The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission Addresses Product Misuse, 11 J.L. & POL. 79, 82-83 (1995) 
(chronicling the rise of the regulation of consumer products in reaction to “substantial 
numbers of unreasonably dangerous products circulated in virtually unregulated fash-
ion throughout the country”); FTC, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/ 
brfovrvw.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (reviewing FTC regulatory authority over “un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices” which “cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and 
not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition” (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006)) (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)); U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC Home Page—About Tab, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (“The U.S. Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unrea-
sonable risks of serious injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer 
products under the agency’s jurisdiction. . . . The CPSC’s work to ensure the safety of 
consumer products—such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household 
chemicals—contributed significantly to the 30 percent decline in the rate of deaths 
and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.”); U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, What FDA Regulates, http://www.fda.gov/comments/ 
regs.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (“FDA is the federal agency responsible for ensur-
ing that foods are safe, wholesome and sanitary; human and veterinary drugs, biologi-
cal products, and medical devices are safe and effective; cosmetics are safe; and elec-
tronic products that emit radiation are safe.”). 
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led to greater safety and more consumer-friendly features.  By com-
parison, innovation in financial products has produced incomprehen-
sible terms and sharp practices that hurt consumers and reduce social 
welfare. 
Credit has provided substantial value for millions of households, 
permitting the purchase of homes that help families accumulate 
wealth and cars that can expand job opportunities.  Credit can also 
provide a critical safety net, permitting families to borrow against a 
better tomorrow if they suffer job layoffs, medical problems, or family 
breakups today.  Many financial products are offered on fair terms 
that benefit both seller and customer. 
For a growing number of families that are steered into overpriced 
and misleading credit products, however, credit products benefit only 
the lenders.  For families that get tangled up with truly dangerous fi-
nancial products, the results can be wiped-out savings, lost homes, 
higher costs for car insurance, denial of jobs, troubled marriages, 
bleak retirements, and broken lives.3
3 On the effects of credit card debt, see, for example, RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING 
AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS ch. 15 (2006); 
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE 
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT ch. 4 (2000).  On the effect of predatory lending 
on military personnel, see, for example, DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LEND-
ING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS
39-42 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday/reports/ 
page.jsp?itemID=29862306 [hereinafter DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING],
which recounts select profiles from 3393 case studies of service members trapped in 
high-cost loans—the financial consequences of which were contributing factors to se-
rious military disciplinary actions, including loss of promotion and separation from the 
military, lawsuits, bankruptcy, divorce, and impact upon other financial circumstances, 
such as exorbitant fees, necessitating further loans or home refinancing.  On the effect 
of subprime mortgage products, see, for example, JOINT ECON. COMM., 2007 JOINT 
ECONOMIC REPORT 37-44 [hereinafter JEC REPORT], which concludes that a subprime 
foreclosure results in “loss of a stable living place and significant portion of wealth,” 
“create[s] possible tax liabilities,”  and “reduces the homeowner’s credit rating, creat-
ing barriers to future home purchases and even rentals.”  See also Editorial, Losing
Homes and Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at A20 (noting that “more than 
500,000 . . . subprime borrowers have lost their homes to foreclosures” and that “some 
[of these families] may never recover”).  On the effects of payday loans, see, for exam-
ple, Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, ‘Payday Loans’ Often Snowball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2006, at A1, which asserts that impoverished populations, minorities, and military per-
sonnel are targeted by predatory lending and trapped by payday loans they cannot re-
pay.  On the effects of credit cards, see, for example, Moon Ihlwan, Falling Madly in 
Love With Plastic: Is Korea’s Credit-Card Binge a Disaster Waiting to Happen?, BUS. WK.
(INT’L ED.), May 13, 2002, at 57, depicting students who have resorted to criminal be-
havior to pay off their credit card debt; Clarissa Segovia, Watch Out for the Black Hole of 
Credit Card Debt, ONLINE FORTY-NINER, Aug. 30, 2004, http://www.csulb.edu/~d49er/ 
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In this Article we argue for parity of treatment between ordinary 
physical products and financial products that are sold to consumers.  
Credit products should be thought of as products, like toasters and 
lawnmowers, and their sale should meet minimum safety standards.4
We harness both theory and data to demonstrate that sellers of credit 
products have learned to exploit the lack of information and cognitive 
limitations of consumers in ways that put consumers’ economic secu-
rity at risk, turning them into far more dangerous products than they 
need to be.  We argue that consumers are no better equipped to pro-
tect themselves from many common credit products than they were 
from poorly wired toasters or badly designed lawnmowers that started 
fires or sliced off fingers before the safety of these physical products 
was regulated.  We also argue that the current legal structure, a loose 
amalgam of common law, statutory prohibitions, and regulatory-
agency oversight, is structurally incapable of providing effective pro-
tection.  We propose the creation of a single regulatory body that will 
be responsible for evaluating the safety of consumer credit products 
and policing any features that are designed to trick, trap, or otherwise 
fool the consumers who use them. 
Despite the benefits that it provides, the market for consumer fi-
nancial products suffers from deficiencies that prevent even intense 
competition from maximizing both consumer and social welfare.  
Rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding,5 a careful examination of 
the market for financial products illustrates the need for systemic 
archives/2004/fall/news/volLVno2-debt.shtml, noting that students have committed 
suicide from the pressures of credit card debt.  And on the effects of indebtedness 
generally, see, for example, Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health?  A Pre-
liminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 560, 561 (2002), which surveys studies that sug-
gest a causal link between indebtedness and health problems and concludes that 
“[i]ndebtedness may trigger stress that worsens health, or indebtedness may limit an 
individual’s ability to seek preventative medical care and make health-maximizing 
choices generally.” 
4 This does not mean that the minimum standard should be set by regulation.  For 
example, in some cases regulation that mandates disclosure of product attributes, 
and/or a standardized, government or nongovernment, ranking of product safety will 
induce sellers to offer safe products. 
5 See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics:  Human Errors and Market Corrections,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 128-32 (2006) (arguing that the consumer credit card market 
functions well and that anything more than light-handed regulation would raise con-
sumers’ transaction costs or create anticompetitive harm); Richard A. Epstein, The Neo-
classical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803 (2008) (asserting that 
regulation reduces overall output in the regulated sector and causes spillover eco-
nomic losses outside of the regulated sector). 
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regulation and suggests how such regulation can support optimal 
market functioning. 
Two clarifications are in order:  First, we are not claiming that the 
current regulation of physical products is perfect, or that regulation of 
credit products is completely absent.  Our claim is that regulation of 
physical products is more broadly accepted and more effective than 
the regulation of credit products.  Second, we are not claiming that all 
potentially dangerous physical or credit products should be regulated.  
Regulatory intervention is necessary only when markets are shown to 
fail, as elaborated below. 
Today, consumers can enter the market to buy physical products, 
confident that they will not be deceived into buying exploding toasters 
and other unreasonably dangerous products.  They can concentrate 
their shopping efforts in other directions, helping drive a competitive 
market that keeps costs low and encourages innovation in conven-
ience, durability, functionality, and style.  Consumers entering the 
market to buy financial products should enjoy the same benefits. 
I. THE PROBLEM
A.  The Theory:  Why Markets for Consumer Credit Products Are Failing 
Credit products are a species of contract.  Conceptually, an 
agreement to lend money is no different from any other contract.  In 
the ideal prototype, each party agrees to a certain set of terms, creat-
ing a wealth-enhancing transfer for both sides.  The role of law is thus 
limited—to enforce the parties’ contract, not to meddle with it. 
The freedom-of-contract principle and faith in the value of free 
markets are premised on a number of assumptions, specifically that 
the contracting parties are informed and rational.  In the area of con-
sumer credit products, not only are these assumptions untested, but in 
many cases both theory and evidence suggest they are unrealistic or 
directly contradicted by the available data.6  When those assumptions 
are not reliable, then freedom of contract shifts from a system to en-
hance consumer welfare, and social welfare more generally, to a tool 
used by more sophisticated parties to take consumers’ money without 
giving value in return. 
6 Consumers who are imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational make mis-
takes.  John Campbell has argued that mistakes are “central to the field of household 
finance.”  John Y. Campbell, President, Am. Fin. Ass’n, Household Finance (Jan. 7, 
2006), in 61 J. FIN. 1553, 1554. 
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We focus on the risk associated with using products.  Of course, all 
products carry risks.  A toaster, if not used carefully, can cause serious 
physical harm.  Similarly, a credit card, if not used carefully, can cause 
serious financial harm.  Yet toasters and credit cards are ever present 
despite the risks that they pose.  These products are ubiquitous be-
cause they provide substantial benefits alongside the serious risks.  If 
an informed consumer purchases a toaster after accurately concluding 
that the benefits of the product outweigh the risks, then the transac-
tion is welfare enhancing.7  Moreover, informed rational consumers 
will minimize product risk by taking optimal care.  And a market 
populated by informed rational consumers will force manufacturers 
and issuers to offer a reasonable level of product risk by optimally de-
signing their products.8
The problem, of course, is that consumers are not always perfectly 
informed, and very few consumers are perfectly rational.  When the 
ideals of perfect information and perfect rationality are replaced by 
their real-world counterparts, imperfect information and imperfect 
rationality, the rosy picture of optimally designed products and wel-
fare-maximizing transactions must be redrawn. 
Markets and contracts can be relied upon to maximize welfare 
only when consumers are rational and informed.  If consumers do not 
know what they are buying, markets might not give them what they 
would have bought had they known.  If consumers have no informa-
tion about the risks associated with a specific toaster or do not under-
stand these risks, then manufacturers will not invest in designing and 
producing low-risk toasters.  Why would a manufacturer spend money 
on improving its product if uninformed consumers will not reward the 
manufacturer with a higher price—which, in a competitive market, is 
necessary to cover the higher costs of the better, safer product?9
The same is true for consumer credit products.  It may not be very 
expensive to design and offer a high-quality, welfare-maximizing 
credit card contract.  But the alternative costs of such an optimal con-
tract to the issuer might be substantial.  For example, if consumers 
7 We abstract at this stage from the possibility of negative externalities.  For a dis-
cussion of the negative externalities generated by credit products, see infra Part I.C.2. 
8 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW ch. 3 (1987). 
9 See id. (analyzing cases where consumers know only average risks).  It should be 
emphasized that the social objective, against which the ramifications of imperfect in-
formation are measured, is not the production of zero-risk products.  It will generally 
be socially optimal to bear a positive risk level.  The point is that imperfect information 
will lead to excessive risk. 
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know only the standard interest rate and annual fee associated with a 
specific card, issuers would offer cards with high penalty interest rates 
and fees.  Foregoing these high penalties would impose a substantial 
cost on the issuer.  If the improved contract would not attract more 
business and would not allow the issuer to charge higher nonpenalty 
interest rates and fees, then there would be no reason for an issuer to 
offer a better contract with more reasonable penalties.  Moreover, an 
issuer who offers an efficient contract with lower penalties and higher 
nonpenalty prices will lose business to a competitor who offers an in-
efficient contract with higher penalties and lower nonpenalty prices. 
Imperfect rationality exacerbates these problems.  An uninformed 
yet rational consumer would understand that she is buying a danger-
ous product because she understands that sellers have no incentive to 
invest in making a safer product given consumers’ imperfect informa-
tion.10  But the rational uninformed consumer would at least reach 
the correct decision about whether to purchase the dangerous prod-
uct.  And if she decides to purchase the dangerous product, the ra-
tional consumer will exercise the appropriate level of care.  Not so for 
the imperfectly rational consumer.  The optimistic consumer who un-
derestimates the risks associated with the product might purchase a 
product when the benefits do not outweigh the risks.  Instead, the un-
derestimating consumer would consider purchasing the product 
whenever the benefits outweighed the perceived risks.11  Moreover, this 
imperfectly rational consumer will not take adequate care when using 
the product, thus risking substantial injury. 
The application of these principles in the credit card market, for 
example, illustrates the welfare costs.  An imperfectly rational con-
sumer might underestimate the likelihood of a penalty-triggering 
event.  This consumer, even if she is aware of the high penalties, will 
underestimate the risk associated with high penalties.  Consequently, 
this consumer might obtain a credit card that is not welfare maximiz-
ing for her.  Moreover, she might use this credit card in a way that 
unduly exposes her to the risk that penalties will be imposed. 
All markets suffer from the risk that consumers will be underin-
formed and therefore make judgments that are not welfare enhanc-
ing.  In the market for ordinary consumer products, safety risks—
10 The rational uninformed consumer would understand that the market equilib-
rium features a dangerous product.  Still, if consumers cannot identify the safe seller, 
no sellers would have a reason to try to change this equilibrium.  See id. at 52-53. 
11 Id.
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exploding toasters, lawnmowers that slice off toes, baby toys covered 
with lead paint, infant seats that crumple on impact, and so on—are 
regulated.  Effects that are difficult for consumers to see and evaluate 
in advance of purchase are tested and controlled.  Consumers are 
then free to inform themselves about other, more visible features.  
Sellers also benefit because they are protected from competition from 
high-risk alternatives.12
Consumer credit products are not inherently safer than physical 
products.  Nor are markets for credit products inherently superior to 
markets for physical products in curbing the imperfect information 
and imperfect rationality that might allow safety risks to persist.  In 
fact, as we discuss below, certain features unique to consumer credit 
products render markets for these products especially vulnerable to 
the problems of imperfect information and imperfect rationality.  As 
we develop later in the Article, at least three features of credit prod-
ucts make them particularly dangerous for consumers to use:  (1) the 
complexity of credit products,13 (2) lenders’ ability to change the 
terms of credit products at low cost, simply by printing and mailing a 
new form, and (3) lenders’ ability to apply changes to existing cus-
tomers by sending contract amendments after a customer uses the 
product.  For now, we note that creditors often design dangerous con-
tracts as a strategic response to consumers’ underestimation of the 
risks that these contracts-products entail. 
In the remainder of this Part we explore why credit product mar-
kets fail.  We begin with a description of three forces—learning by 
consumers, information provided by third parties (e.g., Consumer Re-
ports), and information provided by sellers—that work in many mar-
kets to reduce imperfect information and imperfect rationality.14  We 
argue that these forces, while undeniably important, have only limited 
12 See Adler, supra note 2, at 82-83 (describing the creation of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission to regulate safety of consumer goods). 
13 Many physical products are also complex—for example, electronic gadgets.  Yet 
with physical products the benefits are often more complex than the costs.  The prod-
uct may have multiple and complex value-increasing features but a simple, one-
dimensional price.  An exception is complex physical products where different com-
ponents have different probabilities of failure and different costs associated with these 
failures.  Sellers have a strong incentive to educate consumers about complex benefits; 
they have a much weaker incentive to educate consumers about complex costs.  It 
should also be emphasized that complexity is, to some extent, endogenous.  If con-
sumers fail to comprehend the cost of a complex product, sellers will have an incentive 
to produce an inefficiently high level of complexity. 
14 A fourth force is reputation.  Reputation can be viewed as a learning mecha-
nism, and, therefore, we do not treat it separately. 
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power to expose credit risks and to influence the development of safer 
products in the credit marketplace.  We then examine the informed-
minority argument—the claim that a small number of informed, ra-
tional consumers are enough for markets to work well.  According to 
this argument, even if many imperfectly informed and imperfectly ra-
tional consumers remain, the informed minority will drive the market 
to behave as if all consumers were perfectly informed and perfectly ra-
tional and to offer only reasonably safe products.  We explore why de-
tailed recordkeeping about customers and the ability of credit issuers 
to customize their products undercut the impact of the informed-
minority principle in consumer credit markets. 
Finally, we focus attention on an underappreciated category of 
missing information that increases the risk associated with credit 
products:  use-pattern information, meaning information about how 
the consumer will actually use the product.  Use-pattern information 
often receives less attention than product-attribute information be-
cause consumers are assumed to know how they are going to use the 
product, or, at least, they are assumed to anticipate their future use 
more accurately than sellers.  These assumptions, while valid in many 
markets, are invalid in important consumer credit markets.  In these 
markets, counterintuitively, sellers often know more than consumers 
about consumers’ use patterns.  Use-pattern information creates op-
portunities for creditors to tailor their products to match individuals’ 
cognitive errors, thus magnifying consumer risks.  Moreover, consum-
ers’ use-pattern mistakes can be less susceptible to the three mistake-
correction forces described above. 
We discuss below each of these theoretical problems that under-
mine efficiency in the credit products market.  We then turn to the 
data showing how consumers are making consistent, costly errors in 
dealing with dangerous consumer credit products.  We conclude this 
Part with a discussion of the impact of these market failures on the 
harm to consumers and on the externalities imposed on third parties. 
1.  The Limits of Learning 
Imperfect information leads to more dangerous products.  Manu-
facturers of lawnmowers will produce lawnmowers with a higher prob-
ability of causing harm or lawnmowers that cause greater harm in the 
event of an accident.  Similarly, lenders will offer contracts that inflict 
higher financial harm on consumers who suffer a penalty-triggering 
12 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1
financial accident.  Moreover, these contracts might even increase the 
probability of such a financial accident.15
Why do consumers remain uninformed?  If information can 
eliminate dangerous products, why don’t consumers simply invest in 
information acquisition?  Imperfect rationality provides one answer.  
Consumers do not seek to acquire more information because they are 
not aware that they need more information or that more information 
is available for them to acquire.  Put differently, an imperfectly ra-
tional consumer might not be aware of the fact that she is unin-
formed.16  Alternatively, an imperfectly rational consumer might be 
aware that she is uninformed, yet mistakenly believe that the unknown 
information is trivial, irrelevant, or insufficiently important to justify 
the cost of its acquisition.  For example, a consumer who mistakenly 
believes she will never make a late payment on her credit card will not 
even try to learn the penalty fees and interest rates for late payments.17
Or a consumer might know she is imperfectly informed, but she might 
conclude that the information she needs is not available or not avail-
able at a reasonable cost.  For example, given the complexity of the 
average credit card contract and the legalistic language used in this 
contract, even a consumer who would be willing to invest time and ef-
fort to learn the terms of the contract might assume that they are too 
obscure for her to master.  And those consumers who actually invest 
the time and effort to read the contract might not understand it, or, 
even if they understand the terms themselves, these consumers might 
underestimate the risks implied by these terms.18
15 See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2004) (stat-
ing that credit card companies frequently incentivize excessive purchases with “[z]ero 
annual and per-transaction fees, [and] benefits programs”). 
16 See generally Eddie Dekel, Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, Standard State-
Space Models Preclude Unawareness, 66 ECONOMETRICA 159 (1998) (examining “the ex-
tent to which commonly used models [of bounded rationality] need to be modified in 
order to capture unawareness”). 
17 A similar problem arises if the consumer underestimates the likelihood of being 
late rather than dismissing the possibility of being late altogether.  The benefit of 
learning the late fees and rates is proportional to the likelihood of being late.  And the 
perceived benefit of learning the late fees and rates is proportional to the perceived 
likelihood of being late.  The smaller the perceived benefit of becoming informed, the 
smaller the likelihood that this perceived benefit will exceed the cost of becoming in-
formed, and the smaller the likelihood that the consumer will become informed. 
18 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEX-
ITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CON-
SUMERS 46-51 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT] (presenting 
the results of interviews with credit card holders and examining the reasons for the 
confusion exhibited by the cardholders with respect to credit card terms); see also U.S.
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But there is an even simpler answer, one that does not rely on im-
perfect rationality.  Consumers are uninformed because information 
is costly to acquire.19  This is especially true with respect to modern 
consumer credit products.  The standard credit card or mortgage con-
tract has gotten longer and more difficult to read, and comparison 
among such contracts is challenging even for a professional.  More-
over, lenders retain the right to change the contract at will, so that 
even a consumer who understands the initial contract may be re-
quired to invest more and more time to continue to stay abreast of 
multiple changes added to the contract and to compare those changes 
with other available credit products.20
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: CUSTOMIZED MINIMUM PAYMENT DIS-
CLOSURES WOULD PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION TO CONSUMERS, BUT IMPACT COULD 
VARY 26-28 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, CUSTOMIZED DISCLOSURES REPORT] (assessing 
the feasibility and usefulness of providing cardholders with customized information 
about the financial consequences of making minimum payments).  Failure to compre-
hend the implications of available information is the product of imperfect rationality 
and cognitive bias.  Evidence suggests that learning to overcome such biases is imper-
fect, especially in the context of financial decisions.  See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Grif-
fin, Introduction to HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 
1, 5-7 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (suggesting through experimental evidence 
that, while learning is generally effective in minimizing mistakes, biases in relatively 
abstract domains like math and finance are more resilient); Michael Haigh & John 
List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion?  An Experimental Analysis, 60 J.
FIN. 523, 529 (2005) (documenting persistent bias, specifically myopic loss aversion, 
even among financial professionals who have ample opportunity to learn); Keith 
Stanovich, The Fundamental Computational Biases of Human Cognition:  Heuristics that 
(Sometimes) Impair Decision Making and Problem Solving, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROBLEM 
SOLVING 291 (J.E. Davidson & R.J. Sternberg eds., 2003) (same); Sumit Agarwal et al., 
The Age of Reason:  Financial Decisions over the Lifecycle (MIT Dep’t of Econ., Working Pa-
per No. 07-11, Feb. 11, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790 [hereinaf-
ter Agarwal et al., Age of Reason](same); Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose 
the Right Credit Contracts? 4, 11 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=843826 [hereinafter Agarwal et al., Credit Contracts] (re-
porting that, even given a relatively simple choice between two credit card contracts, 
consumers often make suboptimal decisions). 
19 For example, Kornhauser states that “[d]issemination and acquisition of infor-
mation, which play important roles in the setting of prices, involve costs.  Imperfec-
tions arise from rational agents economizing on these costs.”  Kornhauser, supra note 
1, at 1156.  Of course, this costliness applies to information that affects quality as well 
as price. 
20 See GAO, CUSTOMIZED DISCLOSURES REPORT, supra note 18, at 14-15 (evaluating 
the possibility of providing consumers with standardized and customized “minimum 
payment estimates”); GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 33, 36-48 
(identifying reasons for consumers’ failure to understand credit card disclosures).  
And again imperfect rationality exacerbates the problem.  An imperfectly rational con-
sumer might underestimate the likelihood and impact of a midstream change in the 
contract, and thus fail to acquire information about such changes. 
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The cost of becoming informed might not be prohibitive if it were 
distributed across all consumers.  Many consumers buy the very same 
lawnmower.  Similarly, credit card and mortgage contracts are stan-
dard form contracts, offered virtually unchanged to many consumers.  
If each and every consumer must invest independently in learning 
about the product, the cost of acquiring the necessary information 
might exceed the benefit of the information to the individual con-
sumer.  If, however, the information could be learned once and be 
disseminated to all consumers, the aggregate benefit would surely ex-
ceed the cost. 
The public-good nature of information might generate a collec-
tive-action problem that prevents consumers from becoming in-
formed.  Individual consumers may reason as follows:  If all other con-
sumers are informed, then dangerous products will not be offered, 
and I have no reason to invest in acquiring information about the 
dangerousness of the product.  Conversely, if all other consumers are 
not informed, then only dangerous products will be offered.  A single 
informed consumer will not affect market dynamics.  Thus, there is no 
reason to invest in acquiring information about the dangerousness of 
the product.21  The conclusion is abrupt:  individual consumers have 
insufficient incentives to invest in acquiring information. 
This does not mean that learning is entirely absent.  Some errors 
can be quite instructive.  A consumer who is initially unaware of a cur-
rency-conversion fee on her credit card will learn about this fee after 
returning from a vacation abroad and receiving the credit card bill.  
Other errors are much less informative, as the data on fee/interest 
choices show.  Our point is not that learning never occurs; rather it is 
that the learning is imperfect and that the remaining errors impose 
substantial welfare costs. 
2.  Why Getting Smarter Collectively Does Not Work 
In the case of physical products, the collective action problem is 
partially solved by publications such as Consumer Reports. Consumer Re-
ports invests in information acquisition and sells that information to 
21 To be sure, knowledge about dangerousness is useful in deciding whether to 
buy the product, even if this knowledge will have no effect on the quality of the prod-
uct.  But consumers already know that the product is dangerous.  The fact that con-
sumers are uninformed means that they cannot identify and reward with a higher price 
a seller/lender who offers a safe product.  A rational consumer, even if uninformed, 
realizes that the market equilibrium will feature dangerous products. 
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individual consumers.  Consumer Reports buys competing products, 
runs tests, and publishes reports.  It compiles this information in ways 
that facilitate comparison shopping, thus supporting the efficient op-
eration of the market. 
Consumer Reports saves consumers the cost of collecting and com-
piling information, but it cannot completely eliminate the cost of be-
coming informed.  Each consumer must still subscribe to and read the 
report in Consumer Reports, and she must remember it when shopping.  
As Consumer Reports covers more products and as the report on each 
covered product becomes more detailed and informative, the cost of 
reading the report increases for each consumer.  Even in the age of 
the Internet and when digital search further reduces the cost of read-
ing, a relatively small proportion of consumers regularly consult Con-
sumer Reports or its equivalents.22  Because the cost of becoming in-
formed is not completely eliminated, the collective action problem 
persists.23  Similarly, consumers’ imperfect rationality imposes limits 
on the effectiveness of the protection Consumer Reports can offer.24
The nature of financial products further limits the effectiveness of 
Consumer Reports, or any similar organization, to inform consumers 
and correct market imperfections.  Because of the complexity and 
multiplicity of the products, Consumer Reports must invest substantial 
resources in collecting and compiling the necessary information 
about credit products.  By comparison with physical products like the 
lawnmower, credit products often come in many more shapes and 
sizes.  Compare, for example, the number of lawnmowers Consumer 
22 “Consumer Reports magazine . . . has about 4 million subscribers.”  ConsumerRe-
ports.org—Our Mission, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/mission/ 
overview/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
23 Each consumer reasons that if all other consumers read Consumer Reports she 
does not need to read it herself, because only safe products will be offered on the mar-
ket.  And if all other consumers do not read Consumer Reports, only dangerous products 
will be offered regardless of whether she reads Consumer Reports or not.  Since all con-
sumers reason in a similar fashion, the incentive to read Consumer Reports is inade-
quately low.
24 An imperfectly rational consumer might find it difficult to process the informa-
tion provided by Consumer Reports and to use this information when deciding which 
product to buy.  Specifically, evidence suggests that the average consumer considers 
only a handful of attributes when deciding which product to buy.  Even if a consumer 
reads the detailed report provided by Consumer Reports, she is likely to internalize only a 
small portion of the information summarized in the report.  In addition, as noted 
above, optimism can lead consumers to underestimate product risks, or to underesti-
mate their own exposure to product risks.  Such optimism would reduce a consumer’s 
incentive to read Consumer Reports.
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Reports evaluated in its most recent report on yard equipment (36)25
with the number of different credit cards offered by a single issuer 
(Bank of America, for instance, offers over 400 different cards on its 
website).26  Multiply the number of cards by the ten largest issuers and 
add in the cards offered by the next two hundred issuers and the 
scope of the rating task becomes clearer.  This is not to say that there 
are no complex physical products:  automobiles, personal computers, 
and other electronic gadgets suffer from similar complexity and mul-
tiplicity problems.  But consumer credit products are surely among 
the more complex, multidimensional products in the marketplace. 
Second, as compared to physical products, credit products can 
more easily be changed, further increasing the cost of information 
collection.  To change a lawnmower, the manufacturer needs to re-
design an assembly line.  To change a credit card product, the issuer 
need only print out a new piece of paper.  Moreover, a lawnmower 
cannot be changed after it has been delivered to the consumer.  A 
credit card, on the other hand, can be readily changed, even when it 
is already in the consumer’s wallet, simply by sending out a mailing 
that alters the terms of the agreement.  The ease of product change 
would require constant vigilance on the part of Consumer Reports—and 
on the part of the consumers who relied on Consumer Reports’ help. 
Finally, credit card issuers are not required to treat all customers 
alike, further complicating the benefits of collective evaluation.  For 
example, three people might hold the same card on June 1, but by 
July 1, one might continue to hold the same card, one might hold a 
card with a few more onerous terms, and one might hold a card with 
substantially more onerous terms.  The identifying logos on the card 
and the name of the affinity program might remain the same, even as 
the terms applicable to each customer differ dramatically.  In such a 
case, evaluation of the initial contracts by Consumer Reports would not 
only be inadequate, it would be affirmatively misleading.  Continuous 
evaluation on a consumer-by-consumer basis of the different changes 
that each card undergoes would entail prohibitive costs.27
25 Lawn Mowers:  More Make the Cut, CONSUMER REP., May 2006, at 38. 
26 Bank of America, Credit Cards Overview, http://www.bankofamerica.com/ 
creditcards/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
27 In theory, the problem of midstream changes can be curbed if Consumer Reports
rates issuers according to the number and reasonableness of their mid-stream changes.  
In practice, however, such rating would entail substantial cost, since Consumer Reports
would have to survey credit card customers with annoying frequency and rely on both 
their understanding of the changes that had been imposed and their willingness to 
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The purchase of a lawnmower and the decision to use a credit 
card face yet another difference:  if the customer decides the lawn-
mower has become unsafe, she can stop using it.  The grass may grow, 
but she does not have to take on newly appreciated risks.  For a cus-
tomer who has made purchases on the credit card with the plan of 
paying over the next two years, however, such an option may not exist.  
She may stop using the card for new purchases, but the outstanding 
debt balance will subject her to the new terms even if she sees them as 
now unacceptably risky.  The only credit card users who will have the 
option to avoid risky changes in the terms of their cards will be those 
who carry no credit balances or who have adequate savings or other 
credit options so that they can pay off any balance in full.  The major-
ity of credit card users carry a balance,28 and many, especially lower-
income consumers, cannot pay off their credit card balances in re-
sponse to a midstream change of terms. 
Consumer Reports may help level the information playing field with 
many manufactured products, but the nature of credit products limits 
its effectiveness in this sphere.  Given the complexity, fluidity, and di-
versity of credit products, Consumer Reports is largely confined to gen-
eral education articles (“Watch Out for These Ten Scams”).29  This is, 
of course, a useful undertaking, but it hardly corrects widespread 
market imperfections. 
3.  Why Sellers Do Not Educate Consumers 
Mistake-correction efforts by sellers can sometimes minimize im-
perfect information and imperfect rationality in consumer markets.  
Consider the following, arguably common, scenario:  Seller A offers a 
product that is better and costs more to produce than the product of-
fered by seller B.  Consumers, however, underestimate the added 
value from seller A’s product and thus refuse to pay the higher price 
that seller A charges.  In this scenario, seller A has a powerful incen-
reveal such changes.  The large number of different credit card contracts further in-
creases the cost of maintaining such a rating.  The considered rating system would be-
come feasible if issuers—forced by regulation or motivated by reputational concerns—
publicly disclosed all midstream changes. 
28 See Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in 
U.S. Family Finances:  Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED.
RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at A1, A30 (“From 2001 to 2004, the proportion of families 
carrying a balance rose 1.8 percentage points, to 46.2 percent.”). 
29 See Credit Cards:  They Really Are Out to Get You, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 2005, at 12 
(detailing how credit cards have “become much more treacherous for consumers”). 
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tive to educate consumers about her product—to correct their under-
estimation of the product’s value. 
But if both seller A and seller B and many other sellers offer iden-
tical products or offer different products that share a certain product 
risk, the incentives change.  If seller A reduces this risk and invests in 
educating consumers about the benefits of her superior product, then 
seller A will attract a lot of business and make a supracompetitive 
profit.  But this is not an equilibrium.  After seller A invests in con-
sumer education, all the other sellers will free-ride on seller A’s ef-
forts.  They will similarly reduce the product risk and compete away 
the profit that seller A would have made.  Anticipating such a re-
sponse, seller A will realize that she will not be able to recoup her in-
vestment.  Seller A will thus be less likely to improve the safety of her 
product, and instead will continue to offer a higher-risk product.  This 
collective-action problem can lead to the persistence of consumer 
misperception.30  For example, if Citibank wanted to issue credit cards 
without a universal-default clause, it would have to invest resources in 
correcting consumers’ underestimation of how much universal default 
costs them.  If Citibank was successful in convincing consumers that 
they should look for cards without universal default, then other issuers 
will also offer such cards, quickly competing away any potential return 
on Citibank’s consumer-education investment. 
To be sure, sellers of physical products face the risk that, if they 
invest in educating the public about the benefits of innovations they 
offer, their competitors will imitate these innovations and capture a 
portion of the benefits of that education at little or no cost.  But once 
30 See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491, 527 (1981) (explaining why sellers might not disclose both positive and 
negative information); see also Campbell, supra note 6, at 1586-88 (describing the limits 
of competition, specifically the collective-action problem that prevents sellers from 
educating consumers, in the mortgage market); R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My 
Brother’s Keeper:  The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 635, 659 (1996) (explaining that free riding disincentivizes information 
sharing); Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168, 173 (2002) (applying the general argument in Beales et al., 
supra, in the consumer credit context).  In some markets the first-mover advantage will 
be large enough to overcome the collective-action problem.  For a general discussion 
of information failures in consumer markets, see Beales et al., supra, at 503-509.  On 
the limits of advertising as a mistake-correction mechanism, see also Xavier Gabaix & 
David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Com-
petitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 512-21 (2006); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rational-
ity, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1242-43 
(2003).
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again, the ease with which credit contracts can be altered exacerbates 
this problem.  While the manufacturer of a physical product might 
count on the fact that it would take months or even years for a com-
petitor to redesign a product to include the innovation, another 
credit issuer could adopt a new practice in a matter of weeks.31  More-
over, innovators of physical products have the chance to protect their 
innovations through patents, while no such options are available to 
those whose products are credit.32
Finally, sellers of physical products can often point to a specific, 
easy-to-understand feature that improves safety—for example, an 
automatic braking system, a child-proof lid, etc.  Because many fea-
tures of financial products are exceedingly complex, it would be diffi-
cult both to inform future customers about the feature and to alert 
them to its presence elsewhere.  If, for example, Citibank dropped 
double-cycle billing, it would face a very difficult time explaining to 
consumers what the change meant and, because billing practices are 
often not even listed in the printed credit card contract, an even 
tougher time encouraging consumers to avoid products that involve 
double-cycle billing. 
Sellers of financial products sometimes provide information to 
consumers and even help consumers process this information.  For 
example, the websites of credit card issuers provide assistance in 
choosing among the many different cards offered through the web-
site.  The consumer need only enter her credit rating, preferences, 
and anticipated use-patterns and the website will recommend the ap-
propriate card.33  These card-selection algorithms are helpful, but they 
31 And the credit issuer would be able to apply the new practice to both existing 
and new customers, while the manufacturer of a physical product would typically apply 
the new design only to new customers. 
32 Even apart from this collective action problem, sellers might prefer not to cor-
rect consumer mistakes and might even invest in creating misperception.  Arguably, 
manipulation of consumer perceptions, and even preferences, is a main purpose of 
advertising:.  See Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 
409-411 (2004) (“Markets do not eliminate (and often exacerbate) irrationality . . . . 
The advertising industry is the most important economic example of these systematic 
attempts to mislead, where suppliers attempt to convince buyers that their products 
will yield remarkable benefits . . . . It is certainly not true that competition ensures that 
false beliefs will be dissipated.  Indeed in many cases competition will work to increase 
the supply of these falsehoods.”).  In a later piece, however, Glaeser argues that gov-
ernment decision makers have weaker incentives than consumers to overcome errors, 
and thus intervention in markets might make things worse.  Edward L. Glaeser, Pater-
nalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 144 (2006). 
33 See, e.g., Capital One Credit Cards:  Find the Card for You or Build Your Own 
Credit Card, http://www.capitalone.com/creditcards/; Citi Credit Cards, Find the Per-
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are not designed to eliminate consumer errors.  First, consumers 
might not have accurate information, for example, on their future use 
patterns, to enter into the card-selection algorithm.  Second, it is not 
clear that the algorithm will recommend the card that is best for the 
consumer, rather than the card that is best for the issuer.  Third, cer-
tain undesirable product features, for example, double-cycle billing, 
may be common to all of the many cards offered by the issuer.  In 
such cases, the card-selection algorithm will not steer the consumer 
toward a better product.  More generally, when a product dimension, 
for example, interest rates or rewards programs, becomes salient to 
consumers, competition will focus on this dimension.  Sellers will in-
form consumers about how attractive their products are on the salient 
dimension, and card-selection algorithms will emphasize the salient 
dimension.  The problem is that not all dimensions are salient to con-
sumers.  And for the nonsalient dimensions, such as double-cycle bill-
ing, sellers have much weaker incentives to inform consumers.34
Indeed, there is some evidence that creditors are not able to in-
form consumers about safer products.  The example of Citibank is in-
structive.  In the wake of complaints by consumer groups, investiga-
tions by Congress, and significant press coverage, Citi announced that 
it would stop two of the most dangerous consumer practices associ-
ated with credit cards:  universal default and any-time interest rate 
changes.  The company made a large public show of the decision, re-
ceiving substantial praise in Congress and elsewhere.  Within two 
years, Citi announced that it was reinstituting universal default.  John 
P. Carey, the chief administrative officer for Citigroup’s credit card 
unit explained, “[w]e hoped and expected that these two points of 
differentiation would lead customers to vote with their feet. . . . We 
have been disappointed with the results we have seen so far.”35  When 
the largest credit card issuer in the country has given the most public 
launch of a safety feature and it is nonetheless unable to explain to 
consumers why they should choose this safer card, the limits of credi-
tor education become clear. 
fect Credit Card, https://www.citicards.com (offering selection boxes for “general con-
sumer,” “small business owner,” and “college student,” as well as various features, such 
as rewards and interest rate promotions). 
34 Salience is, to some extent, endogenous.  Sellers could make a nonsalient at-
tribute salient.  But often there will be little incentive for them to do so.  See Gabaix & 
Laibson, supra note 30, at 517-20. 
35 Eric Dash, Citigroup Considers Repealing a Pledge, and the Slogan with It, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2008, at C4 (quoting John P. Carey, Chief Admin. Officer, Citibank Credit 
Card Unit). 
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4.  Why the Informed Minority Does Not Drive the Market 
Many consumers are uninformed and irrational.  This is true for 
both credit products and physical products.36  Still, most markets work 
reasonably well.  Why?  The answer is that, in most markets, relatively 
few informed, rational consumers can wield enough influence to en-
sure the efficient operation of the market.  Under certain reasonable 
conditions sellers will offer safe products to attract those few informed 
consumers, and the uninformed majority will benefit.37
The informed minority wields less power in the market for con-
sumer credit products for two reasons.  First, it is not clear that in-
formed consumers will constitute a sufficiently large number to drive 
the market.  A recent survey study conducted by the Auriemma Con-
sulting Group found that “only a third of consumers applying for a 
36 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that 
many AT&T customers who received a new service contract with their monthly bill 
failed to skim or even look at the new contract, even when it was labeled as important 
information), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Allan v. Snow 
Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing relief to a party 
to an adhesion contract where the provision in question was clear but the party failed 
to read it); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 993 (Colo. 1986) (recounting the tes-
timony of an automobile rental agent that she “had never observed any of her custom-
ers reading the reverse side of the [rental] agreement,” which contained provisions 
limiting the company’s liability); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) (“The 
ordinary consumer goods purchaser more often than not does not read the fine 
print . . . .”); Holiday of Plainview, Ltd. v. Bernstein, 350 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (N.Y. Dist. 
Ct. 1973) (“[I]t is true that defendant (as have many before him and probably many 
will after him) failed to read the entire contract . . . .”); Elliot Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quig-
ley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977) (“It is common knowledge, and so should have been 
known to [the car leasing company], that the detailed provisions of insurance con-
tracts are seldom read by consumers.”); Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 
648, 652 (Vt. 1987) (finding that an average consumer would not understand the nu-
merous exceptions to the limitation on liability for damage to the rental car); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979) (“A party who makes regular 
use of a standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to 
understand or even to read the standard terms. . . . Customers do not in fact ordinarily 
understand or even read the standard terms.”). 
37 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract 
Terms:  The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1450 (1983) 
[hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information] (“[F]irms probably cannot distin-
guish the consumers who read from those who did not,” so “if enough shoppers ex-
ist . . . [,] that the nonshoppers do not read is irrelevant; they benefit from the shop-
pers’ efforts.”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 637-38 
(1979); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect Information, 52 
REV. ECON. STUD. 251, 251-52 (1985). 
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new credit card do so after researching the cards available to them.”38
The study also found that “[n]early half of applicants apply for a new 
credit card spontaneously, with no prior thought given to obtaining 
an additional card.”39  With a large, uninformed customer base, the 
market may feel little disciplinary effect from informed consumers. 
Second, the informed-minority argument relies on sellers’ inabil-
ity to discriminate between the informed minority and the unin-
formed majority.  But if a seller can offer two products—a better 
product to informed consumers and a shoddier one to uninformed 
consumers—then the benefits that uninformed consumers would en-
joy when a critical mass of informed consumers exist in a market dis-
appear.  In the consumer credit market, sellers have substantial in-
formation about each and every consumer and the capacity to tailor 
products to each customer.  Accordingly, the no-discrimination as-
sumption is unrealistic.  In these markets, informed consumers may 
get safer products, but there is no reason for that benefit to carry over 
to the uninformed consumers. 
An example of the latter form of discrimination surfaced during 
Congressional hearings years ago.  Then-Representative (now-
Senator) Bernie Sanders of Vermont told the story of a credit card is-
suer that raised every customer’s interest rate by 2%.  The rate in-
crease was not tied to changes in the cost of funds or any difference in 
the customers’ ability to repay.  Instead, the increase was across the 
board.  When a handful of customers called to complain, the com-
pany immediately apologized and rescinded the increase.40  For every-
one else—those who were not sophisticated enough to call—the in-
crease stuck.41
38 Card Applications, May 16, 2007, http://www.cardweb.com/cardflash/2007/ 
05/16/card-applications. 
39 Id.
40 A similar phenomenon concerns the selective waiving of fees, specifically late 
and overlimit fees, for customers who call to complain while leaving such fees in place 
for those who do not know this will work. 
41 Warranties are another common solution to the problem of uninformed con-
sumers.  In markets from automobiles to electrical appliances and computers, seller 
warranties protect customers against safety defects.  But in the financial-products mar-
ket, such warranties make less sense.  Several difficulties—from defining the financial 
benchmark for measuring harm, through proving causation, to diluting consumers’ 
incentives—explain why financial products do not come with warranties.  These diffi-
culties may also explain why credit-products liability is not recognized.  John Pottow 
has recently argued that reckless lending should give rise to a cause of action in tort or, 
at least, should preclude reckless lenders from recovering in bankruptcy.  Pottow, supra
note 1, at 420-21.  Pottow discusses the shortcomings of a warranty or liability solution, 
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5.  Who Knows the Most About Me? 
The relative dangerousness of credit products turns on another 
aspect of imperfect information:  how an individual consumer will use 
the product.  If a customer misestimates her own use patterns, such as 
the likelihood that she will go over her credit limit or be unable to 
make a payment because of an income shock, then she will select the 
wrong card and use it in the wrong way.  Consumers can always make 
errors about how they might use any product, but the complexity of 
credit products and the number of exogenous factors, such as jobs, 
medical problems, and family breakups, make them particularly sub-
ject to this form of misestimation.42  Moreover, while use patterns are, 
of course, relevant to both physical products and credit products, 
payments from buyer to seller are usually independent of use patterns 
for physical products and very much dependent on use patterns for 
credit products, and specifically for credit cards. 
The impact of misestimation of the customer’s own use is com-
pounded in the credit market by the lender’s superior ability to de-
velop fairly accurate estimates of the consumer’s future use.  Sellers 
collect voluminous statistics about use patterns.  Details of every trans-
action—the place, time, amount, merchant—are carefully recorded 
and preserved.  The data are then combined with information about 
each customer—name, credit score, address, zip code, payment times, 
payment places, payment amounts, and so on.  For issuers with multi-
ple relationships with the debtor—home mortgage lender, credit  
card issuer, checking account bank, car lender, etc.—the opportuni-
ties to collect data multiply.  These data can then be categorized by 
demographic or geographic groups, creating powerful prediction 
but argues that these shortcomings are not critical.  Id. at 441-51; see also Vern Coun-
tryman, Improvident Credit Extension:  A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1, 17-
18 (1975) (proposing that, “at a minimum, debtors should be allowed to assert the im-
providence of a credit extension as a defense to repayment,” and, to a lesser extent, 
that the debtor and his other creditors should be entitled to recover from the improvi-
dent credit extender for any damages they can prove); Adam Goldstein, Note, Why “It 
Pays” to “Leave Home Without It”:  Examining the Legal Culpability of Credit Card Issuers Un-
der Tort Principles of Products Liability, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 856-58 (proposing that 
credit card companies be exposed to product liability based upon their “defective” 
products). 
42 For example, optimism about self-control and about the likelihood of adverse 
contingencies that could lead to borrowing will cause a consumer to underestimate 
future borrowing.  The cost of borrowing—including interest rates, fees, and the risk 
of financial distress—would thus receive inadequate weight in the consumer’s choice 
of a credit card.  See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1401. 
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models for others in similar groups.  Or the data can be mined to cre-
ate individual debtor profiles that expose particular consumer weak-
nesses.  Based on past history and a few demographic characteristics, 
an issuer can generate an accurate estimate of the probability that a 
particular consumer will trigger a penalty—an estimate that is often 
more accurate than the consumer’s own estimate of the same prob-
ability.  As Duncan McDonald, former general counsel of Citigroup’s 
Europe and North America card businesses, noted: 
 No other industry in the world knows consumers and their transac-
tion behavior better than the bank card industry.  It has turned the 
analysis of consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA . . . . 
 The mathematics of virtually everything consumers do is stored, up-
dated, categorized, churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from 
every possible angle in hundreds of the most powerful computers and by 
among the most creative minds anywhere.  In the past 10 years alone, 
the transactions of 200 million Americans have been reviewed in trillions 
of different ways to minimize bank card risks.
43
Variations in use, and in lenders’ possession of detailed use-pattern 
information, provide an opportunity for some lenders to customize 
their products to exploit consumer error to its fullest, far more than 
would be possible with physical products. 
The importance of use-pattern information also affects the effi-
cacy of the mistake-correction forces described above.  With a stan-
dardized product (or feature), a consumer who discovers a certain 
hidden feature or unusual risk associated with the product can share 
this information with family and friends.  Since the information per-
tains to a standardized product (or feature), its relevance to others is 
immediately clear.  But interpersonal learning is less effective with re-
spect to nonstandardized products or attributes.  With a nonstandard-
ized product, the information obtained by one consumer might not 
be relevant to another consumer who purchased a different version of 
the nonstandard good. 
When the nature of the product is more broadly defined to in-
clude different potential use patterns, then the degree of standardiza-
tion shrinks.  Even an otherwise standardized product is nonstandard-
ized with respect to use patterns, when different consumers use the 
product in different ways.  This difference can inhibit learning of use-
pattern information.  After using a credit card for some time, a con-
43 Duncan A. MacDonald, Card Industry Questions Congress Needs to Ask, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 23, 2007, at 10. 
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sumer will obtain valuable use-pattern information, for example, on 
revolving patterns, on repayment patterns, and on the likelihood of 
late payment.  But this information, while valuable to this specific con-
sumer, is likely to be of little value to another consumer who will use 
the same card differently. 
Third parties are also less effective in curing market imperfections 
whenever use-pattern variations are present.  Consumer Reports can 
read several credit card contracts to evaluate their relative safety.  Con-
sumer Reports cannot interview each cardholder to learn about revolv-
ing balances, repayment rates, and late payments.  Consumer Reports
could interview a sample of cardholders and provide average use-
pattern information, but the value of such information diminishes as 
heterogeneity among consumers rises.  Similarly, expert advice44—for 
example, how to evaluate credit cards or what kind of mortgage to 
buy—suffers from the same problem of matching the advice with a 
consumer’s particular pattern of use.45
44 Consumers, recognizing their imperfect rationality and the imperfection of the 
information at their disposal, take steps to limit the mistakes that they make.  In par-
ticular, consumers seek advice and consult experts before entering the market.  See, 
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355,
361-62 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).  While clearly effective in 
many contexts, this indirect form of learning is also limited.  Consumers do not seek 
advice before each and every purchase or use decision.  When faced with a big deci-
sion, consumers are more likely to take the time and incur the cost of seeking expert 
advice.  They are less likely to do so when faced with a smaller decision.  For example, 
consumers are more likely to seek third-party assistance before taking on a substantial 
home equity loan.  They are less likely to engage in substantial consultations before 
deciding to buy sneakers with their credit card.  In many markets, consumers make 
many small decisions rather than a few large decisions.  In these markets, reliance on 
expert advice is probably rare.  To the extent that product-use decisions are smaller 
decisions, mistakes in product use are less likely to be cured by advice and consultation 
than mistakes in product purchasing.  Use-pattern mistakes affecting product-choice 
decisions are also less likely to be cured by advice and consultation.  Experts and other 
advice-providers can assist the consumer by providing product-attribute information 
and by offering more sophisticated analysis of this information.  Third-party advisers, 
however, generally do not have superior information about the consumer’s wants and 
needs—an important determinant of anticipated product use.  Evidence suggests that 
a substantial number of consumers do not seek advice before making financial deci-
sions. See Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Fuzzy Math and Household Finance:  Theory 
and Evidence 59, tbl. 8 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-41, Nov. 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081633 (finding that approximately half of the 
households in the data sought advice, but over 30% of households with above-average 
bias levels did not seek advice; the bias that this study focuses on is underestimation of 
exponential growth, which leads to underestimation of the cost of short-term borrow-
ing and of the return to long-term saving). 
45 The importance of use-pattern information also limits mistake correction by 
sellers and thus inhibits competition.  Use-pattern information is available only to con-
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B.  The Evidence:  Markets for Consumer Credit Products Are Failing 
The preceding section argued that, in theory, credit product mar-
kets are likely to be affected by problems of imperfect information 
and imperfect rationality that can cause these markets to fail.  In this 
section, we survey the empirical evidence and argue that imperfect in-
formation and imperfect rationality are serious problems in many 
credit product markets.46
The evidence summarized below falls into three categories.  The 
first includes survey evidence that attempts to assess directly the extent 
of consumer information by questioning consumers about credit.  
This methodology is obviously limited, but it nevertheless provides 
valuable insight.  The second category of evidence, which we find 
more persuasive, indirectly assesses the limits on consumer informa-
tion and rationality by measuring the behavioral effects of such limits.  
The central idea is that consumers make systematic mistakes in their 
choice of credit products and in their use of these products.  These 
observed mistakes indicate the existence of deficits in either informa-
sumers themselves and to sellers.  Many consumers do not collect, compile and retain 
the necessary information.  Sellers do, but only after serving the specific consumer for 
a sufficiently long period of time.  Because the main reason for sellers to educate con-
sumers is to get their business, the result is a catch-22.  The consumer’s current pro-
vider has no incentive to educate the consumer, while the competitor, who has every 
incentive to educate the consumer, does not have the necessary information.  The 
power of the informed-minority argument also diminishes as use-pattern information 
becomes more important.  The informed-minority argument presumes that the miss-
ing information is equally relevant to all consumers—informed and uninformed.  This 
assumption is necessary if the informed minority is to exert market pressure that will 
protect the uninformed majority.  But individual use information can be relevant only 
to the individual consumer.  An informed consumer who recognizes that he is prone 
to forgetfulness might avoid credit cards with high late fees.  The theory of the in-
formed minority posits that if enough consumers shun cards with high late fees, such 
terms will disappear from the market.  But an informed consumer who possesses this 
use-pattern information, rather than switching cards, may choose to change use pat-
terns.  For example, that consumer may employ reminders or enter an automatic pay-
ment program to avoid paying a late fee.  These steps will not help the uninformed 
consumer, who will continue paying late fees. 
46 Regulators are obviously concerned with consumer mistakes in credit product 
markets, as evidenced by their attempts to educate consumers.  For example, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (FRB) posts numerous Consumer Information Brochures on its 
website.  Fed. Reserve Bd., Consumer Information Brochures, http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/pubs/brochure.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008); see also, Bd. of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Interest-Only Mortgage Payments and Payment-Option 
ARMs—Are They for You? 2-11 (Nov. 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
mortgage_interestonly/mortgage_interestonly.pdf (discussing costs and benefits and 
comparing several similar mortgages with differing interest-rate structures). 
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tion or rationality—or both.  Finally, perhaps the best evidence of 
consumers’ lack of information or their systematic irrationality is in 
the credit products themselves, which are carefully designed to exploit 
any such problems.  Accordingly, the observed product designs may 
prove the prevalence of information and rationality deficits. 
1.  Survey Evidence 
Starting with the direct survey evidence:  a recent study by the 
Center for American Progress and the Center for Responsible Lend-
ing found that 38% of consumers believe that “[m]ost financial prod-
ucts such as mortgage loans and credit cards are too complicated and 
lengthy for [them] to fully understand.”47  Consumers who have dealt 
with credit products describe the language that forms the basis of 
their agreements with lenders as too complex to comprehend. 
The experts confirm the consumers’ intuition.  A 2006 study by 
the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found 
that “many [credit card holders] failed to understand key terms or 
conditions that could affect their cost, including when they would be 
charged for late payments or what actions could cause issuers to raise 
rates.”48  Moreover the GAO found that “the disclosures in the cus-
tomer solicitation materials and cardmember agreements provided by 
four of the largest credit card issuers were too complicated for many 
consumers to understand.”49
47 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ET AL., FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 8 question 47 (2006), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/debt_survey_frequency_questionnaire.pdf (pre-
senting the results of a survey of 1,000 adults, age eighteen and over, from the general 
population). 
48 GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 6. 
49 Id. Edward Yingling, President and CEO of the American Bankers Association, 
admitted that the complexity of their products and contracts confuses consumers.  See
Credit Card Practices:  Current Consumer Regulatory Issues:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Financial Institutions. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 
14-15 (2007) (statement of Edward L. Yingling, President and CEO, Am. Bankers 
Ass’n) (acknowledging that the increased complexity of credit cards confuses consum-
ers and can result in a difficult financial situation, but arguing that the industry is tak-
ing these concerns very seriously and working to address them).  Comptroller of the 
Currency John Dugan similarly acknowledged that current credit card disclosure rules 
should be changed to improve consumers’ ability to make well-informed decisions.  See
Improving Credit Card Consumer Protection:  Recent Industry and Regulatory Initiatives:  Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
110th Cong. 14-16 (2007) (testimony of John Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Consumer Protection Hear-
ing].  In response, the FRB and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
are revising the disclosure regulations under TILA.  See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. 
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These findings are reinforced by a 2007 study commissioned by 
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB).  This study, based on focus group 
sessions and one-on-one interviews, found that many consumers 
poorly understand current credit card disclosures.  The Federal Re-
serve identified terms that many consumers did not understand, in-
cluding:
· many of the numerous interest rates listed; 
· when issuers disclose a range of annual percentage rates 
(“APRs”), that their specific APR will be determined by their 
creditworthiness; 
· that the APR on a “fixed rate” credit card product can 
change;
· what event might trigger a default APR; 
· which balances the default APR will apply to; 
· how long the default APR will apply; 
· what fees are associated with the credit card product; 
· how the balance is calculated (e.g., two-cycle billing); 
· how payments are allocated among different rate balances; 
· the meaning and terms of “grace period” and “effective 
APR”; 
· the time, on the due date, that payment is due; 
· when the introductory rate expires; 
· how large the post-introductory rate is; and 
· the cost of convenience checks.50
The Federal Reserve Board is in the process of revising Regulation 
Z, which governs disclosure of terms and conditions of credit prod-
ucts.  The Board proposes to redesign the disclosures required under 
Regulation Z and to adopt disclosure designs that the study revealed 
to be more effective.51  Yet even the more effective disclosure designs 
(May 2, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080502a.htm. 
50 MACRO INT’L, INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING DIS-
CLOSURES, at ii-x (2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/ 
Execsummary.pdf [hereinafter DISCLOSURE EFFICACY STUDY].
51 See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (May 23, 2007), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20070523a.htm (announcing the issuance 
for public comment of the proposed amendments to Regulation Z). 
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that were tested in the study and adopted by the Federal Reserve in 
the proposed revisions to Regulation Z did not completely eliminate 
consumer mistakes.52  Finally, the study concludes by noting that a 
significant number of consumers “lack fundamental understanding of 
how credit card accounts work.”53
Mortgage products raise the same concerns.  A recent FTC survey 
found that many consumers do not understand, or even identify, key 
mortgage terms.54  Survey evidence suggests that some consumers with 
fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) do not know the interest rates on their 
mortgages.55  A survey conducted by the Federal Reserve found that 
homeowners with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) were poorly in-
formed about the terms of their mortgages.56  The survey results 
showed that “[t]hirty-five percent of ARM borrowers did not know the 
value of the per-period cap on interest rate changes.  Similarly, 44 
percent of respondents . . . did not know the values of one or both of 
the two variables used to calculate the lifetime interest cap.”57  More-
over, many consumers do not understand that rising interest rates can 
lead to increases in their ARM rate.58  And a 2003 survey of financial 
52 See DISCLOSURE EFFICACY STUDY, supra note 50 (comparing various proposed 
and current disclosure designs, and showing the proposed designs to be more effec-
tive, but not fully effective). 
53 See id., at 52.  Similarly, a recent study conducted by the Auriemma Consulting 
Group found that over 40% of respondents do not feel well informed about credit 
cards and their benefits before deciding to apply for a new card.  See Card Applications,
CARDFLASH, May 16, 2007, http://www.cardweb.com/cardflash/2007/05/16/ 
card-applications (reporting that 58% of the over 400 respondents to the Auriemma 
survey felt well-informed about credit cards, and only one-third applied for new credit 
cards after researching other options). 
54 See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC, IMPROVING CONSUMER 
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE 
DISCLOSURE FORMS chs. 3, 6 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/ 
P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf (examining the efficacy of mortgage cost-
disclosures through thirty-six in-depth interviews and a quantitative survey of over eight 
hundred mortgage customers).  For example, 95% of respondents could not correctly 
identify the prepayment penalty amount, 87% could not correctly identify the total up-front 
charges amount, and 20% could not identify the correct APR amount.  Id. at 79 tbl.6.6. 
55 Cf. Campbell, supra note 6, at 1584 (stating that about 7% of the questioned 
households reported “implausibly low mortgage rates”). 
56 See Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and 
Mortgage Terms? 26-27 (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors, Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Pa-
per No. 2006-03, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/ 
200603/200603pap.pdf (concluding that “[b]orrowers with less income or education 
seem especially likely not to know their mortgage terms”). 
57 Id. at 19 (footnote omitted). 
58 Id.; see also Campbell, supra note 6, at 1584 n.27 (citing Bucks & Rence, supra
note 56). 
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literacy in Washington State found that victims of predatory lending 
did not understand the cost of mortgages.59  Focusing on closing costs, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has 
concluded that “[t]oday, buying a home is too complicated, confusing 
and costly.  Each year, Americans spend approximately $55 billion on 
closing costs they don’t fully understand.”60
Survey evidence on other consumer credit products similarly sug-
gests that consumers are only imperfectly informed about the relevant 
characteristics and costs of these products.  For example, payday-loan 
customers, while generally aware of finance charges, were often un-
aware of annual percentage rates.61  With respect to another con-
sumer credit product, the tax-refund-anticipation loan, approximately 
50% of survey respondents were not aware of the fees charged by the 
lender.62  Survey evidence also suggests that “[m]ost consumers do not 
understand what credit scores measure, what good and bad scores are, 
and how scores can be improved.”63  Neither do they fully understand 
the implications of a low credit score.64  More generally, a nationwide 
survey sponsored by the Consumer Federation of America found that 
30% of Americans did not know what the letters “APR” stand for, and 
59 See DANNA MOORE, SURVEY OF FINANCIAL LITERACY IN WASHINGTON STATE:
KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR, ATTITUDES, AND EXPERIENCES (Wash. State Univ., Soc. and 
Econ. Scis. Research Ctr., Technical Report No. 03-39, Dec. 2003), available at
http://dfi.wa.gov/news/finlitsurvey.pdf (finding that victims of predatory lenders have 
statistically significantly lower levels of financial knowledge than the general popula-
tion), cited in Campbell, supra note 6, at 1585. 
60 News Release No. 05-091, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., Jackson Un-
vails “Road to Reform” for American Homebuyers (June 27, 2005), http:// 
www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr05-091.cfm. 
61 See Gregory Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use of High-Price Credit Products:  Do They 
Know What They Are Doing? 29-30 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State Univ., Working Pa-
per No. 2006-WP-02, May 2006) [hereinafter Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use] (“Eighty-five 
to 96.1 percent of payday loan customers reported accurate finance charges paid for 
their most recent payday loan.  In contrast, only 20.1 percent of customers were able to 
report accurate annual percentage rate.” (footnote omitted)); GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN 
& EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CTR., GEORGE WASH. UNIV., PAYDAY AD-
VANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 48-49 (2001), available 
at http://www.business.gwu.edu/research/centers/fsrp/pdf/Mono35.pdf (citing simi-
lar statistics). 
62 Elliehausen, Consumers’ Use, supra note 61, at 31. 
63 Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am. & Providian, Most Consumers Do Not 
Understand Credit Scores According to a New Comprehensive Survey 1 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/092104creditscores.pdf. 
64 See id. at 1-2. 
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63% did not understand that the APR was the primary indicator of a 
loan’s cost.65
Consumers who lack information about the basic operation of 
credit products, who do not understand annual percentage rates, or 
who do not know that they have been charged substantial fees, cannot 
make effective comparisons among products.  Without comparison 
shopping, the ordinary discipline that drives markets toward efficiency 
is missing.  Instead of facing informed consumers to whom they must 
offer the best, most competitive product, lenders can offer credit on 
onerous terms and compete instead by finding new ways to attract cus-
tomers, such as clever radio ads or promises of cash rebates. 
Other evidence also suggests that consumers have inadequate fi-
nancial information.  Many consumers do not know their credit 
scores.66  Since the terms of credit products are often a function of the 
consumer’s credit score, these consumers cannot accurately assess the 
costs associated with credit products, nor can they shop effectively for 
65 Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Finance Services 
Marketplace:  The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role 
of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 662 n.441 (2000); see also Diane 
Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep’s Clothing:  Why Re-Regulating the Consumer 
Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1592 (2005) (citing 
Drysdale & Keest, supra) (discussing several consumer surveys revealing a lack of con-
sumer knowledge regarding loan costs). 
66 A recent survey conducted by Capital One and Consumer Action found that 
27% of respondents had never checked their credit report.  See Survey:  27% of Consum-
ers Do Not Read Credit Reports, CREDIT & COLLECTIONS WORLD, Oct. 5, 2006, 
http://creditandcollectionsworld.com/article.html?id=20061016NIJPR6OI.  Another 
recent survey from Visa USA found that over 40% of respondents have never checked 
their credit score and that only 22% of respondents check their credit score once a 
year.  See Scores & Jobs, CARDFLASH, Sept. 14, 2007, http://www.cardweb.com/ 
cardflash/2007/09/14/scores-jobs.  A 2003 survey commissioned by the Consumer 
Federation of America, and conducted by Opinion Research Corporation Interna-
tional, found that consumers lack essential knowledge about credit reporting and 
credit scores.  See Poll:  Consumers Don’t Understand Credit Reporting, Favor Reforms, INS. J., 
Aug. 11, 2003, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2003/08/11/ 
31410.htm (noting that most Americans do not understand what credit scores mean, 
how scores can be changed, or even how they can be obtained).  See also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT REPORTING LITERACY: CONSUMERS UNDERSTOOD THE 
BASICS BUT COULD BENEFIT FROM TARGETED EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS 10-11 (2005), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05223.pdf [hereinafter GAO, LITERACY 
REPORT] (reporting that, even though 70% of respondents correctly defined a credit 
score, less than one third had obtained their scores); Angela Lyons, Mitchell Rachlis & 
Erik Scherpf, What’s in a Score? Differences in Consumers’ Credit Knowledge Using OLS and 
Quantile Regressions 24-26 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State Univ., Working Paper No. 
2007-WP-01, Jan. 2007) (analyzing data from the GAO’s Literacy Report, supra, to iden-
tify demographics in the most need of financial education). 
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lower-cost credit products.  Beyond the credit score itself, consumers 
are poorly informed about general credit-related issues.  The mean 
Credit Knowledge Score obtained in a 2004 survey conducted by the 
GAO was 55 out of 100.67  Many consumers also lack general informa-
tion about bankruptcy law.68  For consumers who are in financial diffi-
culty, this information is critical to rational decision making.  These 
data suggest that many consumers are imperfectly informed about the 
costs of financial distress and, indirectly, of credit products that might 
increase the likelihood of financial distress.69  Finally, a growing litera-
ture on consumers’ financial literacy shows that “providing financial 
information and education results in positive improvements in con-
sumers’ financial literacy levels.”70  These findings imply that there is 
room for improvement, or, put differently, that millions of consumers 
are making financial mistakes. 
The impact of consumers’ lack of information is made worse by 
the misinformation that many consumers hold.  The 2002 Fannie Mae 
National Housing Survey found that over half of all African-American 
and Hispanic borrowers erroneously believed that lenders are re-
quired by law to provide the best possible loan rates.71  They might 
know that they did not fully understand mortgage rates, but their mis-
placed trust in lenders and mortgage brokers gave them false confi-
dence that their lack of knowledge did not harm them.  In such cases, 
market imperfections are magnified. 
67 GAO, LITERACY REPORT, supra note 66, at 84 fig.10. 
68 Press Release, Experian, Experian-Gallup Survey Shows Many Consumers Are 
Not Prepared for a Katrina-Like Disaster (Oct. 12, 2005), http://press.experian.com/ 
press_releases.cfm (select “United States,” “Consumer Credit,” and “2005” from the 
pull-down menus) (summarizing data from the September 2005 Experian-Gallup Per-
sonal Credit Index survey). 
69 Another underappreciated cost of financial distress and, indirectly, of credit 
products follows from the effects of low credit scores on employability.  A recent survey 
from Visa USA shows that only 20% of Americans know that it is legal for employers to 
refuse to hire job applicants with low credit scores.  Scores & Jobs, supra note 66. 
70 See Lyons et al., supra note 66, at 4. 
71 FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE NA-
TIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 9 (2002), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/global/ 
pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf. 
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2.  Consumer Behavior 
a.  Credit Cards 
Indirect, behavioral evidence reinforces a vision of poorly in-
formed consumers.72  In a recent study, economists Haiyan Shui and 
Lawrence Ausubel identified mistakes in consumers’ credit card 
choices.  They found that a majority of consumers who accepted a 
credit card offer featuring a low introductory rate did not switch out 
to a new card with a new introductory rate after the expiration of the 
introductory period, even though their debt did not decline after the 
initial introductory period ended.73  This is puzzling because a major-
ity of consumers in the study received multiple pre-approved credit 
card offers per month and switching from one card to another would 
have entailed only a small transaction cost.  With a common ten-
percentage-point margin between introductory and postintroductory 
interest rates and an average balance of $2,500, this mistake alone cost 
$250 a year.74
72 The studies summarized in this part focus on borrowing behavior.  In addition, 
experimental evidence suggests that credit cards affect spending behavior.  See Drazen 
Prelec & Duncan Simester, Always Leave Home Without It:  A Further Investigation of the 
Credit-Card Effect on Willingness to Pay, 12 MARKETING LETTERS 5, 5-6, 10-11 (2001) (find-
ing that the method of payment—credit card or cash—affects people’s willingness to 
pay). See also GEORGE RITZER, EXPRESSING AMERICA: A CRITIQUE OF THE GLOBAL 
CREDIT CARD SOCIETY 60-62 (1995); Richard A. Feinberg, Credit Cards as Spending Facili-
tating Stimuli:  A Conditioning Interpretation, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 348, 349-55 (1986); 
Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Differences in Consumer Purchase Behavior by Credit Card Payment 
System, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 58, 59, 62-64 (1979); Michael McCall & Heather J. Belmont, 
Credit Card Insignia and Restaurant Tipping:  Evidence for an Associative Link, 81 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 609, 612 (1996); Dilip Soman, Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behav-
ior:  The Role of Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 460, 472 
(2001).
73 Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Market 9 
(May 3, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
586622.  The evidence shows that most consumers do not jump from one card to an-
other and from one teaser rate to another.  But detailed statistics are not necessary to 
reach this conclusion:  it is evident from the fact that issuers offer teaser rates.  Unless 
issuers have decided to forego interest revenues altogether, issuers would not offer 
teaser rates if most consumers did not stay beyond the introductory period.  It is clear, 
however, that most issuers have not decided to forego interest revenues altogether.  In 
fact, interest revenues represent 65% of issuers’ total revenues.  Examining the Billing, 
Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry, and Their Impact on Consum-
ers:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (2007) 
(statement of Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School). 
74 See Shui & Ausubel, supra note 73, at 8-9. 
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Shui and Ausubel also found that when faced with otherwise iden-
tical credit card offers, consumers prefer a credit card with a 4.9% 
teaser rate lasting for an introductory period of six months over a 
credit card with a 7.9% teaser rate lasting for an introductory period 
of twelve months.  Consumers in this study carried an average balance 
of $2,500 over a one-year period.  Those who accepted the six-month 
introductory offer paid a postintroductory rate of 16% during the lat-
ter half of the year.  These results indicate that at least some consum-
ers were making a substantial mistake:  consumers preferred the 
lower-rate, shorter-duration card even though they paid $50 more in 
interest on this card than they would have with the longer-duration 
alternative.75
What explains these mistakes?  Why are consumers routinely pay-
ing more interest than they must?  One possible explanation is that 
consumers systematically underestimate the amount that they will bor-
row, or at least the amount they will borrow on a specific card, in the 
postintroductory period.  In other words, at the time they take out 
their cards, consumers are optimistic about their future credit needs, 
about their future willpower, about the likelihood that they will switch 
to a new card with a new, low introductory rate, or about all of the 
above.
A second possible explanation attributes a much higher level of 
sophistication to consumers.  This explanation assumes that consum-
ers are aware of their imperfect self-control and seek credit arrange-
ments that would help them precommit to borrow less.  A shorter in-
troductory period can serve as a commitment device.  If a consumer 
must borrow today but wishes to commit to borrow less in the future, 
that consumer may prefer a credit card that allows interest-free bor-
rowing now but makes borrowing very expensive in the future (after 
the introductory period ends)—so expensive that the cost of borrow-
ing will overcome any temptation to borrow.76  The data show, how-
ever, that even if the preference for a shorter-period, lower-rate teaser 
was driven by a sophisticated attempt to purchase a precommitment 
device, this attempt failed.  The extent of borrowing at the postintro-
ductory rate implies a substantial level of optimism about the efficacy 
75 See id.
76 See id. at 14-16.  This precommitment argument assumes that borrowers cannot 
switch to another card with another introductory rate when the introductory rate on 
the first card expires.  But, as mentioned above, new introductory offers are often 
available and switching costs are low. 
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of the commitment device.  In other words, it implies that a large 
number of consumers were making a mistake. 
The data used in the Shui and Ausubel study was taken from a 
randomized experiment conducted by a major credit card issuer in 
1995.  Such experiments are conducted to help issuers optimize their 
marketing strategies.  The specific experiment analyzed by Shui and 
Ausubel provides clear guidance to the issuer’s marketing depart-
ment:  offer lower introductory rates for shorter durations in order to 
increase both the number of customers and total interest revenues.  
As this research shows, exploitation of consumer error is an effective 
way to boost profits. 
Another recent study, by David Gross and Nicholas Souleles, pro-
vides further evidence of seemingly irrational consumer behavior.  
The most striking data show that many consumers pay high interest 
rates on large credit card balances while holding liquid assets that 
yield low returns.  Specifically, more than 90% of consumers with 
credit card debt have some very liquid assets in checking and savings 
accounts.  The amounts in question are often substantial:  one-third of 
credit card borrowers hold more than one month’s income in these 
liquid assets.  With a median balance of more than $2,000 for con-
sumers who have a balance, and a spread of over ten percentage 
points between credit card interest rates and the interest rates ob-
tained on assets in checking and savings accounts, a typical consumer 
is losing more than $200 per year in interest payments that could have 
been easily avoided.77
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and 
Nicholas S. Souleles developed a study using a unique market experi-
ment conducted by a large U.S. bank to assess how systematic and 
costly consumer mistakes are in practice.78  In 1996, the cooperating 
bank offered consumers a choice between two credit card contracts:  
one with an annual fee and a lower interest rate, and one with no an-
nual fee and a higher interest rate.  As the authors explain, “[t]o 
minimize their total interest costs net of the fee, consumers expecting 
to borrow a sufficiently large amount should select the fee card, and 
vice-versa” for those not planning to borrow.79  Even though the 
77 See David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest 
Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior?  Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. ECON. 149, 
180 (2002). 
78 Agarwal et al., Credit Contracts supra note 18. 
79 Id.
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choice between the two contracts was especially simple, the authors 
found that about 40% of consumers chose the wrong contract.80  On 
the bright side, the authors found that “the probability of choosing 
the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the po-
tential error,” and that “those who made larger errors in their initial 
contract choice were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal 
contract,” implying that the observed mistakes were not very costly.81
Nonetheless, the evidence of errors is striking in what is, again, a very 
simple decision. 
Stephan Meier and Charles Sprenger compare time-preference 
data from a field experiment with a “targeted group of low-to-
moderate income consumers,” with credit report data on these con-
sumers.82  The authors find that consumers who exhibit hyperbolic 
discounting and dynamically inconsistent intertemporal choices bor-
row more, and specifically borrow more on their credit cards.83  This 
result suggests that “individuals borrow more . . . than they actually 
would prefer to borrow given their long-term objectives.”84  The data 
may also suggest that those most prone to error are those borrowing 
the most, which means that the impact of errors is exacerbated both 
for the individual and for the marketplace. 
A study by Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, and 
David Laibson was based on two separate proprietary datasets from 
large financial institutions.  The first dataset contained a representa-
tive random sample of about 128,000 credit card accounts followed 
monthly over a 36-month period (from January 2002 through Decem-
ber 2004).  The study found that more than 28% of customers made 
mistakes that triggered fees, including late fees, overlimit fees, and 
80 Id. at 4.  Namely, given ex post borrowing patterns, these consumers would have 
saved money by choosing the alternative contract.  Of course, in theory, given the pos-
sibility of ex post shocks, consumers that chose the incorrect contract ex post might 
still have made the optimal choice ex ante.  The authors test for and reject the ex post 
shock explanation, concluding that these consumers did not make the optimal ex ante 
choice.  Id. at 9-10. 
81 Id. at 5. 
82 See Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Impatience and Credit Behavior:  Evidence 
from a Field Experiment 2-3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 07-3, 
2007), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0703.pdf. 
83 Id. at 24. 
84 Id. at 3.  The authors also find that high levels of impatience, represented by a 
low long-run discount factor, explain account delinquencies and slow debt repayment 
patterns. Id. at 25. 
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cash-advance fees.85  The authors consider fee payment a mistake, be-
cause “fee payment can often be avoided by small and relatively cost-
less changes in behavior.”86  The second dataset contained 14,798 ac-
counts which accepted balance-transfer offers over the period January 
2000 through December 2002.  The authors found that more than 
one-third of consumers made mistakes in using the balance-transfer 
option.  For example, instead of making new credit card charges on 
other available cards, these consumers charged purchases to the 
teaser rate cards.  This was a mistake because teaser rates apply only to 
transferred balances, and the interest rate on new purchases is higher 
than the interest rate charged on the old credit card.87  The impact of 
the mistake is intensified by the fact that the customer’s payments are 
allocated first to the teaser-rate transfer balance, so that the higher-rate 
new purchases accrue interest for the longest possible period of time. 
Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders and Barry Scholnick docu-
mented evidence that consumers unnecessarily incur late fees and 
overlimit fees, even though they had enough money in their deposit 
accounts to avoid these costs (accounting for the possibility that funds 
in deposit accounts are being held as precautionary balances).  The 
study constructs a novel dataset covering almost 90,000 individuals.  
Analysis of these data shows that even these easily avoided mistakes—
mistakes due to inattention or carelessness—are made by significant 
numbers of consumers.  Specifically, 4% of consumers fail to make the 
minimum payment even though they have sufficient funds in their 
deposit accounts (after leaving a precautionary balance).  And 1.7% of 
consumers exceed their credit limit when they could have paid the 
excess amount from their deposit accounts.88
It is notable that researchers have tested only the most obvious 
and unambiguous mistakes.  The data show substantial error rates for 
the simplest credit decisions.  In the credit card area, more complex 
credit decisions remain untested. 
85  Agarwal et al., Age of Reason supra note 18 25 fig.13.  The frequency of fee 
payment was lower for consumers in their forties and fifties (approximately 28%) and 
higher for younger and older consumers (up to 35%).  Id.
86 Id. at 23. 
87 Id. at 26-28 fig.15.  Again the frequency of mistake was lower for consumers in 
their forties and fifties (approximately 27%) and higher for younger and older con-
sumers (almost 50%).  Id.
88 Nadia Massoud, Anthony Saunders & Barry Scholnick, Who Makes Credit Card 
Mistakes? 15 tbl.1 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www. 
philadelphiafed.org/econ/conf/consumercreditandpayments2007/papers/Scholnick 
_Who_Makes_Credit_Card_Mistakes.pdf. 
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b.  Mortgage Loans 
Mortgage loans represent a different borrowing environment.  On 
the one hand, such loans are far more complex than typical credit 
cards, undoubtedly increasing the opportunities for errors.  And the 
fact that consumers enter into fewer mortgage contracts than credit 
card contracts decreases the opportunities for learning.  On the other 
hand, consumers know that a great deal is at stake (and that they 
make these transactions only rarely), which might encourage more 
vigilance and, as a result, fewer errors.  The data suggest that errors 
are prevalent in this financial market. 
Subprime home equity loans offer an example.  Such loans are 
typically targeted at low-income borrowers.  For these borrowers, a 
higher risk of default may justify higher, subprime interest rates.  The 
data show, however, that a substantial number of middle-income fami-
lies (and even some upper-income families) with low default risk sign 
up for subprime loans.  Because these families qualify for prime-rate 
loans, these data indicate a very costly mistake on the part of these 
middle-income borrowers. 
In 2002, researchers at the National Training and Information 
center (NTIC) concluded that at least 40% of those who were sold 
high interest rate, subprime mortgages would have qualified for 
prime-rate loans.89  Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae estimate that be-
tween 35% and 50% of borrowers in the subprime market could qual-
ify for prime-market loans.90  A study by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development of all mortgage lenders revealed that 23.6% 
of middle-income families (and 16.4% of upper-income families) who 
refinanced a home mortgage in 2000 ended up with a high-fee, high-
interest subprime mortgage.91  A study conducted for the Wall Street 
89 See Lew Sichelman, Community Group Claims CitiFinancial Still Predatory, ORIGINA-
TION NEWS, Jan. 2002, at 25 (reporting on new claims of CitiFinancial’s predatory prac-
tices after settlements with state and federal regulators). 
90 See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending:  An Overview, in FINANCIAL 
SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 37 (Fannie Mae 
Found. ed., 2001) (suggesting that default risk alone does not fully explain the size of 
the subprime market); see also Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclo-
sure:  The Problem of Predatory Lending:  Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 730 (2006) (using bor-
rowers’ credit history and loan profile in support of the estimation that, at times, 50% 
of borrowers with subprime loans actually were qualified for prime loans). 
91 Randall M. Scheessele, Black and White Disparities in Subprime Mortgage Refinance 
Lending, at tbl.B.3 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Hous. Fin. Working Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. HF-014, 2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/ 
pdf/workpapr14.pdf. 
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Journal showed that from 2000 to 2006, 55% of subprime mortgages 
went to borrowers with credit scores that would have qualified them 
for lower-cost prime mortgages.92  By 2006, that proportion had in-
creased to 61%.93  Neither of these studies is definitive on the ques-
tion of overpricing because they focus exclusively on FICO scores, 
which are critical to loan pricing but are not the only factor to be con-
sidered in credit-risk assessment.  Nonetheless, the high proportion of 
people with good credit scores who ended up with high-cost mort-
gages raises the specter that some portion of these consumers were 
not fully cognizant of the fact that they could have borrowed for much 
less.  This conclusion is further corroborated by studies showing that 
subprime mortgage prices cannot be fully explained by borrower-
specific and loan-specific risk factors.94
What went wrong?  The Wall Street Journal points to one possibil-
ity:  mortgage brokers received 27% higher fees for originating sub-
prime mortgages than for originating conforming loans.95  In addi-
tion, the complexity of the subprime mortgage products was such that 
the average borrower had little chance of understanding the costs as-
sociated with an offered mortgage, let alone comparing costs across 
several products.96  The market clearly failed these consumers, causing 
92 Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit Worthy:  As 
Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J. Dec. 3, 2007, at 
A1 (citing a study by First American LoanPerformance). 
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, HAR-
VARD UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD MORT-
GAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 2 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/ 
publications/finance/mm07-1_mortgage_market_behavior.pdf (citing ALLEN J.
FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, EXOTIC OR 
TOXIC? AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CON-
SUMERS AND LENDERS 24 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic 
_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf (finding that the borrower’s race affects the likeli-
hood of receiving a subprime mortgage).
95 See Brooks & Simon, supra note 92 (reporting the findings of Wholesale Access, 
a mortgage research firm, which discovered that U.S. mortgage brokers collected 
1.88% of the loan amount as a fee for originating a subprime loan, as opposed to 
1.48% for a prime mortgage); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lend-
ing Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, § 3 (describing, based on interviews with former 
employees and on internal documents, how Countrywide created incentives for bro-
kers and sales representatives to steer borrowers into higher-priced loans and; at the 
same time these representatives would promise borrowers:  “I want to be sure you are 
getting the best loan possible”). 
96 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Con-
tracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://law.bepress.com/alea/18th/art47 (follow “Download the Paper” hyperlink) 
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them to pay far more for credit than they could have qualified for—if 
only they had known how to shop. 
The welfare implications of these mistakes are significant.  As 
noted in the CFA/Providian Study: 
[A]ccording to Fair Isaac’s website, on a $150,000, 30-year, fixed-rate 
mortgage, consumers with credit scores over 720 will be charged a 5.72% 
rate with monthly payments of $872, while consumers with credit scores 
below 560 will be charged a 9.29% rate with monthly payments of $1,238 
(if in fact they are able to qualify for the loan)—an annual difference of 
$4,392.
97
Lauren Willis finds that, with an average APR difference of three to 
four points between prime and subprime loans, a prime borrower tak-
ing a $100,000 thirty-year subprime loan will pay over $200 per month 
more than necessary, which amounts to over $70,000 in unjustified 
charges over the life of the loan.98
While the evidence of prime consumers taking subprime loans is 
most striking, costly mistakes can also be documented among sub-
prime borrowers.  Patricia McCoy, in a recent article, documents the 
prevalence of imperfect information in the subprime mortgage mar-
ket.  She describes marketing and contracting practices employed by 
subprime lenders to minimize consumers’ ability to shop for lower in-
terest rates.99  Susan Woodward, analyzing more than 7500 FHA loans 
(describing the complexity of subprime mortgage contracts and how it inhibits compe-
tition); Willis, supra note 90, at 726-27 (arguing that by creating different mortgage 
products for borrowers in similar financial situations, sophisticated lenders create sig-
nificant barriers to meaningful consumer participation in an efficient mortgage mar-
ket).
97 Consumer Fed’n of Am. & Providian, supra note 63, at 2. 
98 Willis, supra note 90, at 729.  This picture becomes grimmer when comparing 
prime loans to subprime loans with the not uncommon APRs of 20%, 30%, and 
higher. See id. (“In 2003, a year when prime rates averaged less than 6% and points 
and fees averaged about 0.50%, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Household, all major U.S. 
lenders, reported originating subprime loans with APRs exceeding 20%, and House-
hold originated loans with APRs in excess of 30%.”).  As compared to a $100,000 thirty-
year prime loan, a 20% subprime loan will cost the consumer over $1,000 extra each 
month and over $370,000 extra in total.  Id.  Putting these figures into perspective, 
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi conclude that, had the prime household 
“gotten a traditional [prime] mortgage instead [of a 20% subprime mortgage], they 
would have been able to put two children through college, purchase half a dozen new 
cars, and put enough aside for a comfortable retirement.”  See ELIZABETH WARREN &
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND 
FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 134 (2003). 
99 Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 123, 123 (2007); see also Willis, supra note 90, at 726-28 (explaining the dif-
ficulties facing consumers in fully understanding their mortgage contract options).  As 
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(not the typical subprime loans, but often targeting similarly higher-
risk borrowers), found that borrowers overpay by thousands of dollars 
in fees, due to excessive complexity, which prevents effective compari-
son-shopping and hinders competition.100  Eric Stein estimated that 
the sum of interest and fees charged on predatory loans, at levels 
above what a competitive market would produce, costs affected U.S. 
consumers $9.1 billion annually, an average of $3,370 per subprime 
loan household per year.101
Additional evidence of consumer mistakes is provided by data on 
foreclosure rates.  Subprime foreclosure rates range from 20% to 
30%.102  Foreclosure costs a family its home and everything invested in 
the home up to that point, along with the costs of relocating and mov-
ing to new housing.  A foreclosure seriously impairs credit ratings, in-
creasing all credit costs and reducing the likelihood of owning a home 
again.  Moreover, foreclosure is only the official tip of a serious hous-
ing problem.  Instead of hanging on for a formal foreclosure, many 
families that can no longer make payments on their homes move out, 
handing the keys over to the lender, sometimes in return for the 
lender’s agreement not to pursue a deficiency judgment against them.  
If 20% to 30% of mortgages are in formal foreclosure, the number of 
families with subprime loans who are unable to hang on to their 
homes is likely to be considerably higher. 
It is clearly possible for a rational, informed consumer to take on a 
high-cost subprime mortgage with the understanding that adverse 
contingencies might lead to default and foreclosure.  Nonetheless, the 
high rate of foreclosures in the subprime market suggests that not all 
consumers knowingly assumed such a high risk of foreclosure.  A re-
cent study by Ren Essene and William Apgar concluded that “con-
sumers have a limited ability to evaluate complex mortgage products 
a result, subprime borrowers paid prices higher than what their risk profile justified.  
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye:  Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2058 (2007) (citing Howard Lax et al., 
Subprime Lending:  An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 533, 
569 (2004)). 
100 SUSAN E. WOODWARD, A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHS MORTGAGES, at x, 
57-69 (2008), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FHA_closing_cost.pdf. 
101 ERIC STEIN, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE COST OF 
PREDATORY LENDING 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf. The number of borrowers was calculated by adding up the 
number of borrowers affected by the various methods of predatory lending, which in-
cluded equity-stripping methods (financed credit insurance, exorbitant up-front fees, 
subprime prepayment penalties) and rate-risk disparities. 
102 Willis, supra note 90, at 731-32 (summarizing studies). 
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and they often make choices which they regret after the fact.”103  In 
response to the rising foreclosure rates, the Federal Reserve Board, 
prompted by voices within the industry and in Congress, has recently 
proposed regulations that would tighten lending standards.104
The critical role of framing effects provides further evidence of 
imperfect rationality:  a 2004 FTC study evaluated the effects of a new 
proposal by HUD requiring disclosure of payments from lenders to 
brokers for loans with above-par interest rates.  Participants were 
shown cost-disclosure forms for two loans—one from a broker and 
one from a direct lender—and asked which was less expensive.  The 
findings were striking.  When the broker loan was less expensive than 
the lender loan, approximately 90% of respondents in the control 
groups (who did not view the new disclosure) correctly identified the 
less expensive loan.  In contrast, when respondents were shown the 
new disclosure, only about two-thirds of consumers correctly identi-
fied the less expensive loan.  The results were even more dramatic 
when the broker loan and direct-lender loan cost the same.  In this set 
of experiments, the new broker disclosure reduced correct cost com-
parisons by roughly forty-four percentage points.  Moreover, when 
these respondents were asked which mortgage they would choose, 
they revealed a significant bias against mortgages generated by bro-
kers.  Overall, the authors concluded that “[i]f the disclosure re-
quirement has an impact similar to the magnitude found in one of the 
hypothetical loan cost scenarios examined in the study, the disclosures 
would lead mortgage customers to incur additional costs of hundreds 
of millions of dollars per year.”105
A recent study by Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix, 
and David Laibson, using records on 75,000 home equity loans made 
in 2002, identified persistent consumer mistakes in loan applications.  
103 ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at i.  Essene and Apgar further note that “the 
recent rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures suggests that some households 
are taking on debt that they have little or no capacity to repay . . . . [And/or they are] 
taking out mortgages . . . that are not suitable for their needs.”  Id.  They suggest that 
lenders are exploiting consumer mistakes, noting, for example, that some mortgage 
marketing and sales efforts “exploit consumer decision making weaknesses.”  Id. at i-ii. 
104 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1671 (proposed January 9, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (applying new protections to mortgage loans secured by a 
consumer’s principle dwelling, including a prohibition on lending based on the collat-
eral without regard to the consumer’s ability to repay). 
105 JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC, THE EFFECT OF MORTGAGE BRO-
KER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION: A CONTROLLED 
EXPERIMENT, at ES-7 (2004). 
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In particular, consumer mistakes in estimating home values increased 
the loan-to-value ratio and thus the interest rate charged.  Such mis-
takes increase the APR by an average of 125 basis points for home eq-
uity loans and 150 basis points for home equity lines of credit.106
While only 5% of borrowers in their forties and fifties made “rate-
changing mistakes,” more than 40% of younger and older borrowers 
made these mistakes, with the likelihood of mistakes reaching 80% for 
some age groups.107
Another study identified repeated mistakes leading to excessive 
broker fees.  In particular, this study found that consumers with a col-
lege education are able to save $1500 on average by making fewer mis-
takes.108  Finally, numerous studies have identified continuing mis-
takes in refinancing decisions.  Many consumers fail to exercise 
options to refinance their mortgages, and thereby end up with rates 
that are substantially higher than the market rate.109  Other consumers 
refinance too early, failing to account for the possibility that interest 
rates will continue to decline.  According to one estimate, these refi-
nancing mistakes can cost borrowers tens of thousands of dollars or 
up to 25% of the loan’s value.110
For most families, buying a home is the single most important fi-
nancial decision of their lives.  More money is at stake than in any 
other household transaction.  And yet the data show that consumers 
make errors that collectively cost them billions of dollars. 
106 Agarwal et al., supra note 18, at 10. 
107 Id. at 12 fig.6, 13 fig.7. 
108 Susan Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market 22 (Sand Hill Econo-
metrics, Working Paper, July 14, 2003), available at http://www.sandhillecon.com/ 
pdf/consumer_confusion.pdf, cited in Campbell, supra note 6, at 1589. 
109 See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1579, 1581, 1590; see also Robert Van Order et al., 
The Performance of Low Income and Minority Mortgages 33-34 (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1083, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1003444.  Similar mistakes have been identified in the U.K.  See Campbell, su-
pra note 6, at  1588 (citing DAVID MILES, THE UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A 
LONGER-TERM VIEW, INTERIM REPORT: INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND PRICING 53-60 
(2003)) (noting that many consumers in the U.K. fail to refinance their mortgages 
when they become automatically adjusted to significantly higher rates). 
110 See SUMIT AGARWAL, JOHN C. DRISCOLL & DAVID LAIBSON, OPTIMAL MORTGAGE 
REFINANCING: A CLOSED FORM SOLUTION 26, 29 (2008), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1010702 (“[M]arket data . . . shows that many households did refi-
nance too close to the [net present value (NPV)] break-even rule during the last 15 
years . . . .”).  Following the NPV rule, instead of the optimal refinancing rule, leads to 
substantial expected losses:  $26,479 on a $100,000 mortgage, $49,066 on a $250,000 
mortgage, $86,955 on a $500,000 mortgage, and $163,235 on a $1,000,000 mortgage. 
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c.  Payday Loans 
Payday loans provide another example of a credit product that 
can impose substantial costs on imperfectly informed and imperfectly 
rational borrowers.  This consumer credit product is designed as a 
short-term cash advance offered at a fee.  In a typical transaction, a 
consumer might pay a $30 fee for a two-week $200 cash advance.111
The fee structure of payday loans makes it difficult for consumers to 
compare directly the costs associated with a payday loan to the costs 
associated with other consumer credit products.  In the typical payday 
loan described above, the $30 fee corresponds to an annual interest 
rate of almost 400%.112
The collective effect of paying $30 for small financial transactions 
is large, but a single $30 fee is unlikely to bankrupt any consumer.  
The problem lies with the substantial subset of consumers who take 
out multiple advances and pay the $30 fee many times over.  A cus-
tomer who misestimates her ability to repay the loan in fourteen days 
will likely roll the loan over for another fourteen days.  Payday lenders 
target such customers, amassing 90% of their profits from borrowers 
who roll over their loans five or more times during a year.113  The Cen-
111 See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857 
(2007).  A study by the Department of Defense documents payday loans carrying effec-
tive annual interest rates of up to 780%.  See DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING,
supra note 3, at 10. 
112 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 111, at 857. 
113 KEITH ERNST, JOHN FARRIS & URIAH KING, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2004), available 
at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf; URIAH
KING, LESLIE PARRISH & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FINANCIAL 
QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDA-
TORY FEES EVERY YEAR 6 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
pdfs/rr012-Financial_Quicksand-1106.pdf; see also Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter To 
Pay Paul:  A Statistical Analysis of Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
387, 411 (2005) (finding that about 65% of loan volume in Colorado comes from cus-
tomers who borrow more than twelve times a year); Flannery & Samolyk, Payday Lend-
ing:  Do the Costs Justify the Price? 12-13 (FDIC Center for Financial Research, Working 
Paper No. 2005-09, 2005) (indicating that between 24% and 30% of customers at pay-
day loan stores borrowed more than 12 times per year).  A $30 fee may be required to 
cover the costs to the lender of an initial payday-loan transaction.  The cost of rolling 
over an existing loan is, however, substantially lower.  The existence of non-profit pay-
day lenders who charge substantially lower fees suggest that for-profit lenders are 
charging more than is necessary to cover their costs.  See John Leland, Nonprofit Payday 
Loans?  Yes, to Mixed Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at A14 (noting the existence of 
many lower nonprofit payday loan providers, some of which charge half the fees of 
commercial payday lenders).
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ter for Responsible Lending (CRL) estimates that consumers pay an 
extra $4.2 billion each year in excess fees on payday loans.114
A Department of Defense (DoD) study has shown that payday 
lenders prey on members of the military community as a lucrative 
market.115  The DoD study found that borrowers take on a payday loan 
when they can get a lower-interest nonpayday loan, for example, from 
the Military Aid Societies or from the banks and credit unions on mili-
tary installations.116  Another recent study, by Sumit Agarwal, Paige 
Skiba, and Jeremy Tobacman, found that a majority of payday loan 
applicants had more than $1000 available in liquid assets.117  While 
paying a 400% interest rate may be rational, absent other options, un-
der conditions of extreme financial distress, it is very difficult to ra-
tionalize when the borrower can draw on substantial liquid assets. 
114 KING, PARRISH & TANIK, supra note 113, at 9-10.  The $4.2 billion figure as-
sumes that any fee for the fifth rollover and beyond are excess fees, reflecting the 
CRL’s position that a business model relying on multiple rollovers is exploitative (es-
pecially since many borrowers underestimate the number of rollovers and the resulting 
costs).  While we cannot evaluate the CRL’s calculation and the resulting $4.2 billion 
figure, the cited figure is suggestive of the magnitude of the welfare costs involved. 
115 DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 4. 
116 The government has begun organizing Military Aid Societies to provide better 
options and a safety net for Service members and their families in need of emergency 
funds.
Whereas there may be few alternatives for the average consumer with bad 
credit to obtain cash, there is a safety net available for Service members and 
their families outside of high interest loans. . . . Additionally, the banks and 
credit unions located on military installations have begun to provide lending 
products that fulfill the need for quick cash. 
Id. at 29.  The “Army Emergency Relief (AER), the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society 
(NMCRS) and the Air Force Aid Society (AFAS) . . . are chartered expressly to assist 
Service members and their families who have financial crises.”  Id.  Such products in-
clude providing small, short-term loans at reasonable rates, often with a requirement 
that borrowers must obtain additional financial education.  Loan amounts are limited 
$500 or less, with APRs of 11.5% to 18%, and provide between two weeks and six 
months to pay.  Id. at 31-34.  “In 2005, the Aid Societies provided . . . [,] either through 
no-interest loans or grants,” an average support per case of between $808 and $917.  
Id. at 30. 
117 See Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, How Do Consumers 
Choose Between Credit Cards and Payday Loans? 2-3 (Feb 15, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (finding, based on a dataset of loan records from a 
large payday lender and a matched dataset of transactions and credit histories at a fi-
nancial institution, that 3,000 of the 4584 payday loan applicants had more than $1000 
in available liquidity). 
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3.  Product Design 
The evidence described above strongly suggests that imperfect in-
formation and imperfect rationality pervade credit product markets.  
Another category of behavioral evidence reinforces the same conclu-
sion.  These data focus on seller behavior, specifically on evidence of 
how sellers design their credit products.  In many cases, sellers design 
their products to exploit consumers’ imperfect information and im-
perfect rationality.  Observing such product designs provides powerful 
evidence of the prevalence of these imperfections.118
a.  Credit Cards 
i.  Long-Term Interest Rates 
Changes in the credit card contract illustrate the growing sophis-
tication of card issuers in exploiting consumer imperfections.  Until 
recently, credit card interest rates (standard APRs) were exceptionally 
high.  The reason, as admitted by economists who worked as Visa con-
sultants, was that issuers felt that demand for their product was not 
sensitive to this price dimension.119  Consumers, at the time, were fo-
cusing on annual fees, not on long-term interest rates.  One explana-
tion is that consumers optimistically believed that they would not bor-
row, or would not borrow as much, in the long run.  As a result, they 
focused on the annual fee—which they would pay regardless of the 
amount they borrowed—rather than the interest rate which implied 
far greater costs, but only for those consumers who carried a balance.  
A lender could significantly increase profits by dropping the annual 
fee and raising interest rates.  More recently, long-term interest rates 
have become more salient to consumers, perhaps reflecting their 
growing concern over rising balances on credit cards.  The design of 
the credit card product changed in response.  Long-term interest rates 
were reduced to attract and retain customers, as other charges were 
increased. 
118 Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1375-79. 
119 Evans and Schmalensee describe the credit card issuers’ “view that the overall 
demand for credit is relatively insensitive to interest rates, a view supported by at least 
one empirical study and considerable folklore within the industry.”  DAVID S. EVANS &
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING
AND BORROWING 167 (1999). 
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ii.  Penalty Fees and Rates 
When interest rates became salient, competition focused on the 
interest rate dimension, and revenues from finance charges dropped 
accordingly.  But credit card issuers did not simply forego revenues.  
Instead, they began to increase penalty fees and rates, which remain 
largely invisible to consumers.120  For example, the average late fee 
rose from $12.83 in 1995 to $33.64 in 2005.121  The average overlimit 
fee on cards in 2005 was $30.18, going as high as $39.122  Penalty fees 
are the fastest growing source of revenue for issuers.123  Of the $24 bil-
lion in credit card fees that U.S. card holders paid in 2004,124 penalty 
fees totaled $13 billion a year125 and accounted for 12.5% of issuers’ 
revenues.126
120 In Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the bank’s “Credit Card Task Force” pro-
posed increasing “late” and “overlimit” fees as a “good source of revenue.”  1 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 446, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).  Penalty fees are perceived as a “good source of reve-
nue” because the industry perceives that “there (are) very few cardholders that switch 
cards because the late fee is too high.”  See Credit Card Fees Soar Again, CNNMONEY,
Aug. 18, 1998, http://money.cnn.com/1998/08/18/banking/q_bankrate (quoting 
Peter Davidson, Executive Vice President, Speer & Assocs, Atlanta). 
121 GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 18.  Issuers have also 
been imposing cutoff times on the due dates, which have increased the likelihood that 
a payment is considered late.  See 2005 Credit Card Survey, CONSUMER ACTION NEWS
(S.F. Consumer Action, S.F., Cal.), Summer 2005, at 2, available at http:// 
www.consumer-action.org/news/articles/2005_credit_card_survey/ (finding that 34% of 
the forty-seven surveyed issuers set cutoff times). 
122 See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18 (finding that overlimit 
fees on fixed interest rate cards had increased by an average of 6.5%, and overlimit 
fees on variable-rate cards had increased by 6%).  It should be emphasized that issuers 
allow continued use of a credit card, even when the cardholder is over her limit. 
123 Penalty fees have been growing rapidly since 1996, when the Supreme Court 
allowed issuers to apply the lax or nonexistent limitations on fees from their home 
state to borrowers in other states (exportation), thus effectively deregulating late and 
overlimit fees.  See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737, 747 (1996); see also
TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE GROWTH OF 
CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE ’90S 35 (2003), available at
http://www.demos.org/pub1.cfm (stating that late fees are the fastest growing source 
of revenues for issuers); Bob Herbert, Caught in the Credit Card Vise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
22, 2003, at A17 (illustrating the effect of increased late fees, “the fastest growing 
source of revenue for the industry,” on consumers (quoting DRAUT & SILVA, supra)).
124 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 10. 
125 Nadia Massoud et al., The Cost of Being Late:  The Case of Credit Card Penalty Fees 2-
3 (Am. Fin. Ass’n, 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=890826; see also NAT’L CONS. LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING 27 (4th ed. Supp. 
2002) (“Over-limit fees are a major source of revenue for many credit card issuers.”). 
126 Visa and MasterCard credit card issuers’ total revenue was $103.4 billion in 
2004.  Jeffrey Green, C&P’s 2006 Bank Card Profitability Study & Annual Report, CARDS &
PAYMENTS, May 2006, at 30, 31.
48 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1
The cost to consumers of penalty fees and rates rose significantly 
with the advent of “universal default.”127  Universal default clauses 
cause cardholders’ rates to increase (by an average of 6%) when the 
cardholder takes certain actions, such as applying for a mortgage, and 
having too much credit available.128  A credit card company often 
doubles or triples interest rates when a cardholder’s credit score 
drops.129  Consumers are imperfectly aware of the range of events that 
can trigger universal default and of the magnitude of the default in-
terest rates.  Even savvy consumers who actively seek disclosures from 
credit card companies often find the process difficult and exasperat-
ing.  The information given is frequently unclear, obfuscated, or “lack-
ing in key details about conditions, especially those related to fees and 
other costs, and to the circumstances that trigger universal default 
rules.”130  Even the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
recognized the problem and issued an advisory letter instructing na-
tional banks to disclose fully and prominently events that could result 
in an increase in APR.131
Moreover, to be effective, the timing of information is crucial.  
“Advance notice of default or penalty rate increases is not required by 
law.  In many cases, the first time consumers learn of a rate increase is 
when they open their statements.”132  A warning, however, does not 
127 Recently, in response to mounting criticism, Citibank took the lead in stopping 
the universal default practice.  See Citi Stops Universal Default, CARDLINE, Mar. 1, 2007. 
128 See 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 1 (listing several events that can 
trigger a universal default rate). 
129 Id.
130 Id.  Universal default “tops the list of unfair practices because customers are 
given little choice about the rate or fee hikes.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC ADVISORY LETTER 2004-
10, CREDIT CARD PRACTICES (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
Advlst04.htm. 
132 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 1.  Regulation Z does require credit 
card companies to send written notices to affected cardholders of any rate-term 
changes at least 15 days before such change becomes effective.  GAO INCREASED COM-
PLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 26.  This disclosure, however, has proven to be inef-
fective, if only because the consumer is informed about the rate increase after complet-
ing the act that triggered the rate increase.  A GAO study asserted that credit card 
companies have generally ceased practicing universal default based on the idea that 
the six largest issuers and twenty-five of twenty-eight popular large-issuer cards gener-
ally do not automatically raise interest rates if cardholders made a late payment to an-
other creditor.  Id.  Yet many of these same issuers have not changed their practice of 
raising interest rates, merely providing notice to cardholders of triggering circum-
stances either in their disclosures or immediately prior to a rate hike.  Id. at 24-25.  The 
FRB is 
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mean that consumers will be able to pay off or transfer their existing 
balances.  As a result, many will be unable to avoid paying additional 
penalty fees imposed by a universal default rate hike.133  And, from an 
ex ante perspective, even consumers who are aware of the universal 
default clause might overestimate their ability to avoid the rate in-
crease.  In sum, when getting a new credit card consumers are likely to 
underestimate the risks associated with universal default.134 The preva-
lence of universal default clauses can be explained, at least in part, as 
a strategic response by issuers to this underestimation bias.135
iii.  Other Fees 
Credit card products include a long list of additional fees.  Risk-
related fees include late fees, overlimit fees, and bounced-check fees.  
Convenience and service fees include annual fees, cash-advance fees, 
stop-payment-request fees, fees for statement copies and replacement 
cards, foreign-currency-conversion fees, phone-payment-convenience 
fees, wire-transfer fees, and balance-transfer fees.136  Many consumers 
considering a change to its Truth-in-Lending rules that would generally pro-
hibit rate increases unless the cardholder receives 45 days [sic] prior notice.  
The notice would allow the consumer to avoid the rate increase by paying off 
the card balance [at the pre-increase rate] or moving it to another card. 
Rate Changes, CARDFLASH, September 28, 2007, available at http://www.cardweb.com/ 
cardflash/2007/09/28/rate-changes (citing John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Financial Ser-
vices Roundtable (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/ 
2007-104a.pdf). 
133 Rate Changes, supra note 132. 
134 Issuers justify “universal default” as a component of efficient, risk-based pricing.  
It is not clear whether all the events that trigger “universal default” are indeed predic-
tive of future nonpayment.  Our point, however, is different:  even if “universal de-
fault” is efficient ex post, meaning it efficiently increases prices only for high-risk bor-
rowers, ex ante efficiency is sacrificed when borrowers underestimate the expected 
costs of the clause. 
135 Another recent innovation also magnifies the cost of penalty fees.  Some issuers 
are dividing up credit extensions between multiple cards so that a customer with a 
$2,500 credit limit will be issued five cards with five $500 limits (instead of a single card 
with a $2,500 limit).  Five cards mean five opportunities to pay late fees, overlimit fees, 
etc. See generally Robert Berner, Cap One’s Credit Trap, BUS. WK., Nov. 6, 2006, at 35 
(detailing Capital One’s practice of issuing several cards to its customers—even those 
customers who have currently outstanding overlimit balances—in order to generate 
more late fees and overage charges). 
136 See Mark Furletti, Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure 10-13 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Payment Cards Center, Discussion Paper, 2003), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/papers/2003/CreditCardPricing_012003.pdf (de-
tailing credit card fees). 
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are not aware of these fees—their existence, their magnitude, or the 
likelihood that they will be triggered—when signing up for a new 
credit card.  The FRB’s Regulation Z, which implements Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA) credit card disclosure requirements, does not re-
quire advance disclosure of all fees upon application or solicitation.  
Moreover, some of the existing fees are not specifically mentioned in 
Regulation Z and, as a result, issuers make their own decisions about 
disclosures.137
On November 8, 2006 the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York approved a class-action settlement, by which Visa 
and MasterCard agreed to pay $336 million to credit card and debit 
card holders for allegedly unlawful currency-conversion practices.  
(Visa and MasterCard deny any wrongdoing.)  The class-action suit 
claimed, among other things, that issuers charged currency-
conversion fees that were not appropriately disclosed, violating the 
provisions of TILA and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act.138
When consumer behavior is not sensitive to a certain price dimen-
sion, issuers can be expected to increase this price dimension.  More-
over, as the currency-conversion litigation suggests, issuers may be de-
liberately fostering misperception about certain price dimensions. 
iv.  Introductory Rates 
The introductory teaser rate is another example of product design 
that targets consumers’ imperfect rationality.  Assuming that the costs 
of switching from one credit card to another are small, teaser rates 
would not be offered by an issuer that faces perfectly rational con-
sumers.  These consumers would transfer their balance to a new card 
with a low teaser rate as soon as the old card reverted to the high 
postintroductory rate. 
137 See id. at 13-14 (“Issuers generally disclose [phone-payment, wire-transfer and 
stop-payment] fees to consumers by including a menu or a description of these other 
fees in ‘welcome kit’ mailings to new customers or in ‘Cardmember Agreements.’”). 
138 See In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1409, slip op. at 3-4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2006) (order granting preliminary approval of the settlement agree-
ment), available at http://www.ccfsettlement.com/documents/; Third Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 
MDL No. 1409 (S.D.N.Y.), available at http://www.ccfsettlement.com/documents/; see 
also Furletti, supra note 136, at 14 (“Regulation Z does not explicitly address disclosure 
of the foreign currency conversion fee.  Unlike most fees that can be observed upon a 
detailed review of a card statement, foreign currency conversion fees are often rolled 
into the transaction amount or the conversion factor.”). 
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Issuers offer teaser rates because they are attractive to consumers 
who think they will switch, or pay off their balance, when the intro-
ductory period ends, but end up staying and paying the high postin-
troductory rates.  There are two parts to this story.  The first part fo-
cuses on the ex post stage.  Ex post, consumers do not switch and 
borrow at the high postintroductory rates.  In fact, a recent study 
found that most borrowing is done at the high postintroductory rates, 
rather than at the low teaser rates.139  Another recent study estimated 
that effective switching costs must be approximately $150 to explain 
the limited switching observed.140  There is clearly a psychological-
inertia component reflected in such high switching costs. 
The second part of the story focuses on the ex ante stage.  Not 
only do consumers fail to switch ex post, but they also fail to anticipate 
this effective lock-in ex ante.  Alternatively, consumers simply believe 
that they will not need to borrow beyond the introductory period.  
The ex ante part of the story is necessary to explain why consumers 
are more sensitive to introductory rates than they are to long-term 
rates, despite the fact that most of the borrowing is done at the high 
long-term rates.141  In fact, a recent study found that “consumers are at 
least three times as responsive to changes in the introductory interest 
rate as compared to dollar-equivalent changes in the post-introductory 
interest rate . . . .”142  And survey evidence suggests that more than a 
third of all consumers consider an attractive introductory interest rate 
to be the prime selection criterion in credit card choice.143
139 See Gross & Souleles, supra note 77, at 171, 179.  See also Lawrence M. Ausubel, 
Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 263 
(1997) (“[A] substantial portion of credit card borrowing still occurs at postintroduc-
tory interest rates[;] . . . finance charges paid to credit card issuers have not dropped as 
much as the introductory offers might suggest.”); David Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle, in
KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN MACROECONOMICS 228,
228-29 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003) (finding that consumers pay high effective 
interest rates “[d]espite the rise of teaser interest rates”). 
140 Shui & Ausubel, supra note 73, at 24. 
141 See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1405-07 (explaining that “a consumer with a cur-
rent financing need will take the teaser rate bait” because she underestimates her fu-
ture borrowing). 
142 Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market 21 (June 
17, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ausubel.com/ 
creditcard-papers/adverse.pdf.
143 EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 119, at 225. 
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v.  Additional Design Features 
Other features of the credit card contract are also designed to ex-
ploit consumers’ imperfect information and imperfect rationality.  In 
particular, many technical features of the credit card contract provide 
benefits to issuers while imposing underappreciated costs on consum-
ers.  Among these features are low (and even negative) amortization 
rates,144 compounded interest,145 pro-issuer payment allocation meth-
ods,146 and balance-computation methods.147  Issuers also commonly 
insert an arbitration clause that requires consumers to settle disputes 
by binding arbitration that excludes aggregation via class arbitration, 
blocks public access to information revealed in the arbitration, and 
eliminates the procedural rights that would have been available in the 
court system.148
144 Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1408.  Recently, minimum payments have been going 
up, arguably in response to concerns voiced by consumer groups and the Federal 
Banking Agencies.  See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Comptroller Dugan Expresses Concern about Negative Amortization (Dec. 1, 2005),  avail-
able at http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?Doc=I51QIBS3.xml (noting 
new regulatory requirements for increased minimum credit card payments to avoid 
negative amortization); Letter from Richard Spillenkothen, Dir., Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., to the Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Super-
visory and Examination Staff at Each Federal Reserve Bank and to Banking Organiza-
tions Supervised by the Federal Reserve (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2003/sr0301.htm.  A recent amendment 
to TILA also improves the information that consumers receive on the costs of slow re-
payment. See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 § 1301, 119 Stat. 23 (mandating the provision of examples of 
repayment timeframes using minimum payments). 
145 See Furletti, supra note 136, at 15 (“By adding finance charges to the balance 
each day, issuers increased finance charge revenue without increasing stated annual 
percentage rates.”). 
146 See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 27 (“[C]ardholder 
payments [are often] allocated first to the balance that is assessed the lowest rate of 
interest.”); Furletti, supra note 136, at 15 (discussing issuers’ allocation of payments 
first to low APR balances). 
147 See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 27-28 (describing 
the two-cycle billing method); Furletti, supra note 136, at 16 (noting the effective 
elimination of the grace period through double-cycle interest). 
148 See 2005 Credit Card Survey, supra note 121, at 2 (detailing survey results reveal-
ing that more than 50% of banks use arbitration clauses). 
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b.  Mortgage Loans 
i.  Deferred Costs
Some mortgage products, like credit cards, defer much of the 
product’s cost into the future (beyond what is inherently implied by a 
loan contract).  Specifically, subprime mortgage contracts often re-
quire a very small, or even zero, down payment.149  In addition, the 
common 2/28 (or 3/27) hybrid mortgages offer low introductory in-
terest rates for the initial two (or three) year period, to be followed by 
sharp increases in payments.150  These features of the mortgage prod-
uct may be responding to consumers’ optimism bias.  A consumer 
who overestimates the rate by which her income will increase will pre-
fer a mortgage with a small down payment and a low introductory 
rate.151  When the introductory period ends and her income does not 
increase as expected, this consumer may face foreclosure. 
In addition, when taking loans, consumers can overestimate the 
availability and attractiveness of refinancing options at the end of the 
introductory period.  Consumers may also underestimate the deter-
rent effect of the prepayment penalty, a charge that is often many 
thousands of dollars and makes refinancing very expensive.  Consum-
ers who misestimate the costs or availability of refinancing, will neces-
sarily underestimate the likelihood of paying the high postintroduc-
tory rate.  Moreover, consumers might overestimate their ability to 
make optimal refinancing decisions.  The complexity of the optimal 
refinancing decision, and the evidence that many consumers fail to 
make optimal refinancing decisions, suggest that mortgage products 
that appear attractive largely because of the refinancing option may 
be responding to consumers’ imperfect rationality.  This hypothesis is 
especially powerful given the market’s rejection of alternative product 
designs that are less demanding of the consumer.152  Arguably, the 
149 Bar-Gill, supra note 96 (manuscript at 15-16). 
150 Id.
151 Id.; see also Willis, supra note 90, at 778 (invoking consumer myopia as an ex-
planation for introductory rates). 
152 See Campbell, supra note 6, at 1585-86 (arguing that the common contractual 
designs “reward sophisticated decision making and continuous monitoring of financial 
markets,” and suggesting that such contractual designs, rather than less-demanding 
designs proposed by economists—for example, mortgages that adjust interest and 
principal payments for inflation, and automatically refinancing nominal FRMs—may 
be responding to consumers’ imperfect rationality). 
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business model based on low teaser rates is viable only because many 
consumers refinance less often than they anticipate.153
ii.  Proliferation of Fees 
Comparison shopping for cars is relatively easy because the cus-
tomer can compare total prices for similar products.  Mortgage bor-
rowing is much more complex because lenders have disaggregated 
fees.  The cost of borrowing money now includes a number of fees, 
such as origination fees (including document-preparation fees, un-
derwriting-analysis fees, tax-escrow fees, and escrow-fund-analysis fees) 
that are often not disclosed until late in the purchasing process.  It is 
as if a person purchasing a car discovered only at the time of sale that 
there would be additional charges for paint, for a bumper, and for 
tires.  Such additional charges would likely be omitted from the 
buyer’s initial estimates of affordability and would escape inclusion as 
the buyer compared different loan options.154
Similarly, costs imposed later or not at all, such as late fees, fore-
closure fees, and prepayment penalties, are likely to be omitted from a 
buyer’s analysis.  These fees can be 10% (and sometimes more) of the 
loan value.155  Such fees, including those imposed at origination, at re-
financing, and at default, have proliferated, presumably as lenders 
have seen them as an opportunity to increase revenues without en-
153 Such an outcome can be explained either by an underestimation of refinanc-
ing costs or by an underestimation of the difficulty of making optimal refinancing de-
cisions. See DAVID MILES, THE UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A LONGER-TERM VIEW,
INTERIM REPORT: INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND PRICING § 3 (2003)) (concluding, 
based on an analysis of the UK mortgage market, that lenders can offer attractive 
teaser rates only because many consumers fail to refinance); see also DAVID MILES, THE 
UK MORTGAGE MARKET: TAKING A LONGER-TERM VIEW: FINAL REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 97 (2004) (noting borrowers’ poor understanding of interest-rate risks). 
154 To many consumers, the single most salient feature of the loan is the monthly 
payment.  Lenders will therefore manipulate their product design to present a low 
monthly payment.  The monthly payment, however, is a poor proxy for the true price 
of the loan, given the complexity and multidimensionality of subprime mortgage 
loans. See Bar-Gill, supra note 96 (manuscript at 19-20) (detailing the sources of 
origination fees such as credit checks, certifications, and document preparation); 
Willis, supra note 90, at 780-89 (deveopling the argument that “borrowers who rely on 
monthly payments as a simplifying heuristic are vulnerable to price gouging”). 
155 See Willis, supra note 90, at 731 (highlighting a reduction in origination fees to 
10% from 25%). 
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countering customer resistance.156  These products are arguably de-
signed to maximize profits from consumer decision-making errors. 
The numerous fees and penalties together with adjustable interest 
rates have transformed the mortgage loan into a product with multi-
dimensional, nontransparent pricing.  Multidimensionality enables 
tailoring of the product to the special needs of each borrower.  But it 
also creates information problems that sharply inhibit comparison 
shopping.157
c.  Payday Loans 
Perhaps the most dangerous feature of the payday-loan product is 
the loan rollover.  Many payday borrowers do not pay back the loan 
on the next payday.  Instead, they roll over, meaning they renew the 
loan for another period.  A Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) study by Mark Flannery and Katherine Samolyk found that 
about 46% of all payday loans are either renewals of existing loans or 
new loans that follow immediately upon the payment of an existing 
loan.158  Other studies have found even higher rollover rates.  A study 
by the DoD found that among U.S. military personnel “75% of payday 
customers are unable to repay their loan within two weeks and are 
forced to get a loan ‘rollover’ at additional cost.”159  And a study by the 
Center for Responsible Lending found that 90% of payday loans are 
made to borrowers with five or more payday loans per year.160
The design of the payday loan as a short-term cash advance that is 
oftentimes continuously renewed for prolonged periods of time re-
sponds to consumers’ underestimation of the likelihood and cost of 
loan rollover.  Researchers at the Center for Responsible Lending ob-
serve that “[s]ince the loan comes due on payday, borrowers expect to 
have money in their account to cover the check.  Many borrowers, 
however, find that paying back the entire loan on payday would leave 
them without funds necessary to meet basic living expenses, such as 
156 Id. at 725, 731, 766-68; see also Bar-Gill, supra note 96 (manuscript at 30-31) 
(“[I]ncreased complexity . . . allows [lenders] to hide the true cost of the loan in a 
multidimensional pricing maze.”). 
157 Willis, supra note 90, at 726-28; Bar-Gill, supra note 96; see also McCoy, supra
note 99, at 124 (finding that subprime price quotes are available only after payment of 
nonrefundable fees). 
158 Flannery & Samolyk, supra note 113. 
159 DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 14. 
160 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing rollover costs). 
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electricity, rent, and groceries.”161  This results in an unanticipated 
rollover, which means the cost of the loan is far higher than the con-
sumer initially assessed.  The payday loan product is arguably de-
signed to take advantage of consumers’ optimism bias and their con-
sistent underestimation of the risk of nonpayment. 
C.  The Harm:  Implications of Credit Market Failure 
1.  Harm to Consumers 
The evidence summarized above suggests that many credit prod-
ucts are extremely costly to consumers.  The data on credit card 
choice and use show that consumer mistakes cost hundreds of dollars 
a year per consumer.  Failure to switch cards at the end of the intro-
ductory period costs $250 a year.162  Choosing lower introductory rates 
lasting for shorter introductory periods instead of higher introductory 
rates lasting for longer introductory periods costs $50 a year.163  Paying 
high interest rates on credit card balances while holding liquid assets 
that yield low returns costs $200 a year.164  Consumer mistakes in 
choosing mortgage products cost even more.  Borrowers who take a 
$100,000 thirty-year subprime loan while qualifying for a comparable 
prime loan suffer an average financial harm of over $200 per month, 
$2400 per year, and over $70,000 in total.165  More generally, mistakes 
that prevent effective competition within the subprime market cost 
borrowers an average of $3370 a year.166  Suboptimal prepayment de-
cisions alone can cost borrowers tens of thousands of dollars or up to 
25% of the loan’s value.167  In the payday loan market, a 2004 study by 
the Center for Responsible Lending estimated that, each year, preda-
tory payday lending practices cost U.S. families $3.4 billion in excess 
161 ERNST FARRIS & KING, supra note 113, at 3; see also Mann & Hawkins, supra note 
111, at 882 (“[T]here is every reason to think that typical decision-making problems 
like the availability heuristic and the optimism bias cause the typical consumer to give 
inadequate weight to the risk that the [payday] transaction will turn out poorly.”). 
162 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
163 Shui & Ausubel, supra note 73, at 8-9. 
164 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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fees and charges.168  And a DoD study reported a cost of $80 million 
every year to military families from abusive payday-loan fees.169
These numbers suggest that harm to consumers is substantial.  
The aggregate costs are staggering.  The per-consumer costs must be 
multiplied by the large numbers of consumers who bear these costs.  
The $250 cost of failing to switch cards at the end of the introductory 
period is born by 35% of borrowing consumers who chose cards with 
introductory offers—1.4 million consumers each year.170  This implies 
an aggregate annual cost of $350 million.  And this for a single mis-
take triggered by a single design feature of the credit card product.  In 
the home-mortgage market, 35% of prime-qualified borrowers,171 or 
480,000 borrowers,172 get a subprime loan and pay an extra $2,400 a 
168 ERNST, FARRIS & KING, supra note 113, at 2.  Average APRs for payday loans 
range from 391% to 443% in conservative estimates.  “This estimate is conservative be-
cause it does not account for additional costs related to insufficient fund (NSF) fees, 
bounced check fees, disparities between the credit risk and effective interest rate 
charged borrowers, and increased public costs due to collection efforts and payday 
lending induced bankruptcies.”  Id. at 2 n.1.  A DoD study has found that APRs for 
payday lending have reached as high as 780%.  DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING,
supra note 3, at 10. 
169 DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 12. 
170 This number is based on the following data:  (1) about 17 million households 
open a new general purpose credit card account each year; (2) about 50% of new ac-
counts include introductory rates; (3) about 50% of cardholders carry a balance.  See
Fixed Rate vs Intro Rate, CARDFLASH, July 29, 1999 (reporting findings from a 1999 study 
of account acquisition and attrition conducted by PSI Global); Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., 
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances:  Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 23-25 (2003) (stating that, according to 2001 SCF data, 
44.4% of households carry credit card debt; among the 72.7% of households holding 
at least one bank card, 53.7% carry a balance); David I. Laibson et al., supra note 139 
230, 231 (noting that the fraction of households with at least one credit card that are 
borrowing on their credit cards is 63%).  We recognize that cards with introductory 
offers might be issued at different rates to borrowing and nonborrowing consumers or 
households.  Nevertheless, the preceding calculation probably yields a conservative es-
timate, if issuers are more likely to target introductory offers to borrowers and/or if 
borrowers are more likely to be attracted by introductory offers. 
171 Carr & Kolluri, supra note 90, at 37; cf. Sichelman, supra note 89, at 25 (claim-
ing that up to 40% of Citi customers received loans at higher rates than they qualified 
for); Willis, supra note 90, at 730 (“It is estimated that as many as half of the borrowers 
with subprime loans were qualified for lower prime interest rate loans . . . .”). 
172 The 480,000 figure was calculated by multiplying the percentage of subprime 
borrowers who could have qualified for more conventional prime loans (20%) by the 
total number of subprime borrowers (2.4 million).  See STEIN, supra note 101, at 14 
n.49 (providing the 2.4 million figure); Mike Hudson & E. Scott Reckard, More Home-
owners with Good Credit Getting Stuck with Higher-Rate Loans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at 
A1 (providing the 20% figure). 
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year, on average.173  This implies an aggregate annual cost of ap-
proximately $1.3 billion.  More generally, imperfect competition and 
consumer mistakes in the subprime mortgage market cost 2.4 million 
borrowers a total of $9.1 billion annually.174  And yet these numbers 
underestimate the full magnitude of the harm caused by unsafe credit 
products.  The data measure only the bluntest errors.  The costs im-
posed by dozens of other potential mistakes, particularly those associ-
ated with complex pricing, remain unmeasured.  More importantly, 
these numbers do not include the cost of financial distress.175
While the per-accident harm caused by unsafe physical products 
may exceed the “per-accident” harm caused by unsafe credit products, 
the number of victims of financial products is much larger.176  Tens of 
millions of consumers pay more than they should on their credit 
cards, mortgages, or payday loans.  By comparison, only 80,000 con-
sumers are harmed in lawnmower-related accidents each year.177  For 
present purposes, the important point is that aggregate harm from 
unsafe credit products is sufficiently large to justify a systematic ex-
amination of possible regulatory fixes.  Of course, unlike harm caused 
by physical products, harm caused by financial products is not a direct 
welfare cost, but rather it is a transfer from consumers to sellers of 
credit.  Yet, when this transfer is the product of mistake, a welfare cost 
will often follow.  We further elaborate on these welfare costs below. 
2.  Externalities 
Consumer mistakes, especially when coupled with product design 
aimed at exploiting these mistakes, hurt consumers.  The welfare costs 
of these mistakes are not limited to the direct harm suffered by the 
173 See Willis, supra note 90, at 729. 
174 STEIN, supra note 101, at 2-3, 18-19. 
175 Recent evidence shows a causal link between unsafe credit products and finan-
cial distress, including bankruptcy.  See MANN, supra note 3, ch. 3 (arguing that a rise in 
credit card use is causally connected to increased rates in bankruptcy filings). 
176 Cf. Letter from Comm’rs of the FTC to Wendell H. Ford, Chairman of the 
Consumer Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., and John 
C. Danforth, Ranking Minority Member of the Consumer Subcomm. 6 n.12 (Dec. 17, 
1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm (describing con-
sumer injury as potentially “substantial if it does a small harm to a large number of 
people, or if it . . . raises a significant risk of concrete harm”). 
177 A Little Safety Goes a Long Way with DIY (NPR radio broadcast June 21, 2007), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11220621. 
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mistaken consumers.  Unsafe credit products generate a series of 
negative externalities.178
a.  The Cost of Financial Distress 
The costs of financial distress are borne by immediate family 
members.  For example, the 1.8 million people filing bankruptcy in 
2001 were matched by another 1.9 million children and elderly adult 
dependents who were not directly responsible for the bills, but who 
lived in households that declared bankruptcy.179  Indeed, households 
with children are nearly three times more likely to declare bankruptcy 
than their childless counterparts.180
The negative effects of economic distress on children have not 
been studied extensively, but research hints at the future these chil-
dren face.  The catalog of damages inflicted on children when their 
parents divorce—falling test scores, low self-esteem, discipline prob-
lems, depression—also applies to middle-class children whose parents 
are in financial trouble.181  Financial collapse has an additional wrin-
kle less common among children of divorce:  it often sends a child 
178 See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 111, at 881-84 (discussing how financial dis-
tress resulting from debt generally increases the overall burden on the social safety net, 
including effects upon health, employment, and family, and how payday lending, spe-
cifically, decreases competition, choice, and overall welfare of relevant neighbor-
hoods); see also JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-18, 37-41 (warning of myriad negative 
pressures resulting from rampant foreclosures on subprime mortgages, including:  de-
pressed neighboring housing prices; foreclosure costs falling on homeowners, taxpay-
ers, local governments, and mortgage servicers; lost tax revenues from abandoned 
homes; creation of tax liabilities for homeowners; tightening of lending standards for 
families facing foreclosures; a contagion effect whereby concentrated foreclosures 
cause additional foreclosures; and higher levels of violent crime). 
179 Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1010 fig.1 (2002). 
180 Id. at 1013 fig.3.  For two-parent households the ratio of bankruptcies for fami-
lies with minor children and those with no minor children is about 2:1, and for single-
parent households the ratio is about 4:1.  Id. at 1015 fig.4. 
181 See SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S
LIFE CHANCES 76-77 (1997) (finding that five- to seven-year-olds whose parents experi-
enced a drop in income of 35% or more between two adjacent years were more likely 
to experience lower test scores and behavior problems in the classroom).  Mayer con-
trolled for other factors, such as parents’ marital status, race, and parents’ age at the 
birth of the child.  Id. at 77 tbl.4.5; see also Dania S. Clark-Lempers et al., Family Finan-
cial Stress, Parental Support, and Young Adolescents’ Academic Achievement and Depressive 
Symptoms, 10 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 21, 33 (1990) (reporting that adolescents from 
families in financial distress are more likely to experience depression); Les B. Whit-
beck et al., Family Economic Hardship, Parental Support, and Adolescent Self-Esteem, 54 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 353, 353-54 (1991) (finding that adolescents from families in financial 
distress are more likely to experience low self-esteem). 
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into adult roles long before her time.  Sociologist Katherine Newman 
observes that “[f]or downwardly mobile families, it is the parents who 
need their kids’ emotional support. . . . Their children want to be 
more independent, but a sense of responsibility and obligation pulls 
them back.”182
For elderly relatives relying on adult children who get into finan-
cial trouble, the impact may be immediate.  An estimated 20,000 
households filing for bankruptcy in 2001 indicated they had to move 
an elderly relative to a cheaper care facility in order to deal with their 
financial problems.183  Financial distress can impose significant costs 
on ex-spouses or noncustodial children if the debtor is no longer able 
to pay support.  Women’s groups across the country uniformly op-
posed amendments to the bankruptcy laws in part because of their 
concern that ex-husbands would be under so much pressure from 
credit card issuers and mortgage lenders that there would be nothing 
left for support recipients.184  Not even death will insulate families 
from the sting of aggressive debt collectors.  Sears, for example, had a 
special team to collect from bereaved families when a customer died 
still owing a credit balance—even though the family had no legal ob-
ligation to pay these debts.185
Bankruptcy may be the extreme measure of financial distress, but 
not all families in financial trouble declare bankruptcy.  A survey of 
households in 2007 showed that 40% of families were “very con-
cerned” or “somewhat concerned” about paying their bills that 
month.186  Nearly half of all credit card holders missed at least one 
182 KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE 
AGE OF AFFLUENCE 105 (1999). 
183 Bankruptcy Reform:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 25 
(Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Elizabeth Warren), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1381&wit_id=3996 (presenting unpublished data from the 2001 Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Project). 
184 See, e.g., JOAN ENTMACHER, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., BANKRUPTCY BILL WILL
HARM ECONOMICALLY VULNERABLE WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 1-2 (2002) (arguing 
that proposed bankruptcy reform would make the collection of child support more 
difficult); Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women’s Issue?  Bankruptcy, Commercial Law and 
Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 21 (2002) (noting that no 
women’s group has publicly endorsed proposed restrictions on bankruptcy). 
185 WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 98, at 142-43. 
186 Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Holiday Spending Plans:  More Con-
sumers Than in Previous Years Say They Will Cut Spending (Nov. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Holiday_Spending_Press_Release_11-19-07.pdf. 
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payment last year,187 and an additional 2.1 million families missed one 
or more mortgage payments.188  In 2004, about one in every six 
households in the U.S. dealt with a debt collector.189  Economist Mi-
chelle White has estimated that about 17% of all households in the 
United States would see a significant improvement in their balance 
sheets if only they were willing to sign a bankruptcy petition.190  That 
is, 18 million households would have profited from a bankruptcy fil-
ing, compared with the 1.5 million that actually filed, suggesting that 
at least 16.5 million families who did not file for bankruptcy are dealing 
with some form of financial distress—and some of its attendant costs.191
The impact of financial distress does not stop with the immediate 
family.  An individual in financial distress will often require support 
from more distant family, friends, or the state.  Such transfers from 
one individual to another, including transfers mediated by the state, 
involve transaction costs.  These transaction costs are especially large 
when the bankruptcy system—and the attendant lawyers’ fees, filing 
fees, claim forms, and other paperwork—is involved. 
Foreclosures can be even more expensive.  Bank takeovers of resi-
dential housing cost taxpayers money and threaten the economic sta-
bility of already-imperiled neighborhoods.192  A recent housing report 
187 Walecia Konrad, How Americans Really Feel About Credit Card Debt, BANKRATE.COM,
Feb. 20, 2007, at 3, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/financial_literacy/Feb07_ 
credit_card_poll_national_a1.asp (follow “3” hyperlink beneath article title). 
188 Sandra Block, Foreclosure Hurts Long after Home’s Gone, So Cut a Deal While You 
Can, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2007, at 3B. 
189 TOM W. SMITH, TROUBLES IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF NEGATIVE LIFE EVENTS 
ACROSS TIME AND SUB-GROUPS 23 tbl.2 (2005) (noting that 15.8% of Americans dealt 
with payment pressure from stores, creditors, or bill collectors in 2004); Lucy Lazar-
ony, Denying Our Debt, BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 6, 2004, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/ 
news/financial-literacy2004/debt-denial.asp (observing that 11% of Americans have had 
a credit card bill go to collection). 
190 Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy:  A Critical Look at the Incen-
tives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 
718 tbl.2 (1998).  White shows that about 17% of U.S. households would profit from 
filing for bankruptcy—and yet, for some reason, presumably at least somewhat influ-
enced by a sense of shame or stigma, they do not file.  Id.
191 See U.S. Census Bureau, Table AVG1:  Average Number of People per House-
hold, by Race and Hispanic Origin, Marital Status, Age, and Education of House-
holder:  2007, available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ 
cps2007/tabAVG1.xls (providing the total number of American households, 
116,011,000). 
192 See JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 15-16; see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mort-
gage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, at § 3; Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. 
Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks on Current Housing and Mortgage Market Develop-
ments (Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/ 
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observed:  “Foreclosures are costly—not only to homeowners, but also 
to a wide variety of stakeholders, including mortgage servicers, local 
governments and neighboring homeowners. . . . [Costs can reach] up 
to $80,000 for all stakeholders combined . . . .”193  Lenders can lose as 
well, forfeiting as much as $50,000 per foreclosure, translating into 
roughly $25 billion in total foreclosure-related losses in 2003.194  “[A] 
city can lose up to [$19,227] per house abandoned in foreclosure in 
lost property taxes, unpaid utility bills, property upkeep, sewage and 
maintenance.”195 Many foreclosure-related costs fall on taxpayers who 
ultimately pay the bill for services provided by their local governments. 
Financial distress also affects the productivity of borrowers-
workers.  Recent evidence collected by the DoD shows that employees 
or, in the DoD’s case, military personnel, become less productive 
when in financial distress.196  This finding should not come as a sur-
prise.  An employee concerned about debt repayment and about pro-
tecting her family from abusive debt-collection practices is clearly less 
able to focus on work.197
b.  Market Distortions 
Consumer mistakes also lead to market distortions, preventing 
markets from attaining allocative efficiency.  Consumer mistakes skew 
the demand function, inflating demand for products with underesti-
hp612.htm (“Foreclosures are costly and painful for homeowners.  They are also costly 
for mortgage servicers and investors.  They can have spillover effects into property val-
ues throughout a neighborhood, creating a downward cycle we must work to avoid.”). 
193 JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.  See also Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The
External Costs of Foreclosure:  The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property 
Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 57, 69, 70-72 (2006) (finding that a single-family 
home foreclosure causes a decrease in values of homes within an eighth of a mile—or 
one city block—by an average of 0.9% to 1.136%, or approximately $1,870 when the 
average home sale price is $164,599, and 1.44% in low- and moderate-income commu-
nities, or about $1,600 when the average home sale price is $111,002). 
194 See, e.g., Desiree Hatcher, Foreclosure Alternatives:  A Case for Preserving Homeowner-
ship, PROFITWISE NEWS AND VIEWS (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), Feb. 2006, at 
2, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/02_2006_ 
foreclosure_alt.pdf (observing that five-hundred-thousand nonfarm mortgage loans 
were in foreclosure at the end of 2003, causing $25 billion in costs for lenders). 
195 JEC REPORT, supra note 3, at 38. 
196 See DOD, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 3, at 39-43 (listing case 
studies involving military personnel with loan troubles). 
197 The DoD report also describes how military personnel in financial distress be-
come more vulnerable to extortion and, consequently, lose their security clearance.  
Id. at 35-36, 86-87. 
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mated risks.  The inflated demand skews the market price and leads to 
allocative inefficiency. 
Consider two credit products, a closed-end bank loan and a credit 
card.  The bank loan is better suited for some consumers and for cer-
tain purposes.  And the credit card is better suited for other consum-
ers and for other purposes.  Now assume that the credit card, by its 
nature or by specific design, triggers more consumer mistakes.  And 
because of these mistakes, the relative attractiveness of the credit card 
increases.  The result would be that consumers, who, absent mistakes 
and misperception, would take a closed-end bank loan, opt for credit 
card financing instead.  The increased demand for credit cards and 
the reduced demand for bank loans affect the relative prices of these 
two credit products.  As a result, mistakes by imperfectly informed and 
imperfectly rational consumers distort the financing choices of in-
formed, rational consumers as well.198
Similarly, with imperfect information and imperfect rationality, 
credit may seem less costly than it really is.  Accordingly, more con-
sumers will want to borrow.  The economy will respond by shifting re-
sources to meet this increased demand—a shift that, given the mis-
takes underlying the increased demand, leads to allocative inefficiency 
(since there are better uses for these resources).  The most recent ex-
ample is in the subprime mortgage industry.  Artificially inflated de-
mand for financing, fueled in part by consumer mistakes, contributed 
to the real-estate bubble. 
Another market distortion is caused when an increased risk of de-
fault caused by unsafe products increases the prices of safe products.  
A consumer who gets into financial trouble is likely to default on most 
or all outstanding credit obligations, not just on those that caused the 
problem.  When a debtor is out of money, the losses are often shared 
by “good” creditors and “bad” creditors alike.  Because unsafe credit 
products increase the risk of default on all credit obligations, costs in-
crease both for safe and for unsafe credit products.  Anticipating an 
increased likelihood of nonpayment, sellers of safe products are 
forced to increase the price of their products, pricing in the risk of de-
fault caused by the unsafe products.  The higher prices that consum-
198 See Bar-Gill, supra note 15, at 1434 (“[S]ellers will not compete on dimensions 
of the product . . . that are invisible to imperfectly rational consumers.”). 
64 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1
ers must pay for safe products represent another cost of unsafe prod-
ucts.199
3.  Distributional Concerns 
The preceding subsections described how unsafe credit products 
reduce the overall amount of resources in a society.  Unsafe credit 
products also regressively redistribute the remaining resources. 
There are several reasons for this distributional effect:  First, not 
all consumers have identical information, and not all are equally ra-
tional.  Better-educated consumers are less likely to make mistakes.  
Richer consumers are also less likely to make mistakes, if only because 
they can hire experts who will prevent them from making mistakes.200
Second, as a consequence of these differences in information and ra-
tionality, sellers targeting less-educated, poorer consumers will offer 
more products that are finely tuned to exploit consumer mistakes.  
Third, if poor consumers are generally in greater need of financing 
than rich consumers, then poor consumers will suffer more from mis-
takes related to the choice and use of consumer credit products.  Fi-
nally, if richer consumers make a credit mistake, they can often buy 
their way out of the problem—paying off a credit card bill in full or 
refinancing a mortgage on more favorable terms.  Poor consumers 
lack the financial cushion that rich consumers have, and therefore 
they are more vulnerable to the unexpected costs of credit products 
and are more likely to stumble into financial distress.  In his American 
Finance Association 2006 Presidential Address, John Campbell show-
ed that “for a minority of households, particularly poorer and less 
educated households, there are larger discrepancies [between ob-
served and ideal behavior] with potentially serious consequences.”201
Campbell speculates that “the existence of naive households [i.e., the 
199 Perhaps even more costly, from a social welfare perspective, are the ex ante dis-
tortions caused by the prospect of financial distress.  A lender will have an added in-
centive to offer an unsafe credit product if it can recover not only from the borrower 
but also from the borrower’s family, friends, and perhaps also from the state (via wel-
fare payments made to the borrower) when the borrower is in financial distress.  Cf.
Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State:  A Defense of the Unconscionablility Doctrine, 
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 318-
19 (1995) (arguing that stricter usury laws can serve to counteract market distortions 
due to welfare programs). 
200 See Lyons et al., supra note 66, at 25 (“[C]onsumers who were less educated, 
lower-income, older, or Hispanic tended to be less knowledgeable [about credit re-
porting].”). 
201 Campbell, supra note 6, at 1554. 
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poorer and less educated households that make mistakes] permits an 
equilibrium . . . in which confusing financial products generate a 
cross-subsidy from naive to sophisticated households, and in which no 
[other] market participant has an incentive to eliminate this cross-
subsidy.”202
Available evidence supports these observations about the disparate 
impact of consumer mistakes across different socioeconomic 
groups.203  Evidence suggests that better-educated, richer consumers 
make fewer mistakes in the home mortgage market.  For example, 
Susan Woodward found that consumers with a college education 
avoid mistakes that cost less sophisticated consumers $1500 on aver-
age in broker fees.204  In a more recent study, Woodward found that 
offers made by brokers to borrowers without a college education are 
$1100 higher on average.205  Robert Van Order et al. found that “low-
income [mortgage] borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is op-
timal for them to do so.”206  In the credit cards market, recent evi-
dence shows that poorer consumers make more mistakes.  Using a 
rich data set covering almost 90,000 individuals, Nadia Massoud, An-
thony Saunders, and Barry Scholnick found that poorer consumers 
were more likely to incur unnecessary late fees and overlimit fees even 
when they had sufficient money in their deposit accounts so that they 
could have avoided these costs.207  The study accounted for the possi-
bility that funds in deposit accounts are being held as precautionary 
balances.208
202 Id. at 1555. 
203 For example, Essene and Apgar state that  
the recent rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures suggests that some 
households are taking on debt that they have little or no capacity to repay . . . , 
[and/or] taking out mortgages that . . . are not suitable for their needs. . . . 
[T]he concentration of foreclosures in many of the nation’s lowest-income 
and economically vulnerable neighborhoods threatens to reverse recent gains 
in efforts to expand homeownership opportunities for all. 
ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at i; see also Willis, supra note 90, at 725-27 (explaining 
how creative loan structuring can help or hurt consumers depending on their sophisti-
cation). 
204 Woodward, supra note 108, at 2. 
205 WOODWARD, supra note 100, at ix, 49. 
206 Van Order et al., supra note 109, at 21. 
207 See Massoud, Saunders & Scholnick, supra note 88, at 33 (concluding that 
poorer individuals pay fees due to inattention and mistake rather than financial diffi-
culty).
208 See id. at 14 (suggesting that “individuals with low cash flows may hold addi-
tional deposits as precautionary balances”). 
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There is also evidence of disparate impact across different racial 
groups.209  Studies have shown persistent disparities in the share of 
subprime lending made to African-American and Hispanic borrowers 
versus similarly situated whites.210  A study by the Federal Reserve 
Board, evaluating 177,487 subprime loans, suggested the possibility 
that “minority borrowers are incurring prices on their loans that are 
higher than is warranted by their credit characteristics.”211  Another 
study, based on the Federal Reserve data, found that “African-
American and Latino borrowers are at greater risk of receiving higher-
rate loans than white borrowers, even after controlling for legitimate 
risk factors.”212  A third study by the Survey Research Center at the 
209 See WILLIAM APGAR, AMAL BENDIMERAD & REN S. ESSENE, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES, HARVARD UNIV., MORTGAGE MARKET CHANNELS AND FAIR LENDING: AN
ANALYSIS OF HMDA DATA 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/ 
publications/finance/mm07-2_mortgage_market_channels.pdf (evaluating competing 
claims about the causes of observed differences in mortgage lending outcomes along 
racial lines); Massoud, Saunders & Scholnick, supra note 88, at 9 (describing the prac-
tice of “redlining,” where banks make mortgage decisions based on the racial composi-
tion of neighborhoods); Editorial, Subprime in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2007, at A26 (arguing that lawmakers must aggressively investigate the existence of ra-
cial discrimination by lenders). 
210 See BRADFORD CALVIN, CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL DIS-
PARITIES AND THE SUBPRIME REFINANCE MARKET 6-8 (2002), available at http:// 
butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/directory/Background-Reports/Center%20for 
%20Community%20Change%20Report.pdf (positing a direct relationship between 
disparities in subprime lending and income that exists throughout all regions and 
metropolitan areas of the United States); FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 94, at 24 
(showing the increased likelihood of African-American and Hispanic homeowners re-
ceiving payment option mortgages); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 35 (2000), available 
at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (noting that “black borrow-
ers accounted for 19 percent of all subprime refinance loans but only 5 percent of 
overall refinance mortgages”); Paul Calem, Kevin Gillen & Susan Wachter, The 
Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 
401-404 (2004) (examining racial disparity in subprime lending in Philadelphia and 
Chicago, and finding the highest concentration of subprime loans among African-
American homeowners).
211 Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner & Robert E. Cook, New Information Reported 
Under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 381, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/summer05_hmda.pdf. 
This study did not offer any firm conclusions regarding the illegal predatory targeting 
of protected classes, choosing instead to simply note that Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) data alone are “insufficient to account fully for racial or ethnic differ-
ences in the incidence of higher-priced lending . . . .”  Id. at 379. 
212 DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UNFAIR
LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORT-
GAGES 3 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011exec-Unfair_ 
Lending-0506.pdf. 
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University of Michigan found that “black homeowners are significantly 
more likely to have prepayment penalties or balloon payments at-
tached to their mortgages than non-black homeowners, even after 
controlling for age, income, gender, and creditworthiness.”213  And a 
fourth study, by Susan Woodward, found that black borrowers pay an 
additional $415 in mortgage fees and Latino borrowers pay an addi-
tional $365 in mortgage fees.214
In addition, consumer shopping behavior differs across racial 
groups.  “African-Americans are more than 50 percent less likely than 
Hispanics and the general population to shop for an equity lender at 
their own bank, savings and loan or credit union,”215 which generally 
offer more favorable rates.  Furthermore, studies have shown that Af-
rican-Americans “systematically underestimate their credit worthiness” 
and are less likely to apply for mortgage financing.216  As a result, Afri-
can-Americans as a group are “more likely to obtain a loan after being 
‘sold a loan,’” which was crafted and targeted at them, “than as a re-
sult of having searched for a loan.”217
A recent survey conducted by a Hispanic civil rights and advocacy 
group, the National Council of La Raza, found that 56% of Hispanic 
households use credit cards, and that nearly 77% of Hispanic credit 
card users carry a balance on their credit cards, compared to 45% of 
all credit card users.218  Moreover, 19.3% of Hispanics describe their 
credit card debt situation as “burdensome and not enough money to 
pay down [the balance]” and 11.4% report that they are “maxed out 
and can’t use [their cards].”219  One of the major problems, according 
to the National Council of La Raza, is that nearly 22% of Hispanic 
213 Michael S. Barr et al., Who Gets Lost in the Subprime Mortgage Fallout?  Homeowners 
in Low- and Moderate-Income Neighborhoods 2-3 (April 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1121215. 
214 WOODWARD, supra note 100, at ix, 45-46. 
215 AARP, 2003 CONSUMER EXPERIENCE SURVEY: INSIGHTS ON CONSUMER CREDIT 
BEHAVIOR, FRAUD AND FINANCIAL PLANNING 41 (2003), available at http://assets.aarp.org/ 
rgcenter/consume/cons_exp.pdf. 
216 ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at 23; see also Campbell, supra note 6, at 1584 
(finding that race is correlated with prompt refinancing). 
217 ESSENE & APGAR, supra note 94, at 23.  See also Morgenson, supra note 95 (stat-
ing that in December 2006, in an agreement with the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral, Countrywide agreed “to compensate black and Latino borrowers to whom it had 
improperly given high-cost loans in 2004”). 
218 Latino Credit Card Use:  Debt Trap or Ticket to Prosperity?, ISSUE BRIEF: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY Feb. 15, 2007, at 1 (Nat’l Council of La Raza, Wash., D.C.), available at
http://www.nclr.org/files/44288_file_IB17_ExecuSumm_FNL.pdf. 
219 Id. at 2 (alterations in original). 
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borrowers have no credit score, which makes it difficult for them to 
obtain credit at favorable rates.220
Payday lenders and subprime mortgage companies target minority 
neighborhoods.  In Chicago, for example, 41% of the city’s subprime 
refinancing occurs in black neighborhoods, although only 10% of the 
overall refinancing takes place in these same neighborhoods.221  An 
Illinois study found that there were 37% more payday loans issued in 
minority neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods.222  The pres-
ence of these lenders in poorer, minority neighborhoods is not sur-
prising.  After all, payday loans and subprime mortgages are designed 
to extend credit to borrowers who are denied access to traditional 
credit products.  Nevertheless, the broad exposure of minorities to 
payday loans and subprime mortgages implies a broad exposure to the 
risks associated with these products. 
Women may also be disproportionately harmed by unsafe finan-
cial products.  A recent survey found that “two-thirds of women 
graded themselves at C or lower in their knowledge of financial ser-
vices or products.”223  Another recent study found that older women 
display much lower levels of financial literacy than the older popula-
tion as a whole.224  An inadequate understanding of financial products 
is likely to result in more welfare-reducing mistakes. 
Finally, there is evidence that legal intervention aimed at curing 
mistakes in consumer credit markets does not help all consumers to 
the same extent.  In particular, there is evidence that “the beneficial 
effects of [TILA] in enabling consumers to better shop for attractive 
loans may have been limited to well-educated, affluent borrowers.”225
And the recent Federal Reserve study, which examined the efficacy of 
TILA disclosures, concluded: 
[O]ne important finding has been that there are a number of consum-
220 Id.
221 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL DIS-
PARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 5 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/ 
publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf. 
222 MARTI WILES & DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, WOODSTOCK INST., REINVESTMENT ALERT 
NUMBER 14: UNREGULATED PAYDAY LENDING PULLS VULNERABLE CONSUMERS INTO 
SPIRALING DEBT 7 (2000), available at http://woodstockinst.org/document/alert.pdf. 
223 John Leland, Baltimore Finds Subprime Crisis Snags Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 
2008, at A1 (citing a 2006 survey by Prudential Financial). 
224 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Planning and Financial Literacy:  How Do 
Women Fare? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W13750, 2008), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13750.pdf. 
225 Hynes & Posner, supra note 30, at 194 (citing a collection of studies). 
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ers who lack fundamental understanding of how credit card accounts 
work. These participants tended to be those with lower educational lev-
els, and were likely subprime consumers (i.e., those with low credit 
scores).  Unfortunately, this population is generally charged higher fees 
and interest rates than other consumers, and thus has the most at stake 
in understanding how these charges are calculated and how they can be 
avoided.
226
The burden of credit-market imperfections are not spread evenly 
across economic, educational, or racial groups.  The wealthy are insu-
lated from many credit traps, while the vulnerability of working- and 
middle-class families increases.  For those closer to the economic mar-
gin, a single economic mistake—a credit card with an interest rate 
that unexpectedly escalates to 29.99% or misplaced trust in a broker 
who recommends a high-priced mortgage—can trigger a downward 
economic spiral from which no recovery is possible. 
D.  Summary:  The Markets for Consumer Credit Products Are Failing 
Theory predicts and data confirm that markets for credit products 
are failing.  Consumers, their families, their neighbors, and their 
communities are paying a high price for systematic cognitive errors.  
Creditors have aligned their products to exploit such errors, driving 
up costs for many consumers.  Competition for manufactured prod-
ucts has produced a wide array of consumer-friendly features:  ease of 
use, lower prices, more style, and hundreds of innovations that con-
sumers have enjoyed.  Competition in the credit market has similarly 
produced valuable products and features.  But it has also produced an 
array of risky products and unsafe features.  Twenty years ago, no one 
had heard of universal default, overlimit fees, liar’s loans, teaser mort-
gages, payday rollovers, or the dozens of other innovations that have 
exploited consumers’ imperfect understanding of complex credit 
products.  Regulation assured that no manufacturer had to compete 
with another manufacturer who was willing to produce an unsafe 
product for less money.  But regulation has not built the same floor 
under financial products.  To restore efficiency to consumer credit 
markets, the same kind of basic safety regulation is needed. 
226 DISCLOSURE EFFICACY STUDY, supra note 50, at 52. 
70 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1
II. THE SOLUTION
A.  Existing Responses and Why They Failed 
The lynchpin of consumer credit regulation was usury law.  Hark-
ing back to biblical times, through to the foundation of the American 
colonies, and later of the American states, usury laws regulated credit 
by imposing a cap on the interest rate that any lender could charge.  
With a clear upper bound on the price of credit, incentives to raise 
prices while obscuring the total cost of borrowing were low.  In 1978, a 
Supreme Court interpretation of ambiguous language in a national 
banking law effectively abolished state usury laws.227  By the 1990s, 
product innovation, from payday lending to universal default to crea-
tive mortgage financing, took root without much regulatory scrutiny. 
While the states still play some role, state law has largely been pre-
empted by federal legislation.  We begin our survey of existing solu-
tions with an overview of common law approaches to the regulation of 
consumer credit.  After discussing the shortcomings of the ex post, 
common law approach, we turn to ex ante regulation.  We discuss the 
multiple-regulators problem and the regulatory arbitrage opportunity 
it creates, starting with federal versus state regulators and ending with 
the multiplicity of federal regulators.  Beyond the multiple-regulators 
problem, we argue that no single regulator has the necessary combi-
nation of motivation and authority to effectively regulate consumer 
credit products. 
1.  Ex Post Judicial Intervention 
a.  Existing Ex Post Solutions 
There are essentially two ex post judicial tools available to protect 
consumers.  The first is the common law of contracts, and the second 
is the fallback protection of bankruptcy.  Both offer consumers some 
protection against dangerous credit products.  But as ways to over-
come the dangers facing consumers in the financial marketplace, 
both have serious systemic limitations. 
227 In 1978, the Court allowed a Nebraska bank to export credit card rates to Min-
nesota.  Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 
299, 318 (1978).  The credit card companies soon generalized the principle.  Citibank 
moved its operations to South Dakota, which had a high interest rate cap, and Dela-
ware soon raised its usury rate to attract more credit card business. 
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Consumer credit transactions are regulated by the general law of 
contracts.  The main doctrinal vehicle for policing these transactions 
is the unconscionability doctrine.228  This doctrine gives courts broad 
power to strike down contract terms and entire contracts that shock 
the conscience and are the product of a flawed bargaining proce-
dure.229  Unconscionability review is most commonly applied to con-
tracts between consumers and sophisticated corporations,230 and it has 
been used to police credit contracts.231  Yet courts have been very cir-
cumspect in applying unconscionability review to credit contracts.232
As explained below, the reluctance of common law judges to inter-
vene in credit transactions is justified by institutional, doctrinal, and 
procedural considerations.233  Moreover, with respect to interest rates 
and possibly other contractual provisions that form the centerpiece of 
credit contracts, unconscionability review is likely preempted by fed-
eral law.234
228 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
229 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 314 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining 
the doctrine of unconscionability generally as it is invoked by consumers, and discuss-
ing its use in franchise disputes). 
230 See, e.g., id. (discussing the application of unconscionability to contracts when 
there is disparity of sophistication among the parties). 
231 See Posner, supra note 199, at 304-05 (discussing the application of unconscion-
ability analysis in credit cases where lenders set exorbitantly high credit prices to offset 
risk).
232 For example, courts have generally rejected unconscionability claims made 
against arbitration clauses in credit card contracts.  See, e.g., Arriaga v. Cross Country 
Bank, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194-95 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that a credit card con-
tract’s arbitration clause was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable); 
Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830-36 (S.D. Mass. 2001) (ruling 
against unconscionability even where an arbitration clause required plaintiff to bear 
arbitration fees and restricted available remedies); Marsh v. First USA Bank, N.A., 103 
F. Supp. 2d 909, 920 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that the arbitration was not uncon-
scionable though the clause was not bargained for).  Such claims have been upheld, 
but only in extreme cases.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 
778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002) (showing that an arbitration clause that exempts drafter’s 
claims is most likely to be unconscionable); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 
F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“[A]n arbitration provision is substantively 
unconscionable because it waives class remedies, as well as declaratory and injunctive 
relief.”); see also Korobkin, supra note 30, at 1274-75 (discussing arbitration-clause un-
conscionability cases). 
233 See infra Part II.A.1.b. 
234 See infra Part II.A.2.a; see also Cade v. H & R Block, Inc., No. 1454-21, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19041, at *15-18 (D.S.C. 1993) (reviewing the preemption of state uncon-
scionability claims for refund-anticipation loans, but essentially stating that states’ at-
tempts to regulate credit card interest rates and other contractual provisions would be 
similarly preempted). 
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With the prevalence of penalty fees in credit transactions, a sec-
ond common law doctrine—the penalty doctrine—could also be used 
to police consumer credit contracts.  Contract law precludes the speci-
fication of damages for nonperformance that exceeds the true harm 
to the breached-against party, or a reasonable ex ante (at the time of 
contracting) estimate of such harm.  Such excessive damages are con-
sidered an unlawful penalty, and as such are not enforceable.235  At 
least in some cases, the large penalties specified in consumer credit 
contracts clearly exceed the actual harm caused to the lender, as well 
as any reasonable ex ante estimate of such harm.  For example, when 
a credit-card holder is required to pay a $30 fee for missing the due 
date on a $10 balance by only a day, the harm to the issuer is smaller, 
probably much smaller, than $30.  The attempt to collect $30 is ar-
guably an unlawful penalty.236  Thus far, however, few courts have so 
ruled.237
The ever-present option that a financially troubled consumer will 
file for bankruptcy and discharge all outstanding debt obligations im-
poses some regulatory oversight on consumer credit markets.  In the-
ory, lenders can be deterred from offering unsafe credit products by 
the threat that debt incurred through such unsafe products will be 
discharged in bankruptcy.  The potential efficacy of such a threat is 
evident from lenders’ intense lobbying to restrict consumers’ access to 
bankruptcy.  These lobbying efforts have been successful.  Recently, in 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
235 See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 
(1981).
236 One commentator has even questioned the constitutionality of credit card late 
fees. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Are Credit Card Late Fees Unconstitutional?, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 475-487 (2006) (arguing that state and federal laws regulating 
credit card penalties may allow credit card companies to impose late fees on consum-
ers that far exceed the limits imposed by the Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cambpbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)). 
237 See, e.g., Hitz v. First Interstate Bank, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that 
bank’s “late” and “overlimit” fees were illegal liquidated damages in a class action suit); 
see generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provision Imposing 
“Late Charge” or Similar Exaction for Delay in Making Periodic Payments on Note, Mortgage, or 
Instalment Sale Contract, 63 A.L.R. 3d 50, 59 (1975) (discussing courts’ interpretations of 
credit card fees as enforceable liquidated damages and not additional interest). 
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2005 (BAPCPA)238, Congress constrained consumers’ ability to dis-
charge credit card debt.239
Before BAPCPA was signed into law, courts struggled with the is-
sue of debt dischargeability.  In the credit card debt context, this 
struggle was often initiated by issuers’ attempts to prevent discharge-
ability by accusing consumers of fraud under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).  Over time, the courts limited the scope of the fraud 
exception.  For example, the Supreme Court, in Field v. Mans,240 for-
mulated a subjective test, according to which the debtor’s intent to 
repay is sufficient to make the debt dischargeable, precluding the 
creditor from making an allegation that the debtor defrauded the 
company by using a credit card when he was unable to pay.241
The courts have also scrutinized the marketing techniques and 
screening procedures employed by credit card issuers, ruling that, in 
some cases, overzealous solicitation without sufficient inquiry into the 
consumer’s ability to pay precludes any claim of nondischargeabil-
ity.242  Scrutiny of the contractual design itself could be the next step.  
Courts could use unsafe product design as a shield against a lender’s 
238  Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
239 Issuers have also taken to the courts, increasing their challenges against the 
dischargeability of credit card debt based on 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2006).  See
Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame:  The Vexing Problem of Credit Card Obli-
gations in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 110-140 (2001) (addressing the common 
law requirement of justifiable reliance in cases involving fraudulent debtors, and argu-
ing for a rigorous standard of fraud). 
240 516 U.S. 59, 77 (1995). 
241 Cf. David F. Snow, The Dischargeability of Credit Card Debt:  New Developments and 
the Need for a New Direction, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 79-80 (1998) (arguing that when Field
v. Mans found credit card debt dischargeable irrespective of the debtor’s financial 
condition the court departed from the common law standard); Alane A. Becket, Fifth 
Circuit Sets Its Standard for Credit Card Non-dischargeability, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001, 
at 14 (2001) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s standard for credit card nondischargeability, 
established in In re Mercer, 211 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2000)); Richard H. Gibson, Credit
Card Dischargeability:  Two Cheers for the Common Law and Some Modest Proposals for Legisla-
tive Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 153-55 (2000) (explaining the three-step process 
for applying the legal standard of justifiable reliance established in Field v. Mans to 
common law credit card cases); John D. Sheehan, The 9th Circuit Clarifies Intent on Credit 
Card Debt Dischargeability, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 1997, at 16 (1997) (reassessing 
the Ninth Circuit’s use of a totality of the circumstances standard to determine fraudu-
lent intent in light of Field v. Mans).
242 See Snow, supra note 241, at pt. III.B.3 (stating that where courts have consid-
ered industry credit screening practices, they have found that the creditors failed to 
establish justifiable reliance); see also Howard, supra note 239, at 79-80 (stating that the 
behavior of the creditor should also be considered in determining dischargeability, as 
it is in common law fraud). 
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claim of nondischargeability.  In addition, unsafe product design can 
theoretically be used not only as a shield, but also as a sword to ex-
clude credit card issuers from any recovery in bankruptcy.243  Once 
again, however, the protection is more theoretical than actual. 
Contract law and bankruptcy law together provide some protec-
tion for consumers who get into trouble with dangerous credit prod-
ucts.  A consumer may raise some defenses in contract law to avoid the 
obligation to pay, or, if the impact is severe enough, the consumer 
may file for bankruptcy to discharge all debts, including those involv-
ing dangerous credit products.  This protection, however, has substan-
tial limits. 
b.  The Failure of Existing Ex Post Solutions 
The ex post common law approach is not well suited for the regu-
lation of consumer credit markets.  It is not surprising that courts have 
been reluctant to try to regulate these markets using general contract 
law doctrines and bankruptcy law rules.  The problem is not with par-
ticular judges; it is systemic.  Concerns about institutional compe-
tence, doctrinal limitations and procedural barriers justify the ob-
served judicial restraint. 
i.  Institutional Competence 
Effective regulation of consumer credit markets requires informa-
tion that is more readily accessible to regulatory agencies than to 
courts.  For example, while the penalty doctrine may well be used in 
extreme cases to strike down late-fee provisions in credit card con-
tracts,244 courts will often find it difficult to conduct the comprehen-
sive analysis of an issuer’s cost structure that would be required to 
separate illegal penalties from reasonable liquidated damages.  More-
over, in many cases, even a thorough understanding of a single 
lender’s business is insufficient for effective regulation.  Rather, a 
broader perspective is needed—a perspective that encompasses mar-
ket structure and demand characteristics.  As the required informa-
243 Cf. In re Jordan, 91 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (showing a debtor ob-
jection to a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding asserting illegal late 
charges imposed by a creditor).  An even more extreme approach, borrowing from the 
concept of lender liability in the commercial-bankruptcy context, would render the 
issuer liable to the bankrupt consumer’s other creditors.  See 5-79 COLLIER BANK-
RUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE. ¶ 79.05 (2003). 
244 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
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tion and analysis extend beyond the facts of any specific case, the rela-
tive institutional advantage shifts from courts to regulatory agencies.  
The single-plaintiff structure of contract litigation makes inquiry into 
a range of different practices very difficult, particularly when some of 
the practices may have affected the particular plaintiff who is asserting 
a problem and some may not have.  This plaintiff-centered perspective 
further limits a court’s view of the problem. 
The comparative institutional disadvantage of courts has been 
previously noted in the more general context of consumer contracts.  
Lewis Kornhauser argued that imperfections in consumer markets 
may be more amenable to legislative rather than to judicial correc-
tion.245  With respect to disclosure regulation, Richard Craswell has re-
cently argued that common law courts applying contract law doctrine 
on a case-by-case basis are at an institutional disadvantage compared 
with regulators who enjoy a broader market perspective.246  Kip Vis-
cusi, Richard Epstein and Alan Schwartz have similarly argued that 
safety warnings should be designed by regulatory agencies, not by 
common law courts.247  Lawyers are well schooled in the notion of us-
ing single-plaintiff litigation to right legal wrongs.  But in the field of 
regulation of consumer credit markets, there is substantial consensus 
that such litigation is ill suited to produce the most effective results. 
ii.  Doctrinal Limitations 
The main doctrinal tool for policing consumer credit markets is 
the contract-law doctrine of unconscionability.  The limits of the un-
conscionability doctrine, largely shared by alternative doctrines, ex-
plain the inadequacy of an ex post, common law approach to the 
245 See Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 1180-81 (arguing that market imperfections 
leading to unconscionable contracts may be more amenable to legislative rather than 
to judicial correction). 
246 Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:  Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure 
in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 592-93 (2006); see also Beales et al., 
supra note 30, at 528; Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 37, at 1456-59 
(arguing that case-by-case judicial decisions are a poor mechanism for implementing 
general bans due to the deciding courts’ limited access to important information). 
247 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 110-12 (1980); W. KIP 
VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 155–56 (1991) (arguing that a common law 
establishment of warnings will reduce their value by causing firms to be overly conser-
vative, and recommending a standardized warning system); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for
Products Liability Reform:  A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 398 & n.90 (1988) 
(questioning the effectiveness of common law warnings because of jury speculation on 
the adequacy of warnings). 
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regulation of consumer credit markets.  As currently interpreted, the 
unconscionability doctrine is too narrow to address many of the prob-
lems in the consumer credit market.  For example, it would not be 
considered unconscionable for a credit card issuer to offer consumers 
a choice between (1) a credit card with a zero-percent teaser rate and 
a high long-term rate, and (2) a credit card with no teaser rate but a 
lower long-term rate.  This strategy might impose significant costs on 
ill-informed consumers, but would never come close to the standards 
necessary to find unconscionability. 
A possible response is to interpret unconscionability more 
broadly.  Such a move, however, runs a substantial risk of doing more 
harm than good.  Substantial expansion of the doctrine of uncon-
scionability would have consequences far outside the realm of credit 
products and well into markets that may not suffer from the same de-
fects.  In theory, courts could develop a special, broader unconscion-
ability doctrine that would apply only to credit contracts.  More gener-
ally, courts could develop a series of market-specific unconscionability
doctrines for each consumer market.  These market-specific doctrines 
would be based on a fact-intensive inquiry of market conditions and 
practices.  But such an approach would entail a sharp departure from 
current unconscionability jurisprudence—a departure that institu-
tional and procedural considerations advise against. 
Doctrinal constraints similarly limit the efficacy of regulation 
through bankruptcy law.  Specifically, the courts are not free to write 
on a clean slate.  Provisions designed to protect debtors from over-
reaching creditors are often tangled enough to leave plenty of room 
for those creditors to make strong claims for collection.  The courts’ 
struggle with Section 523(a)(2)(A), for example, has not been an easy 
one.248
248 Compare In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653, 657 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (formulating a 
totality of the circumstances test examining a nonexclusive list of twelve objective fac-
tors relevant to dischargeability), with In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting the totality of the circumstances test from In re Dougherty and requiring proof 
of false representation, intent to deceive, justifiable reliance, and actual damages).  See 
generally In re Rembert, 141 F.3d 277, 281 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the use of a 
credit card implies a representation of an intention but not an ability to pay); In re
Hashemi, 104 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring creditor to show only that, as 
a whole, relevant evidence indicates debtor intended to pay); In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 
1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting “intent to deceive” factor to require investiga-
tion only of whether debtor intended to pay, not whether debtor had the ability to 
pay); In re Ward, 857 F.2d 1082, 1084 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring a credit check as a 
precondition for justifiable reliance). 
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iii.  Procedural Barriers 
Unlike harm caused by noncredit consumer products, which is 
commonly a low-probability but high-magnitude harm, the harm 
caused by consumer credit products is typically a high-probability, low-
magnitude harm.249  An unsafe consumer credit product often harms 
many consumers, but the harm to each consumer is usually small.  As 
a result, litigation is a far less effective tool to deal with dangerous fi-
nancial products than to deal with dangerous physical products. 
Credit card fees provide a ready example.  Compared with their 
reluctance to invoke the unconscionability doctrine, courts have been 
somewhat more susceptible to penalty-doctrine claims raised against 
various fees in consumer credit contracts.250  Nonetheless, the sharp 
growth in penalty fees over the past decade, and the increasing frac-
tion of profits they produce for credit card issuers, suggest that con-
sumer efforts to resist fee charges have had minimal impact across the 
market.  According to the GAO, late fees averaged $12.83 in 1995.  
They soared 162%, to an average of $33.64 in 2005.251  In 2005, pen-
alty fees, which include late fees, overlimit fees, and a few others, ac-
counted for 7.2% of issuer revenues, or $7.88 billion.252  While not all 
these fees would be illegal if scrutinized under the current penalty 
doctrine, this increase was produced in large part by late fees and 
overlimit fees that are not always tied to the actual or estimated losses 
the creditor suffers as a result of the consumer’s “breach.” 
But the odds are small that these fees could be meaningfully chal-
lenged by lawsuit.  A single fee is often small; the average late payment 
fee imposed by credit card companies is now $35.253  The aggregate 
effect may be huge, but it makes little economic sense for any single 
borrower to litigate such a modest amount.  Even high interest 
charges, which may seem huge to the borrower, would be dwarfed by 
the costs of litigation and subsequent appeals.  Families who have 
problems with credit are unlikely to have the resources to pursue judi-
cial remedies. 
249 See supra Introduction. 
250 In particular, several such claims have been accepted against late and overlimit 
fees in credit card contracts.  See supra note 237. 
251 See GAO, INCREASED COMPLEXITY REPORT, supra note 18, at 18. 
252 See eCID (the electronic version of Card Industry Directory), Analysis, Industry 
Statistics section, http://www.cardforum.com/staticpage.html?pagename=ecidinfo. 
253 Thomas Redman, Late Payment Fees, CARDTRAK.COM, Apr. 20, 2007, 
http://www.cardtrak.com/news/2007/04/20/late_payment_fees. 
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Other aspects of credit card practices further undercut the effec-
tiveness of any judicial remedy for fee charges or other harmful terms.  
The widespread inclusion of arbitration clauses in standard credit 
card contracts inoculates lenders against the possibility of class action 
lawsuits, which would otherwise change the economics of pursuing 
debtor’s rights.254  Other contract terms have similar effects.  Forum-
selection clauses and contractual provisions to shift the cost of all at-
torneys’ fees to the loser can further increase the costs—and the 
risks—of litigation as a meaningful way to protect borrowers. 
Regulation through bankruptcy presents its own systemic prob-
lems.  Even in bankruptcy court, which is often more informal, the 
costs of litigation will far outstrip any benefits for many debtors, mak-
ing resistance to creditors’ efforts to collect a problematic economic 
calculation.  BAPCPA further increased costs, driving up attorneys’ 
fees, increasing paperwork, creating time delays, and erecting extra 
hurdles on the way to a discharge.  Filing fees have also increased.  
Even if consumers manage to scale all the newly erected barriers, they 
discover that post-BAPCPA the courts’ power to protect consumers 
has been limited.  Because most credit card debt listed in bankruptcy 
is currently discharged, bankruptcy courts have little room at the mar-
gins to influence the creditors’ bottom lines by declaring certain prac-
tices off limits.  Perhaps the most significant limitation on the capacity 
of the bankruptcy system to provide effective consumer regulation is 
that relatively few consumers pass through its doors.  Although bank-
ruptcy filings have climbed over the past decade, the number of filers 
254 See Korobkin, supra note 30, at 1274-75 (finding that courts generally uphold 
arbitration clauses, though some have struck agreements that explicitly preclude class 
actions).  Arguably, this problem could be remedied by legislation or court rulings that 
ensure access to class action litigation (or arbitration).  Such legal reform is, however, 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, given lenders’ relative political strength.  Interest-
ingly, arbitration clauses, and specifically arbitration clauses precluding class actions, 
are much more common in consumer contracts than in business-to-business contracts.  
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration:  An Empirical 
Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly-Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 335, 373 (2007) (noting that, although large corporations do not embrace ar-
bitration in their agreements with other corporations, lenders and credit card issuers 
insist on such clauses in consumer contracts); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & 
Emily L. Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:  An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008) (reporting 
that more than three-quarters of contracts between studied companies and consumers 
contained arbitration clauses, while less than 10% of the companies’ “negotiable, non-
consumer, nonemployment” contracts had similar clauses). 
2008] Making Credit Safer 79
and the amount of debt they carry are mere specks on the overall $2.5 
trillion consumer credit industry.255
2.  Ex Ante Regulation 
The effectiveness of ex post judicial regulation of consumer credit 
products is severely limited.  But ex ante regulation, as currently con-
structed, faces substantial limits as well.  First, state law, which in many 
cases took the lead on consumer protection issues, is being increas-
ingly preempted by federal law.  Second, current ex ante regulation 
excessively relies on legislation, which cannot effectively respond to 
market innovation.  Third, and most importantly, despite the multi-
plicity of regulators, there is no single regulator that has both the au-
thority and motivation to police the safety of consumer credit products. 
a. The Erosion of State Power 
The United States has a dual banking system.  This dual system al-
lows financial institutions a variety of options for organizing them-
selves under state or federal law.  They may become nationally- or 
state-chartered banks, thrifts, or credit unions.256  This variety provides 
lenders with some choice between federal and state regulation.  In 
particular, banks choosing a federal charter can do business in a state, 
255 See Federal Reserve Statistical Release, G19: Consumer Credit (June 6, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20080606/ (listing the total outstanding 
consumer credit for the month of April, 2008 as being in excess of 2.5 trillion dollars). 
256 One commentator has described banks’ different options for organization: 
In commercial banks, for example, there are four possible patterns of regula-
tion:  (1) national banks, federally chartered by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, which automatically are members of the Federal Reserve System and in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (currently, most 
of the very large banks are national banks); (2) state chartered banks, also 
members of the Federal Reserve System and therefore insured by the FDIC; 
(3) state banks insured by the FDIC but not members of the Federal Reserve 
System (most of the numerous small state banks are in this category); (4) state 
banks operating without federal deposit insurance.  Few banks are in this last 
category because lack of federal deposit insurance is seen as competitively too 
disadvantageous. 
Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System:  A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977) (footnotes omitted); see also Christopher L. Peterson, Preemp-
tion, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents:  Are Federal Regulators 
Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 515-16 (2007) (describing 
the creation of the dual banking system in the United States). 
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but avoid regulation under that state’s laws—particularly under that 
state’s consumer protection laws. 
In the past, all financial institutions—federally chartered national 
banks and state banks as well—were subject to the laws of the bor-
rower’s state, especially to the usury laws in the borrower’s state.257
This changed in the late 1970s when the United States Supreme 
Court, interpreting the word “located” in section 85 of the National 
Bank Act (NBA),258 decided that national banks are governed by the 
usury laws of the state where their headquarters are located, not by 
the usury laws of the state where the customer is located.259  In 1996, 
257 William Eskridge, collects and discusses a number of sources regarding the his-
tory of usury laws.  William Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude:  The Need for Mort-
gage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and 
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083 (1984).  These include Jeremiah W. Blyden-
burgh, A Treatise on the Law of Usury (1844), which reprints mid-nineteenth-century
usury laws from each state; Sidney Homer, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES (2d ed. 
1977), which traces and analyzes interest rates across various investment instruments 
across the United States from the colonial period into the 1970s; and Franklin W. 
Ryan, USURY AND USURY LAWS (1924), which chronicles the debate over the repeal of 
usury laws in the mid–nineteenth century, and describes early-twentieth-century at-
tempts to combat loan-sharking and other “immoral” lending practices. 
258 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006). 
259 See id. (“Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or 
discount made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, inter-
est at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is 
located . . . .”).  In 1978, the Supreme Court held that this provision of the National 
Bank Act gave national banks “most favored lender” status in their home state and also 
allowed national banks to “export” their home-state interest rates to borrowers residing 
in other states. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 
439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978) (affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding that the 
NBA “authorizes a national bank based in one state to charge its out-of-state credit-card 
customers an interest rate . . . allowed by its home state, even though that rate is 
greater than that permitted by the state of the bank’s nonresident customers”).  For a 
comprehensive analysis of the “most favored lender” and “exportation” doctrines, see 
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect 
on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 544-617 (2004).  Congress 
granted “most favored lender” status and “exportation” authority to FDIC-insured state 
banks and thrift institutions in 1980.  See id. at 565-67 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, 
which applies to all FDIC-insured state banks); id. at 601-03 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 
1463(g)(1), which applies to federally chartered thrift institutions).  See also Credit Card 
Practices:  Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues:  Hearing before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 70 
(2007) (written testimony of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, George Wash-
ington University Law School) [hereinafter Wilmarth Testimony] (describing the 
holding of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.).  The 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, gives 
the OCC the power to use the NBA, a federal statute, to preempt state law.  See Mark 
Furletti, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate 
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the Court extended this ruling to any payment compensating a credi-
tor for an extension of credit, including numerical periodic rates, an-
nual and cash-advance fees, bad-check fees, overlimit fees, and late-
payment fees.260  As a result, state interest rate regulation has been ef-
fectively preempted.  Currently, any lender with a federal bank char-
ter can locate its operations in a state with high usury rates (e.g., 
South Dakota or Delaware) and then export that interest rate to cus-
tomers located anywhere else in the country.261  States have become 
powerless to protect their citizens from such lending practices going 
on within their borders.262  It is noteworthy that state-level interest rate 
and fee regulation is not preempted by corresponding federal regula-
tion.  Rather, the preemption follows from the federally defined rules 
applicable only to federally chartered banks. Specifically, the NBA 
rule that interstate lending is subject to the laws of the state in which 
the lender is headquartered triggered interstate regulatory competi-
tion to attract lenders, and this competition effectively eliminated 
state-level price regulation. 
In addition, direct federal preemption works to undermine state 
law in areas other than interest rate and fee regulation.  Recently, the 
federal government has used its powers under the Supremacy Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution to preempt more and more state law.263  In 
2004, the OCC issued a regulation (the “activities preemption regula-
tion”) that expanded the scope of preemption.  The OCC insulated 
all banks carrying its charter from any state laws that it deemed to 
Credit Cards, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 425, 426 (2004) (citing repeated rulings by various 
courts upholding the OCC’s power to preempt state law under the NBA). 
260 See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996) (up-
holding the validity of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)); see also Schiltz, supra note 259, at 560-65 
(discussing Smiley and the OCC’s expansive interpretation of “interest” under 12 U.S.C. 
§ 85); Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 70). 
261 “In addition, the OCC issued a ruling in 1998 that allows a national bank to 
‘export’ the ‘interest’ allowed by the law of any state in which the bank maintains ei-
ther its main office or a branch.”  Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 70; see also
Schiltz, supra note 259, at 553-56 (discussing OCC Interpretive Letter. No. 822 (Feb. 
17, 1998)).  On the deregulation of interest rates in the home mortgage market, see 
Eskridge, supra note 257, at 1107-10; Willis, supra note 90, at 718. 
262 On regulatory competition in the banking system, see Scott, supra note 256.  
Such regulatory competition generates negative interjurisdictional externalities.  South 
Dakota enjoys tax revenues from banks that choose to locate in the state, while those 
banks enjoy profits generated by interest rates charged to customers in California and 
Massachusetts—profits that legislatures in California and Massachusetts specifically 
prohibit.  Banks in haven states impose costs that are borne largely by consumers in 
other states. 
263 Peterson, supra note 256, at 516. 
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“‘obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exer-
cise its Federally authorized powers’ in four broadly-defined areas—
viz., real estate lending, lending not secured by real estate, deposit-
taking, and other ‘operations.’”264  This regulation cancels out much 
state-level consumer protection law.265
It is not surprising that a number of banks have switched from 
state to federal charters.  Examples of such regulatory arbitrage are 
the recent decisions by JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, and Bank of Mont-
real (Harris Trust) to convert from state to national charters—
264 Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 72 (quoting 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008 (lend-
ing not secured by real estate), 7.4007 (deposit-taking), 7.4009 (other “operations”), 
34.4(a) (real estate lending) (2008)).  These regulations were recently upheld by the 
Supreme Court.  See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007).  
See also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION ch. 7, sec. E. (4th 
ed., 2008); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters:  Channeling the Power of Federal Preemp-
tion of State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1028886; Robert M. Morgenthau, Who’s Watching 
Your Money?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A21.  For a comprehensive analysis and cri-
tique of the OCC’s rules, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed 
the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer 
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004) [hereinafter Wilmarth, OCC’s 
Preemption Rules].  The OCC’s activities-preemption regulation is closely similar to pre-
emptive rules previously issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).  See 12 
C.F.R. §§ 545.2, 557.11, 560.2.  These rules are discussed in Wilmarth, OCC’s Preemption 
Rules, supra, at 283-84.  A previous OCC regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, recently upheld 
by the Supreme Court, extends federal preemption to state-chartered operating sub-
sidiaries of national banks.  See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572-73 (2007). 
265 See Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 72-73 (arguing that the OCC only 
recognizes state laws when they increase the power of national banks); MACEY ET AL., 
supra note 264, ch. 7, sec. E (“[The OCC preemption rules] significantly undercut the 
states’ ability to promulgate effective consumer protection laws, since those laws may 
not apply to national banks or to their operating subsidiaries.”).  The precise extent to 
which state consumer protection laws are preempted is unclear.  See U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, OCC PREEMPTION RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY THE 
APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS (GAO-06-
387) 10-17 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06387.pdf (question-
ing the applicability of state consumer protection laws in light of OCC preemption 
power); see also, Wilmarth Testimony supra note 259, at 73-74 (citing U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra) (noting the GAO’s concern regarding the application of 
state consumer protection laws).  But even when state law is not preempted, state-level 
enforcement is substantially impaired by the OCC’s “visitorial powers” preemption 
regulation, which gives the OCC exclusive power to enforce both state and federal laws 
against national banks.  See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000; see also Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 
259, at 74 (“The combined effect of the OCC’s preemption regulations is to make the 
OCC the final arbiter of the scope of national bank powers, as well as the sole en-
forcement agency with respect to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.”); 
Wilmarth, supra note 264, at 228-29, 327-34 (discussing the regulation).  The Second 
Circuit recently confirmed the validity of that regulation.  See Clearing House Ass’n v. 
Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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decisions that removed more than $1 trillion of banking assets from 
the state-regulated banking system.  In April 2006, the Bank of New 
York, one of the largest remaining state banks, agreed to sell its 338 
retail branches to JPMorgan Chase, thus merging one of the last large 
state operations into a national bank.  Arguably, these significant 
structural changes in the banking industry were driven at least in part 
by the favorable regulatory environment that the OCC created for na-
tional banks.266
Mark Furletti of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has ob-
served that now almost any state statute designed to protect consum-
ers is preempted by federal law.267  State law is reserved for state-
chartered banks.  State laws, once the principle source of consumer 
protection, can offer local citizens only modest protection.  Many 
credit practices that a state may deem fraudulent, deceptive, or other-
wise unlawful will be nonetheless permitted within state borders 
whenever federally chartered institutions are involved. 
The current regulatory scheme thus has two systemic problems.  
By permitting the states to compete for business by offering less and 
less consumer protection, the regulation scheme starts to unravel.  
Moreover, federal regulations that preempt state consumer protection 
without substituting other protection schemes create large holes in 
the regulatory fabric that encourage lenders to use a national charter 
to evade local protection.  The combination not only leaves consum-
ers with little protection, it also creates structures in which the most 
aggressive lenders can pursue their tactics with impunity. 
The erosion of state power in itself need not be problematic from 
a consumer protection perspective.  In an era of interstate banking, 
uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the federal level 
may well be more efficient than a litany of consumer protection rules 
that vary from state to state.  The problem is not in the federal pre-
emption; it is in the failure of federal law to offer a suitable alternative 
to the preempted state law. 
266 See Wilmarth, supra note 264, at 363-64 (arguing that the OCC’s preemption 
rules incentivize nationalization of banks); see also Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, 
at 74-75 (citing examples of multistate banks converting to national charters due to 
OCC preemption rules). 
267 See Furletti, supra note 259, at 426 (examining “regulatory consequences of the 
NBA’s near total preemption of state statutes designed to protect credit card consum-
ers”).
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b.  Regulatory Agencies, Not Legislators 
Two regulatory approaches fit within the ex ante framework.  In 
one, regulation is the direct product of the legislature, passed one 
statute at a time.  In the other, broad enabling legislation is imple-
mented by a single, specialized regulatory agency that is charged with 
supervising consumer products within its portfolio.  In effect, the dif-
ference is whether the ongoing regulation of a market is lodged with 
legislators or if the legislators have empowered the regulators to 
monitor the market and develop new and nuanced responses.  A sig-
nificant portion of current consumer protection law is based on a se-
ries of highly targeted statutes.  These include the Truth in Lending 
Act,268 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,269 the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act,270 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,271 the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),272 and many more.273  The main 
drawback of these statutes is their specificity.  Each one identifies spe-
cific problems to be addressed and identifies within the statutory 
framework what practices will be outlawed and what practices will not.  
The specificity of these laws inhibits beneficial regulatory innovations, 
so that there is little innovation in such areas of consumer disclosure 
or developing responses to new financial devices.  If a practice was not 
already well documented by the time Congress addressed the issue, 
regulatory inertia set in and the likelihood that it would be covered by 
268  15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1613, 1631–1649, 1661–1667f (2006). 
269 Id. §§ 1681–1681x. 
270 Id. §§ 1692–1692p. 
271 Id. §§ 1691–1691f. 
272 Id. § 1639. 
273 Examples of state-level legislation are also abundant.  See, e.g., Raphael W. Bos-
tic et al., State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws:  The Effect of Legal Enforce-
ment Mechanisms, 3-8, 26 (August 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005423 (describing state-level “mini-HOEPA” statutes and 
other anti-predatory lending laws).  Proposed legislation provides additional examples.  
Focusing on credit card regulation, see, for example, Joe Adler, In Focus: Card Rules 
Have Fed, Lawmakers Far Apart, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2007, at 1 (listing bills:  Stop Un-
fair Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S. 1395, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by 
Sens. Levin and McCaskill); Universal Default Prohibition Act of 2007, S. 1309, H.R. 
2146, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced in the Senate by Sen. Tester; introduced in the 
House by Reps. Ellison et al.); Credit Card Minimum Payment Warning Act of 2007, S. 
1176, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Sens. Akaka, Durbin, Leahy, and Schumer); 
Credit Card Repayment Act of 2007, H.R. 1510, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by 
Reps. Price et al.); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 
2007, H.R. 1461, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Reps. Udall and Cleaver)); Credit 
Card Payment Fee Act of 2007, H.R. 873, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Reps. 
Ackerman and Maloney). 
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regulation was almost nil, even if the regulator had the formal author-
ity to address the new practice.  New practices, both good and bad, 
have occurred outside the regulatory framework, while old practices 
are rigidified even when better approaches become possible.274
In the race between regulation and market innovation, market 
participants have stronger incentives than regulators to change, and 
market participants face substantial incentives to test the boundaries 
of the regulatory framework.  Regulation will invariably follow the 
market.  In an optimal regulatory framework, regulation follows the 
market closely, without lagging far behind.  Regulation through spe-
cific statutes does not allow for a timely and effective response to mar-
ket innovations. 
In an industry in which innovation is rapid, regulation through 
legislation is too clumsy and slow to be effective.  This would be true 
even in a political environment amenable to frequent additions and 
adjustments to an evolving corpus of consumer protection legislation.  
The inadequacy of specific statutes is even more problematic in a po-
litical environment driven by powerful lobbying forces.  The com-
bined power of lenders, enhanced by their superior resources and 
their single-minded focus on credit-related issues, will nearly always 
drown out the power exercised by consumers.  For example, even the 
basic—and largely uncontroversial—effort to require credit card 
companies to disclose how long it will take a customer to pay off a 
credit card balance if the customer makes only minimum monthly 
payments was stalled for years.  Eventually, a watered-down and largely 
ineffective version of this important disclosure was enacted as part of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Section 1301.275
c.  Mismatch of Authority and Motivation 
Effective regulation requires both authority and motivation.  Yet 
none of the many regulators in the consumer credit field satisfies 
these basic requirements.  Federal banking regulators have the au-
thority but not the motivation.  For each federal banking agency, con-
sumer protection is not first (or even second) on its priority list.  By 
274 This is not to say that specific legislation cannot have a positive effect.  Sure it 
can. See, e.g., Bostic et al., supra note 273 (studying the effects of state-level antipreda-
tory lending statutes). 
275 § 1301, 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2006). 
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contrast, the FTC makes consumer protection a priority, but it enjoys 
only limited authority over consumer credit markets. 
i.  The Banking Agencies:  Authority Without Motivation 
Five federal banking agencies exercise authority over various slices 
of the consumer credit market.  The FRB, which is the central bank of 
the United States, directly supervises state-chartered banks that choose 
to become members of the Federal Reserve System.276  The Federal 
Reserve also serves as an umbrella supervisor of banks regulated un-
der the other banking agencies.277  The Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, located within the Treasury Department, was created by 
Congress to oversee the national banking system.278  The OCC char-
ters and supervises national banks.  The Office of Thrift Supervision, 
also located within the Treasury Department, charters and supervises 
federal savings associations and also supervises state-chartered savings 
associations that belong to the Deposit Insurance Fund.279  The FDIC 
is “the primary federal regulator of state banks that are chartered by 
the states that do not join the Federal Reserve System[, yet take advan-
tage of federal deposit insurance].  In addition, the FDIC is the 
backup supervisor for the remaining insured banks and thrift institu-
tions.”280  Finally, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), 
an independent federal agency, charters and supervises federal credit 
unions.  NCUA also “operates the National Credit Union Share Insur-
ance Fund (NCUSIF)[,] insuring [savings accounts] in all federal 
credit unions and many state-chartered credit unions.”281
276 KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND 
EFFECTS 30 (1983).  The Fed’s enforcement authority is limited to these banks.  See BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 76 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf [hereinafter FRB, PUR-
POSES AND FUNCTIONS].
277 The Structure of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/frseries/frseri.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
278 See Furletti, supra note 259, at 427 (citing legislative history of the NBA). 
279 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, STRATEGIC PLAN (2000–2005) FOR THE OFFICE 
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION 1 (2000), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/48103.pdf [here-
inafter OTS, PLAN].  The vast majority of state-chartered savings associations belong to 
the Deposit Insurance Fund. 
280 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Who Is the FDIC?, http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/ 
symbol/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
281 Nat’l Credit Union Admin., About NCUA, http://ncua.gov/AboutNCUA/ 
Index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008). 
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The banking agencies have authority to enforce the federal con-
sumer credit laws.  The Federal Reserve Board’s consumer protection 
responsibilities include “[1] writing and interpreting regulations to 
carry out many of the major consumer protection laws, [2] reviewing 
bank compliance with the regulations, [3] investigating complaints 
from the public about state member banks’ compliance with con-
sumer protection laws.”282  Specifically, Congress charged the Federal 
Reserve with implementation of the TILA.283  TILA was passed in 1968 
with the stated purpose of “assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more read-
ily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed 
use of credit.”284  The Federal Reserve implemented TILA “by writing 
Regulation Z, which requires banks and other creditors to provide de-
tailed information to consumers about the terms and cost of con-
sumer credit for mortgages, car loans, credit and charge cards, and 
other credit products.”285  In addition to the TILA, the Federal Re-
serve implements and enforces numerous other consumer protection 
282 See FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 75. 
283 See id., at 75-76 (“Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act to ensure that con-
sumers have adequate information about credit.  The Board implemented that 
law . . . .”); see also A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1219, 1272 (2001) (“The archetype of all modern consumer disclo-
sure statutes is perhaps the United States [TILA], which among other things requires 
creditors to disclose clearly and conspicuously the ‘annual percentage rate’ and ‘fi-
nance charge’ in consumer credit transactions.” (footnotes omitted)); Heidi Mandanis 
Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 54 (2005) (“The most prominent example of the federal 
laws that regulate the extension of credit by banks is [TILA], which requires lenders to 
disclose the terms and cost of the loan.” (footnote omitted)). 
284 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).  TILA has been amended several times to provide 
additional consumer protection.  These amendments include (descriptions in paren-
theses quoted from FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 78-80):  the Fair 
Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–1666j (2000), (specifies how creditors must re-
spond to billing-error complaints from consumers, imposes requirements to ensure 
that creditors handle accounts fairly and promptly, and applies primarily to credit and 
charge card accounts); the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-325, §§ 151–158, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.) (providing additional disclosure requirements and substantive limitations 
on home equity loans with rates or fees above a certain percentage or amount); the 
Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 1 102 Stat. 
2960 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring that applica-
tions for credit cards that are sent through the mail, solicited by telephone, or made 
available to the public (for example, at counters in retail stores or through catalogs) 
contain information about key terms of the account). 
285 FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 76. 
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laws.286  More generally, the FRB has broad authority under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act to prevent unfair or decep-
tive acts and practices.287
Regulations promulgated under these statutes are enforced di-
rectly by the Federal Reserve against state-chartered banks that chose 
to become members of the Federal Reserve System.  Enforcement 
against other banks and financial institutions is carried out by the 
286 The Federal Reserve also implements the following (descriptions in parenthe-
ses quoted from FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 78-81):  the Fair 
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in the exten-
sion of housing credit on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handi-
cap, or family status); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (protect-
ing consumers against inaccurate or misleading information in credit files maintained 
by credit-reporting agencies and requiring credit-reporting agencies to allow credit 
applicants to correct erroneous reports); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1692–1692p (prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions on several bases, and 
requiring creditors to grant credit to qualified individuals without requiring co-
signature by spouses, to inform unsuccessful applicants in writing of the reasons credit 
was denied, and to allow married individuals to have credit histories on jointly held 
accounts maintained in the names of both spouses); the Consumer Leasing Act of 
1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667e (requiring that institutions disclose the cost and terms 
of consumer leases, such as automobile leases); the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (prohibiting abusive debt collection practices); the Expe-
dited Funds Availability Act (1987), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010 (specifying when deposi-
tory institutions must make funds deposited by check available to depositors for with-
drawal and requiring institutions to disclose to customers their policies on funds 
availability); the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1637a, 1647, 1665b (requiring creditors to provide consumers with detailed infor-
mation about open-end credit plans secured by the consumer’s dwelling and regulat-
ing advertising of home equity loans); the Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4313 (regulating the advertising of savings accounts, requiring that depository institu-
tions disclose to depositors certain information about their accounts—including the 
annual percentage yield, which must be calculated in a uniform manner—and prohib-
iting certain methods of calculating interest); the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C.) (enhancing consumers’ ability to combat identity theft, 
increasing the accuracy of consumer reports, allowing consumers to exercise greater 
control over the type and amount of marketing solicitations they receive, restricting 
the use and disclosure of sensitive medical information, and establishing uniform na-
tional standards in the regulation of consumer reporting). 
287 Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b-1 to -4 
(2006)  This statute 
[a]uthorizes the Federal Reserve to identify unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices by banks and to issue regulations to prohibit them.  Using this authority, 
the Federal Reserve has adopted rules substantially similar to those adopted by 
the FTC that restrict certain practices in the collection of delinquent con-
sumer debt, for example, practices related to late charges, responsibilities of 
cosigners, and wage assignments. 
FRB, PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 276, at 80. 
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banking agencies—OCC, OTS, FDIC, and NCUA at the federal level, 
and by state banking agencies—that supervise these other institu-
tions.288  Moreover, the federal banking agencies can use section 8 of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prevent unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act—
“whether or not there is an FRB regulation defining the particular act 
or practice as unfair or deceptive.”289  The authority of the federal 
banking agencies is limited on one important dimension.  Their su-
pervisory powers are restricted to depository institutions—i.e., banks.  
This restriction proved especially problematic during the recent sub-
prime debacle, as a majority of subprime lenders were nonbank mort-
gage brokers and finance companies.290  The Federal Reserve has the 
power, under TILA and HOEPA, to issue regulations binding upon all
mortgage lenders.  Only recently did the FRB propose to exercise 
these powers.291  But even when the Federal Reserve issues such broad-
reaching regulations, the federal banking agencies cannot enforce 
them on mortgage issuers that are not organized as banks. 
288 See About the OCC, http://www.occ.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2008) (stating that the OCC enforces some consumer protection laws); FED. DEPOSIT 
INS. CORP., STRATEGIC PLAN 2005–2010 2 (2005), http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/ 
strategic/strategic_plan05_10.pdf (listing the assurance that consumer rights are pro-
tected as one of the two strategic goals listed for the supervision program); see also
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1905 (Jan. 5, 2004) (“Part 34 of [the OCC’s] regulations implements 12 U.S.C. 371, 
which authorizes national banks to engage in real estate lending subject to ‘such re-
strictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regu-
lation or order.’”).  And one of the seven legal practice areas in the OCC Law Depart-
ment is responsible for community and consumer law.  See Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, Legal and Regulatory, http://www.occ.gov/law.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2008) (“The Community and Consumer Law Division (CCL) provides legal interpreta-
tions and advice on consumer protection, fair lending and community reinvestment 
issues.”).
289 Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page:  Federal Banking Agency 
Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58 BUS. LAW.
1243, 1244 (2003); see also OCC Advisory Letter 2002-3, Guidance on Unfair or Decep-
tive Acts or Practices (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc (advising national banks regarding practices constituting un-
fair or deceptive acts). 
290 Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22, 2007, at A1 (finding that in 2005, 23% of subprime mortgages were issued 
by regulated thrifts and banks, another 25% were issued by bank holding companies, 
which were subject to different regulatory oversight through the federal system, and 
52% “originated [with] companies with no federal supervision, primarily mortgage 
brokers and stand-alone finance companies”). 
291 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1672-73 (Jan. 9, 2008) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 226) (regulating all lenders of mortgages secured by principal dwellings). 
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In theory, the banking agencies have authority to investigate new 
products, to develop new regulations, and to police those new regula-
tions.  The relevance of such power, however, is diminished by the 
agencies’ lack of interest in exercising this power.  The problem is not 
one of immediate politics or a particular party in government.  The 
problem is deep and systemic.  These agencies are designed with a 
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking 
system.  This means protecting banks’ profitability.292  Consumer pro-
tection is, at best, a lesser priority that consists largely of enforcing 
Truth-in-Lending disclosure rules.293  The closer alignment of banking 
292 A broad interpretation of “safety and soundness,” however, can include con-
sumer protection on the theory that unsafe credit products can lead to consumer de-
fault. See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 283, at 62-63 (“The primary argument in favor of 
vesting federal bank regulators with responsibility for implementing consumer protec-
tion laws is the inherent overlap between consumer protection and prudential regula-
tion.  For example, a bank that is involved in predatory lending practices not only 
harms consumers by charging undisclosed fees, but also may threaten the bank’s fi-
nancial condition by systematically making overly risky loans.”); John D. Hawkes, 
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Women in Housing and Finance 
(Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-10a.doc (cau-
tioning that government regulation inevitably entails burdensome costs). 
293 The Federal Reserve describes its duties as falling into four general areas: 
[1] [C]onducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the monetary 
and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates; [2] supervising and regu-
lating banking institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s 
banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of consumers; 
[3] maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic 
risk that may arise in financial markets; [4] providing financial services to de-
pository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign official institutions, in-
cluding playing a major role in operating the nation’s payments system. 
Fed. Reserve Bd., FRB:  Mission, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/mission/ 
default.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).  The Federal Reserve does not view consumer 
protection as its core mission.  As one scholar explained, “the Federal Reserve’s . . . 
regulatory role remains focused on safety and soundness and not on other goals of fi-
nancial regulation, such as consumer protection.”  Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role 
of Central Banks in Bank Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK.
J. OF INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003).  Like the Federal Reserve, the OCC’s core mission is 
“[e]nsuring a Safe and Sound National Banking System for All Americans.”  OCC, 
Administrator of National Banks, http://www.occ.gov (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).  The 
OTS’s core mission is “to ensure a safe and sound thrift industry,” and it allocates the 
bulk of its resources to this mission.  See OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, STRATEGIC 
PLAN (2003–2008), at 3 (2003), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/480008.pdf.  Nev-
ertheless, the OTS lists “fair access to financial services and fair treatment of thrift cus-
tomers” among its other strategic goals.  OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OMB FY2006
BUDGET/PERFORMANCE PLAN SUBMISSION 3, 6 (2006), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480030.pdf.  OTS lists among its priorities to 
“[c]onduct safety and soundness examinations of savings associations every 12-18 
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regulators with the banking industry than with banking customers is 
most obvious in cases where the interests of banks and consumers collide. 
A recent example of such conflict was the intervention of the OCC 
in a dispute in California.  The state legislature passed a law requiring 
credit card companies to reveal how long a customer would have to 
make minimum payments on a card before the balance would be paid 
in full and how much interest the customer would pay in the mean-
time.  After the law was enacted, banks sued to enjoin enforcement.  
The OCC intervened—on the part of the banks.  The OCC took the 
position that only the OCC could impose such requirements on the 
banks.294  Because the OCC had not imposed any such obligations on 
the banks, it took the position that “no regulation” was the OCC’s 
regulatory stance—and it warned the states off.  Ultimately, the district 
court backed up the OCC.  The California example is not unique.  
Former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer stated that the OCC 
“is actively engaged in undercutting the role of state regulators in en-
suring that banks fairly serve the needs of all customers.”295
months that also incorporate an assessment of compliance with consumer-protection 
laws and regulations,” and to “address[] unfair or deceptive practices of regulated sav-
ings associations and promote[] fair access to financial services for all Americans and 
fair treatment of customers.”  Id. at 6-7.  As with other banking agencies, consumer 
protection is not the main focus of the FDIC.  The FDIC identifies three major pro-
gram areas:  insurance, supervision, and receivership management.  FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., supra note 288.  Finally, the NCUA enforces existing consumer protection laws 
but focuses on safety and soundness of credit unions.  See NCUA Compliance Self-
Assessment Guide, http://www.ncua.gov/GuidesManuals/ConsumerCompliance/ 
ConsumerCompliance.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (providing guidance for self-
assessment of credit union boards); see also Press Release, Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 
NCUA Emphasizes Consumer Protection at Event on Capitol Hill (Feb. 9, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.ncua.gov/news/press_releases/2007/MA07-0209.htm. 
294 See Brief for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs, Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 
2002) (No. 02-1138) (describing the OCC’s statutory authority and recent case law in-
validating state laws restrictive of national banks).  As the Lockyer court stated, 
courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory 
statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.  
The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking 
laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to 
his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws. 
239 F. Supp. 2d at 1013 (quoting NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 
513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995)). 
295 Eliot Spitzer, Att’y Gen., N.Y. Att’y Gen. Office, Testimony Before the Assembly 
Standing Committee on Banks Regarding the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency’s Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http:// 
householdwatch.com/wp/2004/09/02/testimony-of-eliot-spitzer-regarding-the-occ. 
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More generally, in 2004, the OCC issued regulations preempting 
the application of many state laws, including many consumer protec-
tion laws.296  The OCC, when intervening to prevent state consumer 
protection efforts, invokes the idea of a national banking system and 
the threat of inconsistent state regulations.297  If the OCC were more 
concerned with inconsistent regulations than with protecting banks’ 
interests, it would step in and issue its own consumer protection regu-
lations—applicable across the country.  So far, this has not hap-
pened.298  As Professor Wilmarth noted in his testimony before Con-
296 See supra Part II.A.2.a; see also Bank Activities and Operations;  Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, supra note 288, at 1905-06 (clarifying preemption of state law with 
respect to the OCC); Furletti, supra note 259, at 426 (examining “regulatory conse-
quences of the NBA’s near total preemption of state statutes designed to protect credit 
card consumers” in which the NBA was used by the OCC to effect this broad preemp-
tion); Schooner, supra note 283, at 46 (noting that OCC issued regulations that sought 
to preempt state laws “despite much criticism”). 
297 See, e.g., Bank Activities and Operations: Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 
,69 Fed. Reg. at 1907-08 (asserting the need for preemption because “[m]arkets for 
credit (both consumer and commercial) . . . are now national, if not international, in 
scope,” and “the elimination of legal and other barriers to interstate banking . . . has 
led a number of banking organizations to operate . . . on a multi-state or nationwide 
basis”).  “The agency therefore regards it as imperative that national banks be ‘en-
able[d] . . . to operate to the full extent of their powers under Federal law, without in-
terference from inconsistent state laws, consistent with the national character of the 
national banking system . . . .’”  Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment:  A Ri-
poste to National Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 981, 995-96 (2006) (quoting Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1908); see also Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13, 
1016 (explaining that the OCC “is responsible for administration of the [NBA],” where 
the fundamental purpose of the NBA is to “establish a national banking system free 
from intrusive state regulation,” and also concluding that the “national banks’ author-
ity is not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily preempts contrary state law” (citing 
Barnett Bank of Marion County., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32, 34 (1996)); Fisher, 
supra, at 995-96 (examining the justification for preemption as presented in the OCC’s 
regulations); Schooner, supra note 283, at 46 (“National banks applaud the OCC’s pol-
icy as allowing them the opportunity to operate under a single federal legal standard as 
opposed to varied state standards.”); Letter from Stephen I. Zeisel, Senior Counsel, & 
Ralph J. Rohner, Special Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, to John D. Hawke, Jr., 
Comptroller of the Currency 1 (Oct. 3, 2003) available at http://www.cbanet.org/ 
files/FileDownloads/OCCPreemption.pdf (“[N]ational banks must be able to exercise 
the full range of federally established banking functions, without interference or bur-
den from state regulatory and visitorial regimes.”). 
298 See Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 76-83 (attesting to the failure of 
OCC to protect consumers); Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; 
Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6161, 
6376 (Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34) (stating that national banks 
are subject to OCC regulation); see also Fisher, supra note 297, at 985-86 (“OCC con-
tests the authority of state law enforcement officials to commence litigation to enforce 
compliance with state laws and with those federal laws that Congress has empowered 
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gress, “[s]ince January 1, 1995, the OCC has not issued a public en-
forcement order against any of the eight largest national banks” and 
has only issued thirteen orders against national banks for violating 
consumer lending laws.299  In contrast, “[d]uring 2003 alone, state of-
ficials initiated more than 20,000 investigations . . . [,] took more than 
4,000 enforcement actions in response to consumer complaints about 
abusive lending practices,” and held lenders accountable to the tune 
of $1 billion in penalties and restitution.300
The OCC’s inaction may also be attributable, at least in part, to its 
direct financial stake in keeping its bank clients happy.  Large na-
tional banks fund a significant portion of the OCC’s budget.  Assess-
ments comprise 95% of the OCC’s budget, with the twenty largest na-
tional banks covering nearly three-fifths of these assessments.  The 
state officials to enforce, even where OCC itself has declined to act.”).  Furthermore, 
Fisher notes that 
[t]he only actual regulatory prohibitions that OCC has promulgated are 
against making real estate loans “based predominantly on the bank’s realiza-
tion of the foreclosure or liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral, with-
out regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan according to its terms” 
(that is, prohibiting equity stripping), and against engaging in “unfair or de-
ceptive trade practices within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act” and the implementing regulations of the FTC.  The latter is 
rather a hollow gesture given that, as OCC freely admits, it took OCC and the 
other federal banking agencies “more than twenty-five years to reach consen-
sus on their authority to enforce the FTC Act.” 
Id. at 992-93 (footnotes omitted). 
299 Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 77-78.  Two of these orders probably 
resulted only due to indirect pressures exerted by other federal agencies.  Id.
300 Id. at 79.  These actions have attempted to stop “a wide variety of abusive prac-
tices . . . such as predatory lending, privacy violations, telemarketing scams, biased in-
vestment analysis, and manipulative initial public offerings.”  Id. at 78.  In many of 
these cases, the OCC filed amicus briefs in support of the banks arguing for the preemp-
tion of states’ consumer protection laws.  Id.  Other commentators confirm this as well: 
In response to a 2005 Freedom of Information Act request, the OCC reported 
that its “customer assistance group” employed a grand total of three people 
whose job primarily involved investigating and resolving consumer com-
plaints.  By comparison, according to a fact sheet from the House Financial 
Services Committee, state banking agencies and [attorneys general’s] offices 
employ nearly 700 full-time examiners and attorneys who make sure that con-
sumer laws are enforced.  In 2003 alone, state bank agencies brought 4,035 
consumer enforcement actions.  Since 2000, the OCC has brought just 11 
consumer enforcement actions.  The biggest two involved cases that were ini-
tiated and investigated by state attorneys general and that the OCC initially 
tried to prevent from going forward. 
Stephanie Mencimer, No Account:  The Nefarious Bureaucrat Who’s Helping Banks Rip You 
Off, NEW REPUBLIC, August 27, 2007, at 14, 14-15. 
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OCC’s ability to attract large banks to the national banking system re-
sults in a significant financial gain.  During 2004–2005, the charter 
conversions of three large, national banks—JP Morgan Chase, HSBC, 
and Bank of Montreal—resulted in the transfer of $1 trillion of bank-
ing assets into the OCC’s jurisdiction.  This transfer alone raised 
OCC’s assessment revenues by 15%.301  Moreover, the greater the sta-
bility of OCC institutions, the more influence the agency has.  By at-
tracting more financial-services companies to incorporate as federally 
chartered banks under the supervision of the OCC, the agency can 
expand its influence.  Accordingly, the OCC would be reluctant to 
impose substantial constraints on banks, fearing that such constraints 
might induce the banks to switch to a competing regulator. 
The lack of interest and incentives to address consumer protec-
tion issues is not limited to the OCC.  Recently, the Federal Reserve 
has come under congressional scrutiny for failing to exercise its rule-
making authority to protect consumers.302  In response to well-
publicized pressure from Congress,303 the Federal Reserve and the 
OCC have begun to address some of the consumer protection prob-
lems associated with consumer credit products, specifically credit 
cards304 and subprime mortgage loans.305  But the agencies’ long his-
tory of inaction in the consumer credit markets suggests that the 
301 See Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 259, at 17. 
302 Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 37-38 (2007) (statement of Rep. Frank) [here-
inafter Frank Statement] (“[I]f the Fed doesn’t start to use that authority to roll out 
the rules, then we will give it to somebody who will use it.”). 
303 See John Poirier, Lawmaker Tells Fed to Step Up Consumer Protection, REUTERS, June 
13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN1339842620070613 
(quoting Frank Statement, supra note 302). 
304 See supra note 132 (discussing potential changes by the FRB); see also Consumer 
Protection Hearing, supra note 49, at 15-16 (advocating to Congress that current credit 
card disclosure rules should be changed to improve consumers’ ability to make well-
informed decisions).  In response, the FRB and the OCC are revising the disclosure 
regulations under TILA.  See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 51 (“The 
[proposed] provisions . . . follow the Board’s 2007 proposal to improve the credit card 
disclosures under [TILA].”). 
305 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (providing new protections for high-price mortgages secured 
by a consumer’s dwelling).  The Fed and the other banking agencies became aware of 
questionable lending practices in the subprime mortgage market in 2004.  Yet they 
took no action until September 2006 and even then issued only a “guidance” that ad-
dressed only exotic mortgage products (e.g., Option ARMs) to the exclusion of most 
subprime loans.  A broader “guidance” was issued only in June 2007.  And binding 
rules were not proposed until January 2008.  See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and 
Regulators Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1. 
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agencies lack the interest or willingness to dedicate the resources 
needed to create effective consumer protection. 
ii.  The FTC:  Motivation Without Authority 
Consumer credit products are also regulated by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).  While consumer protection is generally of sec-
ondary importance to banking agencies, one of the central missions of 
the FTC is consumer protection.306  But the FTC’s consumer protec-
tion activities span many different categories of consumer products, 
leaving only limited resources for consumer credit products.307  More 
importantly, the FTC lacks authority over banks and other depository 
institutions, and thus cannot effectively regulate consumer credit 
products.  The FTC Act specifically excludes banks from FTC supervi-
sion.308  Even the hallmark FTC mandate—to prevent unfair and de-
ceptive acts and practices309—cannot be enforced by the FTC when 
the actors are financial institutions.310  Instead, if the FTC found that a 
bank engaged in unfair or deceptive acts, it would have to turn to the 
banking agencies to deal with the problem.  Moreover, the FTC Im-
provement Act of 1975 gave the Federal Reserve—not the FTC—the 
authority to define what constitutes unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices by a financial institution.311
This is not to say that the FTC has no authority over consumer 
credit products.  The FTC assures compliance by nondepository enti-
ties with a variety of statutory provisions under TILA312 and other 
306 See FTC—About Us, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2008) (summarizing the mission of the FTC to both protect consumers and promote 
fair competition). 
307 See FTC, Legal Resources—Statutes Relating to Consumer Protection Mission, 
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (describing the many dif-
ferent statutes the FTC implements); FTC, Commission Actions for December 2007, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/index.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (describing 
how during a single month in 2007, the FTC was involved in actions pertaining to 
rental car issuers, marketers of medical bracelets, and the Multiple Listing Service for 
selling homes). 
308 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). 
309 Id. § 45. 
310 Williams & Bylsma, supra note 289, at 1244-45.  The FTC does have authority 
over nonbank lenders, however.  For example, many mortgage companies fall into this 
category. 
311 Id. at 1244. 
312 “These provisions include mandatory disclosures concerning all finance 
charges and related aspects of credit transactions, requirements for advertisers of 
credit terms, and a required three-day right of rescission in certain transactions involv-
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credit laws.313  The FTC also regulates mandatory disclosures by non-
federally insured depository institutions, under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.314  In addition, the 
FTC performs some other credit-related functions:  it combats identity 
theft, which is often related to consumer credit products;315 it enforces 
statutory limits on debt collection practices;316 it exercises some over-
sight over “credit repair” services, prohibiting untrue or misleading 
ing the establishment of a security interest in the consumer’s residence.”  FTC, supra
note 307; see also Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1613, 1631–1649, 1661–
1667f (2006).  The description of this law, as well as the descriptions of other laws in 
the text and notes below, are taken from FTC, supra note 307. 
313 See Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666–1666j (2006) (requiring prompt 
written acknowledgment of consumer billing complaints and investigation of billing 
errors by creditors, prohibiting creditors from taking actions that adversely affect the 
consumer’s credit standing until an investigation is completed, and requiring that 
creditors promptly post payments to the consumer’s account and either refund over-
payments or credit them to the consumer’s account); §§ 1637a, 1647, 1665b (imple-
menting provisions of the Home Equity Loan Consumer Protection Act of 1988 by re-
quiring creditors to provide certain disclosures for open-end credit plans secured by 
the consumer’s dwelling and imposing substantive limitations on such plans); Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (establishing disclosure re-
quirements and prohibiting equity stripping and other abusive practices in connection 
with high-cost mortgages); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.) (requiring certain creditors to disclose on the front of 
billing statements a minimum monthly payment warning for consumers and a toll-free 
telephone number, established and maintained by the Commission, for consumers 
seeking information on the time required to repay specific credit balances); Fair 
Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (requiring credit and charge card 
issuers to provide certain disclosures in direct mail, telephone, and other applications 
and solicitations to open-end credit and charge accounts and under other circum-
stances); Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f (regulating personal prop-
erty leases that exceed 4 months in duration and that are made to consumers for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes, imposing limitations on the size of penalties for 
delinquency or default and on the size of residual liabilities, and requiring certain dis-
closures in lease advertising).  The preceding descriptions of acts are quoted from 
FTC, supra note 307. 
314 12 U.S.C. § 1831t (2006) (charging the FTC with enforcement of audit and dis-
closure requirements for depository institutions lacking federal deposit insurance). 
315 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 
Stat. 1952 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 20 U.S.C.) (amending 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act) (giving consumers access to credit information in addi-
tion to providing for mitigaion of the likelihood and harm of identity theft); Identity 
Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)) (establishing the FTC as the agency 
responsible for identity-theft claims). 
316 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006). 
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representations and requiring certain affirmative disclosures;317 it pro-
tects consumers’ privacy rights against financial institutions and credit 
bureaus that collect consumer information by ensuring the accuracy 
of the collected information;318 and it enforces antidiscrimination laws 
in the consumer credit context.319  Beyond the implementation and 
enforcement of these specific statutes, the FTC enjoys general author-
ity to prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices and, in particular, 
to prevent unfair advertising practices—but not in depository institu-
tions.320  In other words, credit cards and mortgages issued by banks 
or thrifts are exempt from the reach of the FTC.321
This litany of agencies, limits on rulemaking authority, and di-
vided enforcement powers results in inaction.  No single agency is 
charged with supervision over any single credit product that is sold to 
the public.  No single agency is charged with the task of developing 
expertise or is given the resources to devote to enforcement of con-
sumer protection.  No single agency has an institutional history of 
protecting consumers and assuring the safety of products sold to 
them.322
317 See Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679–1679j (2006) (prohibit-
ing deceptive and abusive tactics for the collection of debts incurred from personal, 
family, or household expenditures). 
318 See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 6801–6809, 6821–6827 (2006)) (requiring financial institutions to have privacy poli-
cies in place to protect data integrity); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–
1681(u) (2006) (setting requirements for creditors providing information to credit 
reporting agencies to ensure accuracy); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 
2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006) (amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act) (pro-
viding free annual credit reports for consumers from three major credit reporting 
agencies).
319 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2006). 
320 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 57a(f) (2006). 
321 See Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, FTC, to Jennifer L. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., at 1 (Sep. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/November/20061121/OP-1253/OP-1253_
53_1.pdf (describing the authority of the FTC and noting the FTC’s “wide-ranging re-
sponsibilities regarding consumer financial issues for most nonbank segments of the 
economy”).
322 As Henry Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury, remarked, 
our complex and fragmented regulatory system complicates an already diffi-
cult situation.  Existing federal laws address mortgage fraud, disclosures, fair 
lending, unfair and deceptive practices, and other aspects of the mortgage 
process.  But the regulatory and enforcement authority varies across different 
federal agencies.  States have also enacted an additional layer of regulation, 
typically applied only to certain institutions that operate within that state and 
enforced by the state agencies. 
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B.  A New Proposal 
Learning from the strengths and, more importantly, from the 
shortcomings of current solutions, it is possible to sketch the outlines 
of a more effective regulatory response to the identified failures in 
consumer credit markets.  We propose the creation of a single federal 
regulator—a new Financial Product Safety Commission or a new con-
sumer credit division within an existing agency (most likely the FRB or 
FTC)—that will be put in charge of consumer credit products.  Our 
proposed regulatory framework has three critical elements:  (1) ex 
ante regulation, rather than ex post judicial scrutiny; (2) regulation by 
an administrative agency with a broad mandate, rather than by spe-
cifically targeted piecemeal legislation; and (3) entrusting the author-
ity over consumer credit products to a single, highly motivated federal 
regulator, such that the same regulation applies to all similar prod-
ucts, regardless of the identity of the lender.323
First, the proposed solution adopts an ex ante approach.  The 
regulation of consumer credit markets is not amenable to ex post ju-
dicial review.  While extreme practices may be policed using the un-
conscionability doctrine or other common law doctrines, these tools 
are too blunt to provide a comprehensive regulatory response to un-
safe consumer credit products.  The proposed regulator will develop 
expertise that will enable it to promulgate nuanced regulations that 
account for product innovation.324
 This patchwork structure should be streamlined and modernized. 
Henry M. Paulsen, Jr., Sec’y, U.S. Treasury, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law 
Center on Current Housing and Mortgage Market Developments (Oct. 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp612.htm. 
323 A different approach would reverse the preemption trend and restore state au-
thority over consumer credit products.  This approach would also have to reverse the 
exportation doctrine in order to avoid a race to the bottom.  But empowering the 
states would come at a cost.  First, not all states will be equally motivated to regulate 
consumer credit products (perhaps due to regulatory capture in certain states).  Sec-
ond, not all states will be equally effective in regulating consumer credit products—
e.g., resources, at least in some states, will be significantly more modest than federal 
resources.  Finally, state-level regulation will potentially expose national lenders to fifty 
different regulatory regimes.  For these reasons, we believe that an optimally designed 
regulatory framework at the federal level is superior to state-level regulation.  We rec-
ognize, however, that a comprehensive comparison between the federal- and state-level 
solutions is much more complicated, and we defer such a comparison for future re-
search.
324 These regulations can be enforced either via ex ante inspection or via ex post 
litigation.  Our main point is that common law courts should not be setting the stan-
dards ex post as a by-product of specific case resolution. 
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Second, we propose that the ex ante regulations be promulgated 
and enforced by an administrative agency with broad rulemaking and 
enforcement authority over consumer credit products.  Legislation 
targeted to specific practices, with narrowly defined authority dele-
gated to administrative agencies, is incapable of effectively responding 
to the high rate of innovation in consumer credit markets and the 
subtle ways in which creditors can exploit consumer misunderstand-
ing.  An administrative agency with a broad mandate could develop 
more institutional expertise and quicker responses to new products 
and practices.325
Third, we propose to regulate consumer financial products, much 
in the same way that manufactured products—meat, agricultural 
products, drugs, cosmetics, and a host of other physical products—are 
regulated:  regulation follows the product, not the manufacturer.  Re-
gardless of who issues the product, a single federal regulator will over-
see the design and dissemination of the product.  This approach will 
eliminate regulatory gaps and contradictions, and it will halt the state 
and federal regulatory competition that undercuts consumer safety.  
In this respect our proposal has much in common with the Conduct 
of Business Regulatory Agency (CBRA) envisioned in Secretary Paul-
son’s “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.”326
Paulson proposes the establishment of a single federal regulator that 
will “be responsible for business conduct regulation across all types of 
financial firms.”327
325 A possible concern about concentrating authority in a single regulator is that it 
could exacerbate the problem of political capture.  It is not clear that diffuse authority 
is less prone to regulatory capture than concentrated authority.  For example, con-
sumer groups find it difficult to oppose well-funded banking interests at multiple state 
legislatures, and they may be better able to serve as an effective counterweight at a sin-
gle federal regulator.  In any event, minimizing the risk of capture is a main regulatory-
design challenge in implementing our proposal. 
326 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 170-74 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (proposing a single “business conduct regulator” 
to protect customers of financial institutions). 
327 Id. at 171.  More fully, Paulson suggests that 
a new business conduct regulator, CBRA, should be created.  CBRA should be 
responsible for business conduct regulation across all types of financial firms.  As 
described above, business conduct regulation in the optimal framework in-
cludes the regulation of key aspects of consumer protection such as disclo-
sures, business practices, and chartering and licensing.  CBRA should be re-
sponsible for implementing uniform national business conduct standards in 
these areas. 
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We recognize that concentrated, broad authority in itself will not 
guarantee adequate protection for consumers.  To be effective, au-
thority must be coupled with motivation to exercise that authority.  An 
agency that views its core mission as ensuring the safety and soundness 
of banks might not dedicate sufficient resources to consumer protec-
tion even if it has complete authority to regulate the safety of con-
sumer credit products.  In implementing our proposal, a central chal-
lenge will be the design of enabling legislation that provides this 
crucial combination of authority and motivation.328
CONCLUSION
The market for consumer credit is not operating efficiently.  Evi-
dence abounds that consumers are sold credit products that are de-
signed to obscure their risks and to exploit consumer misunderstand-
ing.  Ordinary market mechanisms, such as competition and expert 
advisers, cannot fully correct these deficiencies.  Without regulatory 
intervention, market distortions and inefficiencies will continue to 
grow, imposing substantial costs on American families and on the 
economy. 
Minimum product safety standards are carefully regulated for 
nearly all physical products.  Such standards are, however, noticeably 
absent in the regulations of credit products.  Ex post regulation by 
litigation is a weak tool, and the contradictory patchwork of state and 
federal ex ante regulations has proven itself ineffective to protect con-
sumers.  The flaws in the current system are not simply the shortcom-
ings of particular legislators or regulators.  Instead, the entire frame-
work of credit product regulation is deeply flawed. 
The failure of current attempts at regulation of credit-product 
safety prompts us to propose the creation of a new federal regulator—
a Financial Product Safety Commission or a new consumer credit divi-
Id. (emphasis added).  The Paulson proposal to consolidate authority in CBRA is moti-
vated by the shortcomings of the current regulatory structure—shortcomings that are 
similar to those described earlier in Part II.A.  Id. at 172 (“The current multi-agency 
business conduct oversight structure creates uneven enforcement, potential enforce-
ment gaps, disputes over jurisdiction, and regulatory inconsistency.”). 
328 Congressman Frank has raised the possibility of entrusting the FTC with au-
thority over consumer credit products.  See Frank Statement, supra note 302.  Similarly, 
the Center for Responsible Lending, noting the FRB’s failure to exercise its authority 
under HOEPA, proposed that Congress give parallel authority to the FTC.  See Preserv-
ing the American Dream:  Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures:  Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Development, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony 
of Mark Eakes, CEO, Ctr. for Responsible Lending & Ctr. for Self-Help). 
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sion within an existing agency (the FRB or FTC).  We do not lay out 
every aspect of such a regulatory body—indeed, we invite those more 
deeply schooled in administrative law and other disciplines to help fill 
in the picture of how such a regulator can be optimally structured.  
We can, however, identify three features that will enable this regulator 
to make markets function better for consumers:  reliance on ex ante 
regulation rather than ex post litigation, rulemaking located with a 
regulatory agency rather than a legislature, and regulation based on 
the product sold rather than the identity of the seller.  These three 
features would go a long distance toward restoring a functioning mar-
ket for credit that is based on wealth-enhancing transactions for both 
consumer and seller. 
